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Synopsis		
	This	PhD	claims	that	art	and	cultural	production,	more	broadly,	are	irrevocably	changed	now	that	the	logic	of	the	derivative	is	seeded	in	and	transmitted	by	culture’s	objects.	The	thesis	and	the	artworks	that	form	this	PhD	submission	employ	examples	of	cinema	from	the	early	1970s	onwards	to	affectively	map	how	the	spectral,	but	impactful,	reign	of	the	derivative	has	taken	hold,	and	how	its	violent	rearranging	of	time	and	space	is	dramatically	different	from	the	commodity	form’s	sedimenting	of	the	same	forces.	I	examine	how	the	modern	derivative’s	ability	to	bundle	and	unbundle	the	component	qualities	of	a	commodity,	and	then	mine	the	information	arising	from	those	actions,	performs	a	spectral,	politically	romantic,	but	absolute	power.	I	consider	how	the	function	of	probability	for	both	derivatives	and	information	engineering	has	amplified	the	ideological	effects	of	the	derivative	and	afforded	it	the	qualities	of	a	mythic	law.	Cinema	is	employed	throughout	as	a	form	of	divination	that	locates	instances	where	the	ideological	info-power	of	the	derivative	clashes	most	visibly	and	productively	with	the	chaotic	and	material	properties	of	information.	I	suggest	that	it	is	in	these	shuddering	bodies	and	markers	of	underlying	dispositions	of	power	that	the	refracted,	immense	power	and	mythic	law	of	the	derivative	can	be	represented	and	annulled.		
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Introduction		
	
		
Fig.	1	The	Taking	of	Power	by	Louis	XIV	(Rossellini,	1966).	Rossellini	forensically	describes	the	apparatus	of	the	court	of	Versailles	and	the	refracted	power	of	the	Sun	King.									
																					
	Fig.	2	The	Black-Scholes	Merton	pricing	formula	for	call	options	(derivatives).	Probability	and	the	derivative	assume	a	sovereign	power.	
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	 “	'[Après	moi,	le	deluge]	After	me,	the	deluge,'	declared	King	Louis	XV,	at	what	was	almost	but	not	quite	the	high	water	mark	of	Absolutism.	These	days	one	might	say,	after	capitalism,	the	derivative”	(Wark,	2017).		This	thesis	stems	from	my	time	as	Lead	Artist	and	curator	for	a	post-war	British	New	Town.	My	brief	was	to	advise	on	the	revision	of	the	master	plan	for	a	town	that	had	been	envisioned	as	both	an	artwork	and	with	artworks	in	it	that	were	an	expression	of	post-war	reconstruction	and	statecraft.	These	mainly	sculptural,	discrete	objects	anticipated	discrete	subjects	as	their	intimate	partners	in	the	project.	In	addition,	I	curated	and	made	a	series	of	works	for	the	town	under	the	title	appropriated	from	the	1948	prayer	of	dedication	for	the	town:	Let	Us	Pray	
for	Those	Now	Residing	in	the	Designated	Area.	Harlow	was	master	planned	by	the	architect	Sir	Frederick	Gibberd	in	1947	as	an	entirely	new	town	designed	to	take	the	population	overflow	from	a	devastated	post-war	London.	From	the	outset,	works	by	Hepworth,	Moore	and	Chadwick	played	a	role	in	the	design	of	the	town’s	civic	spaces,	providing	objects	that	performed	an	explicit	and	highly	visible	statecraft.	In	addition	to	acting	as	a	material	contract	between	the	state	and	its	citizens,	the	works	made	the	power	and	ideology	of	the	state	represented,	spatially	determined	and	concrete.			A	critical	revisiting	of	the	town’s	singular	vision	threw	into	relief	these	and	emerging	forms	of	embodiment,	signification	and	power	but	also	how	informatics	conducts	power.	The	town	was	symptomatic	of	post-war	acts	of	statecraft	across	Britain	but,	because	of	its	focus	on	art	and,	in	particular,	sculpture,	its	statecraft	was	more	tangible	but	also	more	visibly	effected	by	the	changes	brought	by	that	which	has	come	after	capitalism:	the	derivative.	The	ability	of	the	derivative	to	limitlessly	unbundle	the	component	flows	of	a	commodity	and	then	abstract	and	sell	the	information	concerning	those	flows,	represents	a	radical	shift	from	commodity	form	capitalism.	This	economic	and	informatic	(Haraway)	revolution	has	irretrievably	undermined	the	unitary	nature	of	these	objects	but	also	contemporary	art	and	cultural	production	more	broadly.1	As	a	consequence,	the	nature	of	the	contract	between	subject	and	state	
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has	become	diffuse	but	powerful,	always	renegotiable	but	seemingly	final;	ungraspable	but	material	in	its	effects.			Since	the	early	‘70s,	the	commodity	form	has	been	transformed	by	the	logic	of	derivatives	that	unbundles	stores	of	value,	violently	altering	notions	of	embodiment,	time	and	space	in	the	process.	Paradoxically,	this	unbundling	has	simultaneously	installed	bodies	and	objects	as	‘stories’	that	obscure	the	ideological	apparatus	and	extrastatecraft	of	finance	capital.	As	a	result	of	this	polarising	experience,	the	challenge	arose	as	to	how	to	recuperate	a	critical	agency	for	these	artworks	and	the	town’s	master	plan	according	to	this	changed	paradigm.	How	was	this	possible	when,	in	the	age	of	the	derivative,	the	component	flows	of	the	commodity	and	of	the	subject	have	been	scattered	and	made	diffuse?	How	could	art	and	culture	both	represent	the	spectral	power	of	derivatives	and	torsion	its	capacities	for	altering	time	and	space	in	order	to	exit	the	temporal	impasse	and	spectral	sovereign	power	it	installed	in	the	present?			My	role	entailed	being	embedded	in	the	planning	and	economics	of	regeneration,	which	were	themselves	embedded	in	the	logic	of	finance	capital.	Value	and	agency	no	longer	lay	sedimented	in	the	town’s	artworks.	Instead,	they	were	being	mobilised	by	finance’s	ability	to	subdivide	and	trade	all	the	attributes	of	an	object	or	site.	In	the	reign	of	the	derivative,	value	is	created	in	motion	and	the	attributes	of	the	commodity	are	unbundled	as	processes	of	affect	and	abstraction.	Whilst	this	process	of	unbundling	was	experienced	as	an	ungraspable	ideology,	it	nevertheless	impacted	materially.	Public	space	was	annexed	to	private	concerns;	housing	became	an	arbitrary	concession	to	commercial	interests;	and	so	on.			My	attempts	to	understand	both	the	original	vision	of	the	town	and	the	then	pre-crash	economics	of	the	town’s	regeneration	led	me	to	believe	that	art’s	objects	and	practices	were	inadequate.	Inadequate	in	terms	of	challenging,	representing	or	even	understanding	the	ontology	of	finance	and	power	that	produced	the	social	relations,	architecture	and	statecraft	of	our	present.	The	subjectivities,	notion	of	site	and	critical	agency	that	were	invoked	by	the	public,	artists,	commissioning	bodies,	arms	of	government	and	the	private	sector	were	
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inadequate	but	vital	‘stories’	that	obscured	the	peculiar	refracted	materialities	of	contemporary	finance	capital.	The	commodity	form	and	the	unitary	subject	were	no	longer	sufficient	metaphors	for	describing	the	capitalism	at	play	and	art	appeared	redundant	as	a	critical	tool	in	the	face	of	this	dilemma.			During	this	period,	ideas	of	referencing	cinema	to	map	the	operation,	effects	and	logic	of	derivatives	emerged	as	a	possible	way	forward.	The	bodies	and	objects	of	cinema	appeared	to	chart	more	readily	the	derivatives’	unspooling	of	commodities	and	the	forms	of	embodiment	that	result	from	this	transformation	of	the	commodity.	Cinema	creates	value	and	a	sense	of	agency	out	of	its	capacity	for	motion.	A	capacity	that	mirrors,	detects	and	transmits	the	derivative’s	logic	of	restless	motion	and	endless	liquidity.	In	addition,	cinema’s	bodies	point	towards	the	liberal	human	subject	as	both	ideological	excess	and	as	an	ideological	function	of	derivatives.	That	cinema	could	also	show	us	how	ideology	did	this	thinking,	was	doubly	important.	Finally,	and	most	fundamentally,	cinema’s	conversion	of	bodies	into	visual	information	allegorises	the	sovereign	power	afforded	to	information	in	finance	capital	and	the	way	that	this	info-power	creates	a	permanent	‘state	of	exception’	(Schmitt).	Because	cinema	possesses	within	its	form	a	time	consciousness,	it	appears	best	able	to	detect	derivative’s	unbundling	of	the	attributes	of	bodies	and	objects,	violently	rending	open	those	bodies	and	objects	as	it	alters	space	and	time.	According	to	this	emerging	method,	objects	and	bodies	could	be	understood	not	as	unitary	objects	but	as	nodes	or	points	of	convergence	within	a	matrix	of	technologies	and	power.			The	thesis	employs	Anglo-American	cinema	from	a	cusp	moment	of	the	late	‘60s	and	early	‘70s	as	a	means	of	understanding	an	ensuing	crisis	of	embodiment.	I	test	my	claim	that	cinema	best	forecasts	and	transmits	the	advent	and	logic	of	derivatives	as	a	development	so	seismic	that,	one	could	say,	it	is	the	deluge	that	comes	after	capital	(Wark).	In	addition,	cinema	is	the	medium	most	able	to	affectively	map	the	ideological	materialism	and	polity	of	the	derivative	because	it,	of	all	the	arts,	is	most	embedded	in	the	economics	of	its	time.	Whilst	this	thesis	doesn’t	attempt	to	arrive	at	a	solution	for	the	project	from	which	the	question	arose,	it	does	attempt	to	chart	the	spectral	sovereign	power	of	finance	capital	
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which	was	felt	so	forcefully	but	remained	ungraspable	at	this	time	and	ask	what	is	at	stake	for	art	in	the	light	of	this	ontology.	The	thesis	explores	the	paradox	of	the	derivative’s	capacity	for	deterritorialization	alongside	the	bracketed	nature	of	the	agency	that	it	proffers.	In	doing	so,	it	seeks	to	locate	the	vein	of	alternative	sovereign	power	that	occurs	within	the	vectors	of	information	that	derivatives	mine.	As	I	map	this	shift	in	the	‘70s	from	economies	of	real	abstraction	into	economies	of	weightless	and	dynamic	information,	I	explore	how	information	technology	amplifies	the	ideological	capacities	of	those	flows	of	information	and	of	the	derivative.	The	function	of	pattern	and	randomness	in	information	is	explored	and	how	the	application	of	probability	to	these	functions	amplifies	derivative’s	false	claims	for	agency	and	freedom.		—	The	written	aspect	of	this	thesis	explores	the	claim	made	in	the	overall	research	that	the	spectral	power	and	logic	of	financial	derivatives	has	been	seeded	in	contemporary	art.	But	also	that	certain	cultural	objects	intuit	and	affectively	map	the	sometimes	opaque	and	complex	forms	of	distributed	cognition	that	derivatives	perform.	The	writing	seeks	to	do	something	of	the	same	and	aggregates	materials	that	are	now	becoming	audio-visual	and	sculptural	evocations	of	the	overall	research.	As	a	consequence	the	writing	is	not	intended	primarily	for	publication	but	as	a	process	of	disambiguation	or	making	explicit	that,	which	would	normally	remain	implicit	in	the	artworks,	and	as	a	means	of	becoming	immersed	in	and	dirtied	by	these	materials	and	their	affective	qualities.	This	includes	the	examples	of	intense,	affective	cinema	that	I	suggest	divine	the	advent	of	a	transition	from	the	economic	ontology	of	the	commodity	form	to	that	of	the	derivative.	But	also,	and	as	intensely	the	examples	of	theory	that	work	on	the	reader	in	compellingly	imagistic	ways.	By	imagistic	I	mean	language	that	is	strongly	driven	by	images	and	which	also	seeks	to	speculate	with	and	project	those	images	to	the	reader.		The	key	exemplar	of	this	in	the	text	is	Carl	Schmitt’s	work,	whose	political	philosophy	and	writing	on	legal	and	constitutional	matters	is	considered	by	some	academics	as	unusually	imagistic	and	affective	as	opposed	to	aridly	technical	legal	theory.	This	approach	then	extends	to	my	citing	Walter	Benjamin	and	his	use	of	imagistic	language	following	his	own	attraction	to	Schmitt’s	work	on	sovereign	power,	decisionism	and	time.		
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	The	text	is	considered	by	myself	to	be	a	sub-temporal	space	where	I	can	convey	how	technologies	of	power,	images	of	power	and	conceptions	of	information	act	in	feedback	and	feed-forward	circuits	to	enhance	the	ideological	effects	of	each.	So	what	we	encounter	in	the	text	is	an	object	in	which	each	of	these	disciplines,	film-making	(Roeg	&	Cammel),	political	philosophy	(Schmitt),	urbanism	(Easterling),	informatics	(Hayles),	derivatives	and	the	market	(Ayache)	and	cultural	criticism	(Benjamin)	are	understood	as	attempting	to	intuit	complex	forms	of	dispersed	thinking	and	power	via	certain	fleeting	but	historically	persistent	images.	Put	in	blunt	terms,	the	text	‘thinks’	the	‘thinking’	in	each	field	by	juxtaposing	each	and	foregrounding	the	images	and	informatic	realities	that	haunt	the	‘thinking’	of	each.	The	question	of	how	culture	and	its	objects	‘think’	is	dealt	with	in	detail	in	Chapter	Two:	How	Cinema	Thinks	the	Derivative	and	then	again	in	the	conclusion	where	I	talk	about	a	project	being	developed	with	Katherine	Hayles	that	focuses	on	her	recent	book	and	work	Unthought:	The	
Power	of	the	Cognitive	Nonconcious	(2017,	Hayles).			The	text	goes	on	to	engage	with	these	images	and	seeks	their	antecedents,	before	asking	how	their	logic	haunts	the	present.	The	dispersed	cognition	and	info-power	of	the	derivative	is,	I	suggest	dogged	by	both	questions	of	embodiment	and	decisionism	that	stem	from	these	antecedents.	In	turn	these	questions	are	pursued	by	a	concept	of	agency	imagined	as	embodied,	wilful	and	sometimes	violent.	Chapter	One	considers	how	these	compelling	and	highly	kinetic	imagistic	notions	go	on	to	become	the	romantic	ground	for	finance,	politics	and	cultural	production	that	then	paradoxically	become	activities	stuck	and	contained	by	these	images	and	imaginings	of	freedom	and	agency.	However,	regardless	of	the	kinetic	but	bracketed	nature	of	these	imaginings	they	are	ideologically	confabulated	by	conceptions	of	information	as	portable	and	able	to	scythe	through	complexities.	As	a	consequence	these	imaginings	of	agency	obscure	the	material	realities	of	informatics	and	the	less	embodied	agency	that	they	perform.	It’s	these	paradoxes	and	the	feint	narrative	of	this	less	embodied	and	less	human-centric	form	of	agency	at	work	in	the	dynamics	of	information	that	the	text	attempts	to	amplify	in	implicit	and	explicit	ways.		
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 12	
	These	sets	of	powerful	contradictions	that	motion	towards	a	current	crisis	for	contemporary	art’s	objects	and	their	critical	agency	are	affectively	mapped	by	the	writing.	On	the	one	hand	examples	of	cinema	from	the	early	70’s	which	I	argue	discern,	through	their	intensity	the	emergence	of	complex	and	seemingly	murky	forms	of	informatic	and	financialised	extra-law	are	set	alongside	the	affectively	written	political	philosophy	of	Carl	Schmitt	and	his	work	on	sovereign	power,	decisionism	and	political	romanticism.	The	examples	of	cinema	I	use	and	Schmitt’s	political	philosophy	deliberate	over	the	question	of	embodiment	that	plague	notions	of	agency	in	finance,	informatics	and	then	also	cultural	production	but	are	affective	in	that	they	are	productive	of	subjectivities	and	things.	The	text	reaches	further	back	in	time	for	affective	images	that	precede	and	inform	Schmitt’s	conception	of	sovereign	metaphysical	power	and	finds	an	exemplar	in	Hobbes’	Leviathan	as	an	image,	an	embodiment,	a	social	contract,	a	power	and	form	of	time	that	both	haunts	the	present	and	helps	to	constitute	it.	These	images	of	agency	and	will	and	the	formal	stranglehold	they	induce	are	further	amplified	by	a	perception	of	information	that	stands	at	odds	with	its	material	processes.	And	it’s	in	the	entanglement	of	a	conception	of	information	and	its	material	processes	that	the	writing	seeks	to	immerse	and	dirty	itself	in	order	to	understand	and	convey	the	power	informatics	does.			As	I	have	stated	earlier	in	this	section	the	writing	juxtaposes	examples	of	affective	cinema	from	a	cusp	moment	in	economics,	alongside	the	affective	writings	of	Schmitt	in	a	sub	temporal	manner	so	that	I	can	convey	how	technologies	and	images	of	power	as	well	as	conceptions	of	information	act	in	feedback	and	feed-forward	circuits	to	enhance	the	ideological	effects	of	each.	This	form	of	sub-temporal	space	and	model	for	thinking	the	extra-law	of	informatics	first	emerged	for	the	research	during	my	time	as	Lead	Artist	for	Harlow	New	Town	and	signals	the	shift	in	the	focus	of	my	research	from	art	and	urbanism	to	informatics.			The	discovery	during	my	time	as	Lead	Artist	that	the	film	A	Clockwork	Orange	(1971)	had	been	partly	filmed	in	Harlow	Town	led	to	my	securing	the	agreement	
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of	the	Kubrick	Estate	for	us	to	screen	A	Clockwork	Orange	(1971)	at	Harlow’s	theatre,	The	Playhouse.	This	was	accompanied	by	an	event	where	I	convened	residents	who	had	been	involved	in	and	had	documentation	of	the	filming	that	took	place	in	Harlow.	I	had	also	secured	beautiful	location-scouting	photographs	of	Harlow	and	its	architecture	from	the	Stanley	Kubrick	Archives	in	London.		The	film’s	collaging	and	play	with	affect	and	resident’s	immersion	in	the	ways	the	film	speculated	with	the	town’s	architecture-as-ideology	and	as	affective	information	signalled	a	number	of	important	things	that	this	text	then	goes	onto	unpack.	Firstly	the	film	provided	an	immersive	means	for	residents	and	artists	alike	to	feel	and	play	with	the	centralised	and	embodied	forms	of	power	that	the	town’s	master	planner	Gibberd	had	collaged	in	order	to	make	real	his	plan.	The	residents	and	I	identified	with	the	film’s	central	protagonist	(Alex)	and	his	collaging	of	affective	cultural	signifiers	seeing	this	process	as	having	a	subversively	critical	parallel	with	the	collaging	of	affective	architectures	by	the	town’s	master	planner.	Secondly	the	residents	and	myself	were	able	to	sense	in	the	film’s	thinking	an	ontological	shift	away	from	the	embodied	forms	of	power	that	Gibberd	envisaged	towards	more	diffuse	economic	and	informational	assemblages	of	power	which	persist	into	the	present.	The	sometimes	violent	spatio-temporal	torsioning	of	the	film	and	it’s	architectures,	bodies	and	untethered	use	of	cultural	references	suggested	that	each	of	these	elements	were	becoming	affective	information	that	one	had	to	feel	and	be	dirtied	by	in	order	to	map.			As	a	consequence	it	became	clear	to	me	through	the	film	and	the	interactions	with	it	by	residents,	who	had	seen	their	environment	converted	into	cinematic	information	by	Kubrick,	that	questions	of	art	and	urbanism	could	no	longer	be	considered	distinct	from	questions	of	finance	and	cultural	production	for	example.	Under	the	emerging	informatic	power	and	extrastatecraft	of	the	derivative,	bodies,	architectures	and	culture	had	begun	to	exist	more	intensively	as	‘information’	than	they	had	done	previously	and	become	interchangeable	in	ways	not	previously	experienced.	It	was	apparent	that	residents	experienced	the	film	as	an	object	that	aided	a	means	of	sensually,	critically	and	playfully	thinking	an	emerging	and	affective	info-power.	But	also	a	form	of	power	through	which	
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coursed	pre-modern	and	theological	technologies	of	power	that	installed	notions	of	embodiment	and	will	within	that	emerging	and	otherwise	disembodied	logic.			For	the	writing	and	research	overall,	this	aspect	of	the	Harlow	project	(Let	Us	
Pray	for	Those	Now	Residing	in	the	Designated	Area)	provided	a	critical	model	and	method	for	immersing	myself	in	these	logics	and	their	antecedents.	The	challenge	this	poses	for	the	written	aspect	of	this	PhD	submission	is	to	strike	a	balance	between	this	immersive	method	and	moments	of	disambiguation	which	for	example	seek	out	a	materialist	understanding	of	the	workings	of	information	and	means	of	circumventing	the	typologies	of	power	that	other	more	affective	parts	of	the	text	map.	Because	of	this	certain	parts	of	the	text	provide	more	immersed	readings	of	cited	material	than	others	and	mirror	the	forceful	language	at	work	in	Schmitt’s	work	on	political	theology	for	example	as	a	means	of	fully	conveying	the	sense	and	thinking	of	this	work	to	the	reader.		—	In	brief,	the	four	chapters	unfold	in	the	following	key	ways.	Chapter	One	sketches	out	the	notions	of	embodiment,	information	and	power	that	fuel	the	derivative’s	reign	and	has	us	think	of	art’s	objects	as	corporeal	and	as	an	expression	of	a	distinctly	human	agency	and	consciousness.	Whilst	chapter	two	begins	to	reveal	these	imaginings	of	embodiment	and	will	as	a	forceful	ideology	but	suggests	also	that	cinema’s	bodies	are	an	expression	of	these	figures	as	ideological	excess.	Chapter	three	then	proffers	that	this	ideological	excess	points	towards	these	mythical	body’s	shaky	claims	on	authority	and	power.	Lastly,	Chapter	Four	builds	on	the	fissure	that	appears	within	these	narratives	of	embodiment	and	mastery	that	the	logic	of	derivatives	mines.	It	concludes	by	proffering	that	cinema	and	other	cultural	objects	can	‘think’	this	excess	and	its	associated	cinematic	violence	as	an	expression	of	the	chaotic	aspects	of	information	engineering	on	which	we	depend	and	which	then	shatters	the	louder	narratives	of	embodiment.	The	conclusion	frames	this	break	as	an	opportunity	to	embrace	our	collaborations	with	information’s	noisy	emergent	structures	that	extend	our	capacities	and	depart	from	the	derivative’s	mythic,	embodied	reign.	I	then	close	by	laying-out	what	ramifications	this	has	for	art’s	objects	and	proffer	that	it	forces	us	to	think	of	them	as	objects	that	can	‘think’	these	ideological	excesses	
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and	as	components	of	distributed	less	human-centric	forms	of	cognition	and	agency.			The	ways	in	which	the	chapters	unfold	and	converse	with	developments	in	the	parallel	arts	practice	happen	in	a	number	of	ways.	Chapter	one	opens	out	the	method	of	using	cinema	to	divine	the	emerging	logic	of	the	derivative	that	arose	in	the	Harlow	project	through	the	discovery	that	parts	of	the	film	A	Clockwork	
Orange	(1971)	was	filmed	in	the	town.	My	use	of	another	film	of	this	period,	
Performance	(1970)	and	my	personal	connection	with	the	film	allows	me	to	unpack	the	political	romanticism	of	the	period	of	the	films	making	and	its	parallels	in	economics	and	this	process	mirrors	my	use	of	the	film	as	material	for	current	and	future	artworks.	Chapter	Two	(How	Cinema	Thinks	the	Derivative)	allows	me	to	further	explore	this	methodology	and	how	it	can	rethink	bodies	and	objects	as	nodes	of	energy	that	point	towards	the	ideological	apparatus	they	are	folded	into	and	which	forms	them.	This	logic	is	mirrored	in	the	work	DEAD	STOCK	completed	as	part	of	this	research	that	used	vampire	genre	literature	to	make	a	work	whose	elements	formed	a	mutable	assemblage	of	affective	information	—	some	of	it	chaotic	and	other	parts	more	embodied	and	patterned.		Chapter	Three	(Cinema	Thinks	Violence	as	Form	and	Force)	further	leveres	open	this	aspect	of	the	art	work	showing,	through	further	examples	of	cinema,	how	forceful	or	affective	materials	and	information	are	understood	as	form.	This	chapter	really	confronts	the	challenge	that	arose	in	the	artwork	and	in	understanding	the	forceful	statecraft	of	Harlow	and	how	its	artworks	extended	that	forceful	and	mythical	law	making.	The	chapter	carefully	recalibrates	this	perceived	force	that	is	cinematically	expressed	at	times	as	a	violence	that	expresses	an	absolute,	Hobbesian	authoritarian	power.	But	also	at	times	a	violence	that	motions	towards	the	‘splice’	(Hayles)	that	acknowledges	our	collaboration	with	the	chaotic	aspects	of	information	and	which	extends	our	capacities.	This	notion	of	force	and	violence	permeates	through	a	work	such	as	DEAD	STOCK	and	the	developing	work	that	uses	the	affectively	violent	aspects	of	
Performance	(1970)	to	think	of	violence	as	an	oscillating	principle	that	both	instates	a	narrative	of	human	will	and	authority	but	also	expresses	a	break	from	this	conception	of	agency	as	embodied	and	authoritarian.	Chapter	Four	
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(Accelerating	to	a	Standstill	–	Probabilities	Reign)	mirrors	the	method	that	the	artworks	are	performing	of	intensifying	the	derivatives	logic.	The	chapter	suggests	that	one	way	of	overcoming	the	bracketed	(Shaviro)	but	highly	kinetic	production	of	contemporary	art	is	to	take	its	torsioning	of	space,	time	and	bodies	to	a	level	where	its	ideological	excesses	break	apart,	become	chaotic	and	our	relation	to	information	recalibrated.	This	methodology	was	beginning	to	emerge	in	works	created	for	the	Harlow	project	Let	Us	Pray…	but	has	really	taken	hold	in	the	work	DEAD	STOCK	and	the	projects	being	developed	that	use	the	examples	of	cinema	cited	in	this	text	as	raw	material	for	new	works	or	assemblages.	The	text	and	artworks	use	many	of	the	same	approaches	and	materials	to	think	the	logic	of	the	derivative	but	the	artworks	remain	less	explicit	in	their	thinking.	Each	however	has	informed	the	other.		—	The	written	aspect	of	this	submission	exists	as	four	chapters.	The	first	chapter,	'A	Spectral	Sovereign	Power',	employs	the	film	Performance	(Roeg,	Cammell,	1970)	to	‘affectively	map’	(Shaviro)	the	transition	from	economies	of	real	abstraction	into	affective	information	and	forecast	the	logic	of	derivatives.	It	then	asks	how	this	affective	information	performs	a	political	and	financial	romanticism	(Schmitt)	that	is	installed	alongside	the	will	of	the	people	as	a	metaphysical	principle.	The	chapter	further	considers	Carl	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereignty	and	the	state	of	exception	and	the	persistence	of	Schmitt’s	personalised	notion	of	sovereignty.	I	also	consider	how	Walter	Benjamin	adopted	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereignty,	altering	its	temporality	and	displacement	of	sovereignty	and	the	‘state	of	exception’	into	the	sedimented	forces	of	the	commodity.	The	last	part	of	this	chapter	considers	how	information	theory	privileges	pattern	in	information	and	amplifies	the	paradoxes	and	fault	lines	of	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereignty.	I	explain	how	probability	is	deployed	in	information	engineering	and	corroborates	with	information	theory’s	privileging	of	pattern.	Lastly,	I	consider	how	the	‘noise’	or	random	information	in	a	given	signal	suggests	an	alternative	and	less	human	centred	‘state	of	exception’	to	that	instituted	by	the	derivative.			The	second	chapter,	'How	Cinema	Thinks	the	Derivative',	considers	and	demonstrates	how	cinema	is	used	in	the	thesis.	The	chapter	asks	how	this	form	
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of	cultural	production	is	more	embedded	in	the	economics	and	ideology	of	its	historical	moment	than	other	art	forms.	It	then	considers	how	cinema	plays	and	speculates	with	ideology,	how	it	detects	the	ideology	of	the	derivative,	and	what	the	materiality	of	ideology	might	be.	I	also	explore	how	cinema	thinks	of	the	human	subject	as	ideological	excess	and	as	an	ideological	function	of	the	derivative.	I	claim	that	further	examples	of	cinema	from	the	early	‘70s	are	able	to	detect	the	emergence	of	the	derivative,	its	decolonising	of	sovereign	currencies	and	its	temporal	and	spatial	violence.	I	consider	how	particular	examples	of	objects	and	bodies	in	cinema	point	towards	the	apparatuses	that	form	them	and	so	perform	an	affective	critical	function.			The	third	chapter,	'Cinema	Thinks	Violence	as	Form	and	Formlessness',	uses	another	example	of	cinema	from	1970:	The	Conformist	(Bertolucci),	to	consider	how	cinema	speculates	on	the	sovereign	power	of	informatics.	I	explore	how	this	unapologetically	cinematic	film	and	existential	account	of	fascism’s	fantasy	of	embodying	the	‘decision’	explores	an	imagined	relationship	to	information.	This	exploration	provides	a	lead	into	the	following	chapter	that	charts	the	ideological	effect	of	probability	in	the	way	that	it	is	employed	in	the	markets	and	in	information	engineering.	As	part	of	this	exploration,	I	scrutinize	how	The	
Conformist	uses	narratives	of	violence	to	think	of	dematerialised	notions	of	information	and	how	these	segue	into	theories	of	law,	justice	and	founding	violence.	I	use	Walter	Benjamin’s	notion	of	a	mythic	violence	and	law,	explored	by	him	in	A	Critique	of	Violence	(1921),	to	unpack	this	cinematic	violence	further.	I	argue	that	this	conception	of	the	law	helps	to	explain	how	the	derivative,	as	information,	acquires	the	forceful	qualities	of	law	and	how	cinema	expresses	these	qualities	through	narratives	of	violence.	I	then	argue	that	examples	of	cinema	that	threaten	the	integrity	of	its	bodies	speculate	with	a	violence	that	exposes	the	hubristic	and	shaky	claims	on	authority	that	these	bodies	endlessly	perform.	These	bodies,	I	suggest,	threaten	to	annul	what	Benjamin	calls	a	mythic	law	that	aspires	to	have	the	qualities	of	God's	founding	laws.	I	claim	that	it	is	in	these	shaking	and	fraying	informatic	bodies	that	we	can	detect	the	informatically	driven	polity	of	the	derivative	but	also	the	chaotic	dynamics	of	information	that	threaten	the	narratives	of	mastery	and	will	that	this	polity	conducts.		
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	The	fourth	and	last	chapter,	'Accelerating	to	A	Standstill	–	Probabilities	Reign',	considers	how	the	art	market	and	video	have	absorbed	the	logic	of	derivatives	to	arrive	at	a	bracketed	sense	of	freedom	and	autonomy:	one	that	creates	a	temporal	impasse	in	the	present	moment	but	which	is	experienced	as	speed,	power	and	freedom.	I	employ	cinema	critic	David	Bordwell’s	notion	of	post-continuity	cinema	and	Steven	Shaviro’s	Post	Cinematic	Affect	(2010)	to	reflect	on	examples	of	bodies	or	notions	of	embodiment	in	cinema	and	music	video	most	able	to	give	representation	to	the	bracketed	acceleration	of	finance	capital.	I	then	examine	how	this	dynamic	is	replicated	in	contemporary	art	as	a	form	of	romantic	productivity	and	how	art’s	analogue	objects	begin	to	act	as	the	‘stories’	that	obscure	an	underlying	polity.	Architect,	writer	and	urbanist	Keller	Easterling’s	book	Extrastatecraft	(2014)	is	used	to	understand	how	art	might	become	a	marker	of	the	dispositions	of	information	and	power	that	are	otherwise	occluded	by	its	stories.	I	then	visit	the	work	of	writer	and	financial	technologist	Elie	Ayache	on	the	deployment	of	probability	in	derivatives	trading	and	how	it	occludes	the	contingent	and	chaotic	materiality	of	the	market.	This	unpacking	of	a	technical	and	philosophical	exploration	of	derivatives	leads	into	a	description	of	derivatives	as	informatics	and	I	finish	the	chapter	by	revisiting	Claude	Shannon’s	theory	of	information	and	ask	how	informatics	might	escape	probability’s	grasp.	In	doing	so,	I	refer	back	to	examples	of	objects	and	bodies	in	cinema	that	proffer	an	alternative	‘state	of	exception’	to	that	of	the	derivative.	I	reconsider	how	examples	of	cinema	and	cinematic	objects	that	think	the	violent	temporal	and	spatial	effects	of	the	derivative	can	help	us	to	rethink	art's	objects,	spatial	and	temporal	practices.	In	doing	so,	I	anticipate	an	art	practice	that	overcomes	the	bodies	and	objects	that	obscure	the	polity	of	the	derivative.	But	also,	one	that	exits	the	kinetic	but	temporal	impasse	that	derivatives	install	in	our	present.	I	claim	that	these	examples	of	cinema	speculate	on	compelling	narratives	of	mastery	that	persist	in	information	theory	as	well	as	more	chaotic	information	that	has	yet	to	be	categorised.	It	is	within	these	last,	as	yet	unpatterned,	materials	that	emergent	structures	of	information	exist.	And	it	is	these	emergent	structures	of	information	that	I	suggest	offer	a	real	state	of	exception,	which	might	witness	the	liberal	human	subject	working	productively	
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with	distributed	cognitive	environments	released	from	narratives	of	mastery	and	control.			The	cinematic	works	cited	in	the	written	aspect	of	this	PhD	submission	are	also	used	as	the	material	for	the	exhibited	works	that	form	the	practice	part	of	this	PhD	submission.	To	this	end,	both	aspects	of	the	submission	enjoy	and	exploit	some	of	the	same	affective	materials.	The	artworks,	like	the	text,	have	attempted	to	reach	out	for	the	elusive	materiality	and	violently	distributed	nature	of	the	derivative.	The	film	Performance	(1970)	features	heavily	in	the	first	chapter	of	the	text	and	was	cited	in	my	2013	installation	for	Cubitt	Gallery,	London,	originally	entitled	Designs	Towards	a	Meeting	Place	for	Future	Events	of	Universal	
Truth.	The	installation	attempts	to	spatially	mirror	the	post-continuous	nature	of	the	film’s	editing	and	reproduce	the	same	sense	of	affective	disorientation	in	the	viewer	that	the	film	explores.	Using	glass	screens	and	recreated	aspects	of	the	film's	set	design,	the	installation	seeks	to	deny	any	mechanism	for	centring	the	viewer	and,	instead,	thinks	of	viewers	as	a	constituent	flow	within	the	apparatus	of	the	exhibition.	Completed	during	the	earlier	stages	of	this	research,	the	install	included	a	large	photographic	recreation	of	a	drawing	of	the	Laffer	Curve,	a	mathematical	theorem	employed	in	the	argument	against	taxation	during	Ronald	Reagan’s	ascent	to	power.	The	image	was	laid	on	the	flat	as	part	of	a	table	structure	so	that,	once	again,	no	element	of	the	exhibition	privileged	the	viewer	over	the	exhibition's	elements.			A	subsequent	publication	and	installation,	DEAD	STOCK,	revisited	a	past	project	that	transported	a	crate	of	Earth	from	Transylvania	to	Los	Angeles	via	London.	That	past	work’s	concern	with	a	cinematic	object,	born	out	of	the	shape-shifting	myth	of	vampirism,	was	reiterated	in	the	work	DEAD	STOCK	at	the	Stanley	Picker	Gallery,	London.	A	library	of	vampire-genre	books	was	collected	and	scanned	before	being	converted	to	text	via	a	copy-proofing	agency	in	Bangladesh.	The	books	were	then	compiled	in	alphabetical	title	order	to	make	a	single	novel	from	all	the	sampled	novels.	This	novel	was	then	produced	as	a	one-off	publication	with	an	additional	artist's	proof	deposited	in	the	British	Library.	The	publication	was	presented	at	one	end	of	a	specially	built,	twelve	foot	long	reading	table.	At	
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one	end	of	which	was	a	monolith	made	from	fired	Transylvanian	earth	that	oversaw	the	reader	of	the	publication.	DEAD	STOCK	engages	with	the	derivative's	capacity	to	ceaselessly	unbundle	and	bundle	the	attributes	of	an	object:	in	this	case,	the	vampire	novel,	by	subdividing	its	parts,	distributing	them	and	then	re-	collating	them	into	informatic	bodies	that	both	orientate	and	disorientate.	Subsequent	works	consider	the	cinematic	bodies	and	objects	that	appear	in	the	film	A	Clockwork	Orange	(Kubrick,	1972),	for	example,	in	an	attempt	to	locate	what	I	suggest	are	objects	that	sit	between	epochs.	These	objects	that	polarise	the	pre-	and	post-derivative	moment	for	culture,	help	us	to	affectively	explore	and	gain	purchase	on	its	elusive	power	and	materiality.	Harlow	functioned	as	precisely	this	type	of	object:	a	town,	as	an	object	situated	on	a	cusp,	having	been	born	in	the	post-war	period	of	classic	liberalism	but	maturing	in	the	reign	of	the	derivative	and	informatics.			The	title	of	this	thesis,	I	am	the	Sun	and	Cannot	be	Gazed	upon	Fixedly,	is	taken	from	the	last	frames	of	the	film	The	Taking	of	Power	by	Louis	XIV	(1966)	by	Roberto	Rossellini.	The	made-for-television	film	dramatizes	the	rise	to	power	of	King	Louis	XIV	of	France	and	the	transition	of	the	French	Royal	Court	from	the	habits	of	the	Middle	Ages	to	the	spectacular	rituals	of	Versailles	and	the	absolutism	of	the	new	Monarch.	Rossellini’s	film	charts	how	the	King	tames	the	feudal	system	of	France	through	the	building	of	an	ideological	apparatus	that	has	the	aristocracy	produce	their	relations	to	production	according	to	the	court's	affective	rituals.			In	Versailles,	the	King’s	power	is	refracted	through	the	rituals	and	dress	of	the	court,	which	is	paid	for	by	the	aristocracy	using	loans	from	the	King.	The	King	and	court	occupy	a	realm	of	affect	where	the	subjects	of	the	court	come	to	feel	that	the	emotions	of	the	King	(and	of	France)	are	interchangeable	with	their	own.	Risk	and	debt	are	devolved	down	into	the	individual.	Through	a	forensic	cinematic	description	of	the	apparatus	of	the	court	of	Louis	XIV,	the	film	allegorises	the	spectral	but	absolute	power	of	the	derivative	as	it	unbundles	and	decolonises	the	attributes	of	its	subjects.			
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The	title	is	an	appropriation	and	adaption	of	the	last	line	of	the	film	where	we	see	Louis	XIV	seated	alone	in	his	chamber	and	stripped	of	his	finery.	Here,	he	reads	out	loud	La	Rochefoucauld’s	maxim	“Neither	the	sun	nor	death	can	be	gazed	upon	fixedly.”2	The	scene	underscores	how	the	king	has	rendered	himself	one	part	of	the	apparatus	that	he	has	constructed	and,	as	a	consequence,	aligned	himself	with	death.	Whilst	he	remains	at	the	centre	of	the	constellation	of	power,	the	attributes	and	mechanisms	of	his	power	lie	distributed	throughout	the	apparatuses	of	Versailles.	His	function	is	both	to	orientate	and	obscure	the	workings	of	the	apparatus	as	it	proliferates	through	the	habits	and	rituals	of	his	subjects.	In	turn,	the	court's	subjects	explore	and	mistake	their	own	disorientation	in	the	labyrinth	of	Versailles'	architecture	and	rituals	as	autonomy.	Rossellini’s	account	of	the	construction	of	Versailles	allegorises	the	refracted	power	and	materiality	of	derivatives.	I	resume	this	theme	once	more	in	chapter	two	of	the	thesis	using	a	number	of	examples	of	cinema,	including	Stanley	Kubrick’s	Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975):	a	film	that	points	to	the	18th	century	as	the	century	of	debt	and	contracts	and	which,	I	claim,	acts	as	an	analogy	for	the	coming	reign	of	the	derivative.	Louis	XIV	is	a	figure	that	becomes	both	ground	and	figure	in	order	to	do	power	and	his	power	can	be	felt	by	his	court	at	all	times,	refracted	as	it	is	through	its	apparatus.	In	this	example	of	cinema	there	lies	an	allegory	of	the	derivative's	spectral,	distributed,	but	singular,	power.	 	
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Chapter	One:	A	Spectral	Sovereign	Power		
	
How	the	sovereign	spectral	power	of	the	derivative	was	detected	by	cinema	and	
how	cinema	transmitted	the	derivative’s	‘state	of	exception’.	How	derivatives	
induce	a	financial	and	political	romanticism.	Carl	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereign	
power	and	the	incomprehensible	power	of	the	Leviathan.	The	logic	of	derivatives	
supersedes	the	commodity	form	as	a	means	of	art	addressing	capital.	How	
informatics	work	and	serve	to	amplify	the	ideological	effects	of	derivatives.	What	
role	probability	plays	in	this	amplification	and	how	it	produces	a	‘bracketed’	
freedom	and	power.			
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	Fig	3.	Performance,	(Cammell,	Roeg,	1970).	Chas'	execution	of	Turner.	Bodies	pierced,	shattered	and	converted	into	component	flows.	Cinema	as	an	‘affective	mapping’	of	capital’s	transformation	from	the	commodity	to	the	derivative.		Chapter	One	sketches	out	the	notions	of	embodiment,	information	and	power	that	fuel	the	derivative’s	reign.	It	begins	by	providing	a	demonstration	of	the	key	methodology	of	the	text	and	developing	work,	that	of	divining	the	emerging	info-power	and	logic	of	the	derivative	and	the	challenge	this	poses	for	art	through	an	example	of	cinema	(Performance	(Cammel	&	Roeg	1970))	that	I	believe	to	be	intuiting	and	‘thinking’	this	emerging	regime.	As	I’ve	described	in	the	introduction,	this	methodology	arose	from	my	discovery	that	the	film	A	
Clockwork	Orange	(1971)	had	been	partly	filmed	in	Harlow	and	how	the	conversion	of	the	town’s	architecture	into	affective	cinematic	information	meant	that	the	film	could	be	used	by	residents	to	intuit	and	think	the	emerging	info	
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power	of	the	derivative	and	its	effects	on	the	towns	sense	of	space	and	time.	The	chapter’s	immersion	in	and	unpacking	of	the	film’s	‘thinking’	exposes	the	dichotomy	at	play	in	Performance’s	(1970)	mapping	of	the	shift	from	the	commodity	form,	centralised	economics	and	centralised	statecraft	towards	these	same	things	as	flows	of	dynamic	information.	The	chapter	is	on	the	one	hand	an	exploration	of	how	cinema	divines	the	shift	in	the	early	70’s	in	Anglo-American	economies	towards	commodities	and	money	as	dynamic	and	disembodied	information	whilst	on	the	other	hand	installing	narratives	of	embodied,	decisive	sometimes-violent	bodies	into	those	imaginings	of	an	informational	regime.	The	chapter	reaches	back	(via	its	exploration	of	cinema)	for	pre-modern	images	of	agency	that	haunt	these	informatic	imaginings	of	weightless	but	forceful	power	and	finds	them	in	Hobbes’	Leviathan.	A	figure	that	also	haunted	the	statecraft	of	the	pre-derivative	Harlow	but	which	persists	as	intensified	informatics	in	the	post	derivative	era.			The	decision	to	use	Performance	(1970)	and	other	mainstream	films	of	this	period	and	not	A	Clockwork	Orange	(Kubrick,	1971)	is	intended	to	communicate	the	ontological	shift	in	economics	that	took	place	at	this	time	that	is	being	felt	and	thought	by	a	number	of	examples	of	cinema	other	than	A	Clockwork	Orange	(1971).	But	also	that	the	questions	raised	in	the	Harlow	project	are	not	specific	to	Harlow	or	to	questions	of	urbanism	and	art	because	of	the	increased,	intense	reign	of	informatics	that	makes	urban	space,	artworks	and	commodities	for	example	all	affective,	mutable,	interchangeable		and	tradable	information.	For	this	reason	Harlow’s	syndrome	is	also	a	UK	wide	and	global	syndrome.	Conversely	the	text	and	developing	artworks	recognise	a	terra	incognito	for	critical	art’s	practices	wishing	to	address	power	and	be	seen	to	be	conducting	a	good	politics;	that	of	the	quotidian,	absolute	power	that	informatics	conducts	but	which	exists	as	concentrations	and	mobile	assemblages	of	power	and	not	bodies	or	persons	that	we	can	address	directly.	Performance	(1970)	is	also	a	film	that	holds	a	personal	resonance	in	that	its	interiors	were	filmed	near	to	where	I	lived	as	a	child	—	amongst	figures	from	the	counter	culture	of	the	time.	The	film	therefore	converted	parts	of	my	own	lived	experience	into	cinematic	information	I	can	then	speculate	and	play	with	and	acts	as	a	parallel	to	the	primary	research	
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of	Harlow	project.	This	intensely	politically	romantic	period	and	the	concern	with	the	affective,	occassionalist	event	amongst	its	counter	cultures	is	evident	in	
Performance	(1970)	but	in	a	form	that	is	acutely,	material	and	informatic.	—		The	film	Performance	(Cammell,	Roeg,	1970)	is	presented	here	as	an	‘affective	map’	(Shaviro,	2010,	5)	that	plots	a	shift	in	Anglo-American	economies	of	the	late	‘60s	and	early	‘70s.	A	period	in	which	economics	transitioned	from	the	stable	ground	of	real	abstraction	towards	the	ungraspable	but	forceful	ground	of	information	and	affect.	The	cult	film’s	tale	of	violent	London	gangsterism	colliding	with	a	psychedelic	counter	culture,	told	through	the	disorientating	camera	work	of	Nic	Roeg,	detects	and	transmits	the	dissolution	of	an	economy	of	goods	and	the	emergence	of	economies	of	affective	information.	I	suggest	this	shift	transformed	finance	capital	into	an	industry	whose	medium	and	product	is	money	reiterated	as	data.	Meanwhile,	the	rapid	exchange	of	financial	instruments,	including	derivatives,	has	become	an	affective	and	forceful	determinant	of	value	and	of	power.	The	velocity	and	fluidity	of	derivatives	trading	has	created	a	seemingly	permanent	‘state	of	exception’	that	cultural	production,	including	cinema,	contemporary	art	and	architecture,	for	example,	has	‘detected	and	transmitted’	(Avanessian,	2015).	My	use	of	the	term	
sovereignty	is	not	intended	to	relate	specifically	to	notions	of	sovereign	territory	but	of	sovereign	power	and	the	typology	of	bodies	and	‘informatics’	(Haraway)	that	perform	that	power.	It	does,	however,	relate	to	the	ways	in	which	the	power	of	the	state	and	the	power	of	the	individual	are	imagined	as	interchangeable.	Later	in	this	chapter,	I	explore	the	term	and	its	use	by	political	philosopher	Carl	Schmitt	and	its	subsequent	appropriation	by	Walter	Benjamin.			There	are	a	number	of	basic	developmental	stages	in	this	process	of	financialisation	that	I	need	to	layout	briefly	before	we	can	proceed.	The	financialisation	of	the	markets	from	the	early	‘70s	to	the	present	began	with	the	United	States’	departure	from	the	Gold	Standard	on	August	15,	1971.	President	Nixon’s	decision	to	end	the	international	convertibility	of	the	dollar	for	gold	was	intended	as	a	temporary	measure	that	stemmed	from	France’s	reduction	of	its	
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dollar	holdings	and	the	continuing	and	exhausting	costs	of	the	Vietnam	War.	What	followed	was	a	series	of	attempts	by	the	US	government	to	revalue	an	increasingly	deflated	dollar	against	gold:	a	process	that	terminated	in	October	1976	with	the	official	definition	of	the	dollar	no	longer	referring	to	gold.	This	effectively	reduced	the	dollar	to	a	fiat	currency	or	a	currency	that	cannot	be	converted	to	a	good	but	which	is	guaranteed	by	the	government	of	the	day.3			The	second	significant	stage	in	this	process	of	financialisation	is	the	exponential	growth	of	the	derivatives	market	following	their	legitimisation	by	the	Chicago	Mercantile	Exchange	and	the	Chicago	Board	Options	Exchange	in	1972-73.	These	instruments,	which	had	originally	been	employed	to	ensure	a	price	for	a	commodity	such	as	corn	in	advance	of	a	harvest,	became	something	that	in	themselves	could	be	traded	as	the	option	to	buy	a	commodity	at	a	future	date.	The	buying	and	selling	of	options	or	derivatives	before	1972-73	was	a	minority	activity	that	was	viewed	as	being	more	akin	to	gambling	than	investment.	Therefore,	the	process	of	institutionalisation	that	occurred	in	1972-73	delivered	a	means	of	assuring	the	Illinois	regulatory	bodies	and,	in	turn,	Wall	Street	that	derivatives	trading	no	longer	held	connotations	of	the	casino.	Derivatives	claims	now	represent	the	majority	activity	in	the	global	financial	markets.	Writer	Suhail	Malik,	quoting	from	the	Bank	of	International	Settlements,	suggests	that	the	value	of	the	derivatives	market	at	the	end	of	2012	amounted	to	$694.4	trillion	compared	to	the	71.7	trillion	global	market	value	of	the	‘real	economy’	of	goods	and	services	(Malik,	2013,	269).	These	staggering	figures	are	made	more	staggering	by	the	asymmetry	of	the	value	of	trades	in	relation	to	the	goods	and	commodities	(otherwise	known	as	the	underlying)	against	which	the	derivatives	are	traded.	This	asymmetry	is	weighted	towards	the	trade	in	options	to	such	a	degree	that	any	notion	that	the	derivative	draws	on	a	fixed	value	of	the	underlying	assets	is	evacuated.			The	growth	of	derivatives	trading	was	further	exacerbated	by	the	introduction	and	then	digital	automation	of	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	formula,	as	part	of	the	pricing	mechanism	for	derivatives.	This	predictive	mathematical	equation,	originally	intended	as	an	aid	to	pricing	but	which	then	became	the	sole	means	of	
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pricing,	provided	further	legitimisation	by	converting	the	pricing	of	derivatives	into	a	quasi-scientific	process.	I	detail	the	phenomenon	of	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	Formula	in	the	last	chapter	of	this	thesis	but,	at	this	point,	it	is	enough	to	say	that	its	initial	introduction	further	evacuated	the	notion	of	derivatives	as	gambling.	What	we	have	witnessed	in	the	case	of	the	development	of	derivatives	is	an	exponential	expansion	of	the	markets,	no	longer	grounded	in	their	underlying	assets	and	commodities	but	instead	grounded	in	the	emotive	and	immersive	nature	of	trading	itself.	It	could	be	said	that	the	ground	and	matter	of	trading	has	become	both	the	emotional	experience	and	information	that	are	bound	together	in	the	high-speed	transactions	that	constitute	contemporary	finance	capital.	The	reasons	for	this	development	are	covered	in	more	detail	in	the	last	chapter	of	this	thesis,	where	I	consider	in	more	detail	how	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	formula	helped	to	install	what	I	term	a	‘romantic’	economics,	and	how	this	ontology	of	finance	maps	onto	cultural	production.	Performance	detects	and	attempts	to	embody	these	emerging	ontologies	of	finance	as	it	speculates	with	affective	forms	of	consumption.	As	I	explain	a	little	later	in	this	chapter,	new	forms	of	consumption	simultaneously	signal	new	forms	of	embodiment	and	of	signification.	What	we	see	and	experience	in	Performance	is	a	meeting	and	polarising	of	both	old	and	new	forms	of	embodiment	that	provides	us	with	a	way	in,	a	means	of	representing	otherwise	difficult	to	represent	contemporary	materialities.			The	transformation	in	capital	that	I	outline	above	has	produced	a	paradoxical	ground	for	both	a	financialised	political	legal	order	and	cultural	production,	alike.	Capital	has	become	seemingly	groundless,	unbounded,	rooted	in	affect	and	experience	but	is	simultaneously	material	and	impactful.	This	affective	ground	has	come	to	be	populated	by	figures	of	sovereignty,	types	of	embodiment	and	signification	that	are,	no	longer,	figures	of	real	abstraction.	These	figures	are	never	fully	present	but	are	forceful	and	exceed	both	organic	and	inorganic	referents.	Instead,	and	because	capital	becomes	after	1971	more	fundamentally	experienced	as	both	ideological	and	material	and,	most	importantly,	as	information,	agency	is	increasingly	understood	in	terms	of	instances	of	pattern	in	the	flows	of	affective	information	that	circulate	(Hayles,	1999,	28).	Pattern	and	
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affective	pattern	in	information	is	afforded	agency	in	such	a	way	that	supersedes	human	presence	as	the	prerequisite	for	agency.	As	money	increasingly	becomes	information	that	is	no	longer	pegged	to	goods	but	for	which	goods	act	as	a	warranty,	so	the	body	becomes	a	warranty	for	information	that	assumes	sovereignty.	It	follows,	then,	that,	as	questions	of	absence	and	presence	are	rapidly	giving	way	to	questions	of	pattern	in	information	networks,	agency	is	no	longer	seen	as	contained	in	the	body	but	warrantied	by	it:	a	development	that	N.	Katherine	Hayles	underscores	in	her	book	How	We	Became	Post	Human	(Hayles,	1999,	27),	suggesting	that	in	information	networked	societies	money	is:		 “[…]	experienced	as	informational	patterns	stored	in	computer	banks	rather	than	as	 the	 presence	 of	 cash;	 surrogacy	 and	 in	 vitro	 fertilization	 court	 cases	 offer	examples	of	informational	genetic	patterns	competing	with	physical	presence	for	the	 right	 to	 determine	 the	 ‘legitimate’	 parent	 […]	 criminals	 are	 tied	 to	 crime	scenes	 through	DNA	patterns	rather	 than	through	eyewitness	accounts	verifying	their	 presence;	 access	 to	 computer	 networks	 rather	 than	 physical	 possession	 of	data	 determines	 nine-tenths	 of	 computer	 law.	 […]	 The	 effect	 of	 these	transformations	 is	 to	 create	a	highly	heterogeneous	and	 fissured	space	 in	which	discursive	formations	based	on	pattern	and	randomness	jostle	and	compete	with	formations	based	on	presence	and	absence“	(Hayles,	1999,	27/28).		In	societies	imbued	with	information	networks,	sovereignty,	instead	of	being	expressed	through	a	living	corporeal	form,	becomes	expressed	through	pattern	in	information.	Random	information,	the	noise	in	any	message,	is	discounted	as	an	absence,	void	of	agency.	In	this	new,	affective	regime,	finance,	politics,	information	and	culture-as-information	take	on	all	the	delimited	qualities	of	founding	and	decisive	law.	I	explore	how	information	acquires	the	forceful	qualities	of	law	in	the	third	chapter,	Cinema	Thinks	Violence	as	Form	and	Force.	However,	those	qualities	remain	bounded	by	a	romantic	spirit	that,	ultimately,	becomes	the	constraining	conservative	ground	for	capital	and	for	cultural	production.	I	elaborate	on	this	paradox	a	little	later	in	this	chapter	using	the	work	of	political	philosopher	Carl	Schmitt	to	consider,	in	the	first	instance,	political	and	economic	romanticism	and,	in	the	second	instance,	the	form	and	temporality	of	sovereignty.			The	quick-fire	edits	and	camerawork	of	Performance	announce	the	acceleration	of	cinema	(Bordwell,	2002)	from	the	late	‘60s	onwards	and,	more	widely,	the	
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 29	
speeding	up	of	cultural	production	and	its	dispersion	on	ever	new	proliferating	platforms.	The	seeming	ungroundedness	of	this	acceleration,	however,	obscures	the	bracketed	nature	of	this	ground.	So	that,	even	in	the	spaces	of	information,	sovereignty	is	attributed	to	information	in	which	we	can	recognise	form	and	pattern	and	which	takes	on	the	qualities	and	narratives	of	being	human,	of	possessing	will	and	consciousness.	Old	notions	of	embodiment	and	agency	become	installed	into	new	platforms	as:	“[…]	the	present	is	viewed	through	a	rear	view	mirror	that	conceals	the	extent	of	contemporary	change”	(Plant,	1998,	182).			The	testing	of	new	models	of	signification	in	Performance	probes	the	corporeality	of	sovereignty	and	agency,	oscillating	between	noise	and	pattern	as	it	does	so.	As	Hayles	highlights,	new	forms	of	text	or,	in	this	case,	image	production	suggest	different	models	of	signification	and	these	changes	are	linked	to	shifts	in	modes	of	consumption,	which,	in	turn,	initiate	new	experiences	of	embodiment.	What	follows	is	a	case	of	embodied	experience	interacting	with	codes	of	representation	to	form	new	textual	and	image	worlds	(Hayles,	1999,	28).	These	categories	are,	as	Hayles	explains,	in	constant	feedback	and	feedforward	loops	with	each	other.	This	last	important	point	polarises	my	concern	with	how	an	analogue	film	such	as	Performance	feeds	forward	and	rehearses	some	of	the	future	traits	of	digital	production	and	of	financialisation.	As	a	consequence,	the	film	communicates	an	embryonic	frictionless	economy,	grounded	in	human	sovereignty	but	where	the	human	in	that	economy	is	ideological	and	informatic.			The	use	of	the	term	informatics	(Haraway)	is	intended	to	include	not	just	the	networks	of	frictionless	information	but	also	the	technical	and	material	infrastructure	of	those	networks;4	in	other	words,	the	substrates	of	the	information	that	is	inscribed	and	re-inscribed	across	those	networks.	This	last	point	is	of	particular	significance	to	the	question	of	embodiment	when	the	efficacy	of	pattern	and	randomness	threatens	to	supersede	questions	of	presence	and	absence.	In	turn,	the	increasing	dominance	of	questions	of	pattern	and	randomness	and	the	efficacy	of	these	forms	of	embodiment	risk	obscuring	the	material	infrastructures	that	manufacture	them.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	because	of	
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this	ability	to	obscure	material	infrastructures	that	informational	pattern	attains	an	aggressive	agency.	The	last	chapter	of	this	thesis	considers	writer	Steven	Shaviro’s	claim	that	certain	examples	of	digital	cinema	and	music	video	are	able	to	give	full	representation	to	the	materialities	that	manufacture	them.	Because	of	this,	suggests	Shaviro,	we	are	able,	through	these	examples,	to	witness	contemporary	capital’s	otherwise	hard-to-represent	quotidian	and	omnipresent	processes.	This,	Shaviro	says,	provides	us	with	a	critical	agency	that	was	previously	not	afforded	to	us.	I	test	this	claim	and	its	limitations.			
Performance	does	some	of	what	Shaviro	describes	but	in	a	cusp	moment	between	old	and	new	forms	of	consumption,	production	and	embodiment.	Previous	forms	of	embodiment	exist	alongside	emerging	forms	of	embodiment,	throwing	each	into	stark	relief.	The	film’s	play	on	pattern	and	randomness	is	demonstrated	in	its	often	violent	and	disorientating	shooting	style,	accelerated	average	shot	lengths	(ASLs),	quick-fire	editing	and	torsioning	of	temporalities.	Cinematic	bodies	fray,	morph	and	collapse	into	one	another	as	the	film	foregrounds	its	own	function	as	a	body	and	corpus	of	visual	information.			The	film’s	highly	stylized	and	affective	method	makes	it	at	odds	with	its	cinematic	contemporaries	and	their	tendencies	for	realism	and	depth	of	field	(Bazin),	explicit	programmatic	politic	messages	(Godard)	or	structuralist	film’s	concern	with	foregrounding	film’s	apparatus	(Snow,	Conrad).	Instead,	
Performance	appears	more	concerned	with	cinema’s	potential	for	artificiality	and	affect.	The	film,	along	with	other	cinematic	oddities	released	in	this	and	adjacent	years,	challenges	a	politics	and	cinema	of	representation	and	the	notion	that	a	cinema	that	more	accurately	and	broadly	represents	the	demos	is	one	enacting	a	genuine	politics.	These	cinematic	oddities	that	include,	for	example,	Bernardo	Bertolucci’s	The	Conformist	(1970)	press	audiences	faces	up	against	a	spectacle	of	illusion,	as	if	to	challenge	the	strain	of	Socratic	thinking	that	privileges	sight	and	light	and	equates	these	with	truth.	This	Socratic	ascent	out	of	Plato’s	cave	and	spaces	of	illusion	and	chimera	simultaneously	sets	a	course	towards	the	“[…]	heart	of	the	sun,	a	planet	without	a	dark	side”	(Plant,	1998,	179),	whilst	taking	flight	from	the	materiality,	substrate	and	canvas	of	the	
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illusions	that	caused	that	flight.	Whilst	some	of	these	films	are	attempting	to	foreground	ideology	and	its	workings	and,	in	doing	so,	undermine	ideology,	
Performance	appears,	instead,	to	immerse	itself	in	and	‘affectively	map’	(Shaviro,	2010,	5)	ideology’s	effects,	whilst	reaching	out	for	ideology’s	illusive	and	less	corporal	materiality.	I	discuss	ideology’s	materialism	in	the	second	chapter	of	this	thesis,	How	Does	Cinema	Think?,	and	consider	what	implications	this	materiality	has	for	culture,	once	it	becomes	implicated	in	the	derivative’s	logic.		The	middle	section	of	this	chapter	deals	with	the	question	of	sovereignty	and	its	temporality	and	form	using	the	early	work	of	political	philosopher	Carl	Schmitt	and	its	subsequent	appropriation	by	Walter	Benjamin.	In	laying	the	ground	for	this	exploration	of	the	constitution	of	sovereignty,	I	use	another	of	Schmitt’s	books	Political	Romanticism	(Schmitt,	1991	(1921)),	a	critique	of	liberalism	that	forecasted	the	coming	together	of	all	political	tendencies,	economics	and	statecraft	under	an	absolutising	regime	of	‘political	romanticism’,	so	that	a	left	and	right	politics	became	a	false	distinction	as	the	substrate	of	both	tendencies	was	ultimately	political	romanticism.	Schmitt’s	political	romanticism	identifies	the	liberal	human	subject	as	the	solar	centre	of	a	constellation	of	affective	politics	and	information.	Political	romanticism’s	parallels	with	the	Socratic	ascent	from	Plato’s	cave	places	the	liberal	subject	as	the	burning	light	at	the	opening	of	the	cave.	The	ascent	to	which	signals	a	departure	from	the	materialism	of	ideology.	How	political	romanticism	came	to	be	is	forecast	by	Schmitt	but	embodied	by	Performance.		According	to	Schmitt,	under	the	regime	of	political	romanticism	that	began	in	Europe	in	the	mid	nineteenth-century,	every	citizen	becomes	the	sovereign	of	their	own	privatised	realm	and	every	event	becomes	an	occasion	for	subjects	to	indulge	their	romantic	spirit	and	democratised	sovereignty.	For	Schmitt,	sovereignty	and	the	capacity	for	agency	fall	away	when	the	ground	for	all	politics,	economics	and	statecraft	becomes	a	privatised	aesthetic	experience,	where	each	man	and	woman	is	the	sovereign	of	their	private	realm.	Schmitt’s	subsequent	work	on	sovereignty	seeks	to	address	this	paradox	of	a	highly	kinetic	but	ineffectual	and	contained	sovereignty	by	attempting	to	reengineer	both	the	
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temporality	and	composition	of	sovereignty.	The	direct	and	indirect	dialogue	between	Schmitt	and	Benjamin	over	the	consistency	of	sovereignty	exposes	not	only	the	fault	lines	in	Schmitt’s	work	but	also	the	speculative	play	with	these	concepts	that	the	film	Performance	narrates	as	it	detects	and	transmits	a	developing	romantic	economy	of	affect.			Schmitt	makes	the	caveat	that	a	politically	romantic	statecraft	is	not	incapable	of	effects	and	that,	in	fact,	the	“subjective	occasionalism”	(Schmitt,	1991,	18)	of	political	romanticism	seeks	to	possess	all	the	forceful	qualities	of	sovereign	law	and	can	descend	into	authoritarianism	and	literal	violence	precisely	because	it	seeks	aesthetic	and	technically	beautiful	solutions	to	political,	economic	and	ethical	challenges.	According	to	Schmitt,	the	romantic	compulsion	to	create	an	aesthetically	balanced	and	compelling	argument	overrides	a	fundamental	ethical	or	political	decision	or	action.	Schmitt’s	solidly	catholic,	conservative	solution	to	the	technical	and	aesthetic	reign	of	political	romanticism	is	a	sovereignty	that	is	personalised,	romantic	and	corporeal;	a	conclusion	that	delivers	his	proposed	remedy	to	political	romanticism	back	into	the	very	same	formal	stranglehold	of	his	diagnoses.	The	figure	he	invokes	to	break	the	oscillating	but	paralysed	politics	of	liberalism	is	thoroughly	romantic.			
Performance	affectively	maps	this	question	of	the	form	and	temporality	of	sovereignty	but,	here,	the	corporeality	of	sovereignty	is	delivered	as	cinematic	information	and,	instead	of	the	‘wetware’	(Plant,	1997,	248)	of	human	agency,	visual	cohesion	and	pattern	supersede	human	presence	as	a	prerequisite	for	agency.	Benjamin	adopted	Schmitt’s	concept	of	sovereignty	but	reworked	its	temporality.	For	Benjamin’s	sovereignty	or	the	revolutionary	time	that	Schmitt’s	Prince	could	invoke	was	sedimented	in	the	commodity	form.		It	was	in	the	commodity	form	that	Benjamin	believed	forces	and	previous	struggles	lay	dormant.	A	person	needed	only	to	crack	open	and	collaborate	with	these	previously	sedimented	forces	in	order	invoke	a	revolutionary	time	that	would	halt	capital’s	acceleration	towards	fascism.	For	Benjamin,	sovereignty	lies	in	the	compacted	forces	otherwise	dormant	in	the	ephemera	of	history	and	in	the	
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action	of	halting	the	temporality	that	personalised	sovereignty	risked	awarding	to	an	authoritarian	figure.			
Performance	speculates	with	these	two	notions	of	sovereignty	but	is	able	to	affectively	speculate	upon	how	that	authoritarian	figure	might	be	information;	in	this	case,	cinematic	information	that	we	receive	as	the	embodiment	of	sovereignty	that	is	separate	from	the	‘wetware’	of	humans	but	no	less	forceful.	The	cinematic	bodies	of	Performance	are	both	violent	and	have	a	violence	done	to	them	that	breaks	those	bodies	open	and	randomises	their	corporality	and	that	of	the	cinematic	information	from	which	they	are	constructed.	The	film	speculates	with	an	informational	sovereignty	that	exceeds	organic/inorganic	designations	and	asks	which	of	these	patterned	and	unpatterned	categories	of	forceful	information	constitutes	an	agency	that	overcomes	an	authoritarian	sovereignty.	Schmitt	remains	an	antagonistic	but	productive	voice	throughout	this	analysis	of	the	film	and	throughout	the	thesis.				
	
	
1.1	Performance	(1970):	Cinema	as	an	Affective	Mapping	of	the	
Coming	Economy	of	Derivatives		
Performance,	starring	Mick	Jagger	and	set	between	the	two	worlds	of	London’s	crime	and	counter	cultures	of	the	late	1960s,	was	financed	by	a	division	of	Warner	Bros.	Studios	who	sought	to	mine	the	value	of	Jagger’s	value	as	a	rock	star,	sensing	that	audiences	for	cinema	were	now	fracturing	into	niche	groups	that	demanded	different	things	of	cinema.	Author,	journalist	and	chronicler	of	late	‘60s	America,	Joan	Didion,	speaks	of	the	period	as	being	more	“[…]	electrical	than	ethical”	(Didion,	1979,	13).	A	statement	that	underscores	the	advent	of	a	proliferating	media	and	information	age	that	installed	an	expectation	that	events	and	experiences	would	be	quickly	replayed	and	amplified	by	their	representation	in	the	media	and	to	degrees	that	overwhelmed	the	political	or	ethical	objectives	of	those	events.	For	example,	the	romantic	spirit	of	student	rebellion	in	the	‘60s	that	echoed	that	of	mid	nineteenth-century	European	
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student	revolt	was	joined	by	and	had	walking	amongst	it	the	media	echo	of	that	spirit.	I	will	broach	in	more	detail	the	relevance	of	nineteenth-century	romanticism	to	Schmitt’s	critique	of	modernity	later	in	this	chapter.	Schmitt’s	assertion	that	modernity	was	an	age	more	concerned	with	aestheticizing	experience	and	debate	reverberates	in	Didion’s	observation	of	the	late	‘60s.	In	Didion's	observation	and	overarching	commentary	are	the	charges	that	here	was	a	generation	that	mistook	the	mediated	experience	of	political	revolt	as	impactful,	ethical	and	political	change.	Performance	both	speculates	upon	and	puts	into	effect	this	affective	and	technological	regime.			In	the	rush	in	this	period	to	capitalise	on	new	but	as	yet	unmapped	markets,	major	studios	were	willing	to	speculate	capital	on	mainly	untested	production	talent	and	with	little	supervision	of	the	production	itself.	Partly	because	of	this	executive	distance	and	a	lack	of	understanding	of	newly	emerging	post-Fordist	economies,	Performance	is	a	serendipitous	collision	of	individuals	experimenting	in	lightly	grasped	philosophies	being	appropriated	by	pop	culture,	underground	politics	and	media	at	this	time.	The	film	and	the	process	of	its	making	pulls	disparate	materials	into	the	event	of	its	making.	The	writer	and	artist	Paul	Buck’s	account	of	the	film,	Performance:	A	Biography	of	the	Classic	‘60s	Film	(Buck,	2012)	acts	as	an	extensive	catalogue	and	testimony	to	the	volume	of	ideas	and	people	the	film	drew	into	its	circle	and	congealed	into	the	mixture	of	conventional	cinema	and	chaotic	materials	that	resulted.	References	to	Nietzsche,	de	Sade,	Borges	and	Magritte	become	the	source	materials	of	a	cinematic	experience	that	associate	of	the	film,	Marianne	Faithfull,	described	as	a	groundless	moment	that	signalled	the	end	of	the	‘60s	(Buck,	2012,	281).	In	a	portent	of	what	was	to	come	for	cultural	production,	the	vertical	management	structures	of	the	studio	cinema	system	in	the	making	of	Performance	were	threatened	with	dissolution.	In	its	place	would	come	flattened	structures	of	production,	characterised	by	proliferating	sub	genres	and	narratives.			Co-director	Cammell’s	insistence	that	the	film	was	a	collective	enterprise	reinforces	the	notion	that,	whilst	he	and	Roeg	were	its	directors,	the	production	maintains	a	peristalsis	of	opening	and	closing	to	both	its	internal	workings	and	
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to	external	economic	forces	in	such	a	way	that	it	destabilises	the	director’s	authorship	of	the	film.	Buck’s	biography	of	the	film	describes	a	production	process	more	akin	to	Warhol’s	Factory	or	online	prosumerism	than	the	singular	vision	of	a	sole	director	or,	in	the	case	of	Performance,	two	directors,	Nicolas	Roeg	and	Donald	Cammell.	The	film’s	many	casual	collaborators	and	associates	appear	to	add	to	and	adjust	Cammell’s	original	conceptual	assemblage	to	the	point	at	which	it	reaches	a	critical	mass	and	becomes	a	self-perpetuating	entity.	Situated	at	a	cusp	moment,	the	production	is,	on	the	one	hand,	embedded	in	the	economy	and	ideology	of	mainstream	studio	cinema	and,	on	the	other,	it	is	collaborating	with	as	yet	unfinancialised	forms	of	cultural	production.	It	manifests	both	an	economics	that	is	about	to	atrophy	and	another	emergent	economy	of	affect.	Regardless	of	this	paradox,	the	film	is	capable	of	affectively	mapping	each	of	these	economic	models	as	it	departs	from	one	model	and	effects	another.	The	film’s	peristaltic	opening	and	closing	to	both	its	internal	workings	and	to	external	economic	forces	causes	it	to	exceed	any	notion	of	having	a	discrete	internal	or	external	life.	The	film	is	able	to	map	a	near-future	subjectivity	that	is	neither	public	nor	private	but	where	the	private	is	mobilised	and	put	to	work.			
Performance	concocts	the	worlds	of	the	London	gangster	with	that	of	the	King’s	Road	dandy	in	an	involuted	cinematic	space.	In	brief,	the	plot	features	Chas	(James	Fox),	a	violent	and	psychotic	East	London	gangster	who	needs	a	place	to	lie	low	after	carrying	out	an	unsanctioned	killing.	He	finds	refuge	in	the	form	of	a	rented	room	in	the	house	of	Mr	Turner	(Mick	Jagger),	an	eccentric,	reclusive	former	rock	star,	who	is	looking	to	reclaim	his	‘lost	demon’.	The	household	includes	two	women;	Pherber	(Anita	Pallenberg)	and	Lucy	(Michele	Breton)	engaged	in	a	ménage	à	trois	with	Turner.	Chas	assumes	the	name	of	Johnny	Dean	and	demonstrates	contempt	for	his	effeminate	and	dandyish	host	who,	in	turn,	becomes	fascinated	by	what	motivates	and	equips	his	guest	to	operate	in	a	violent	world	of	crime.	Turner	claims	that	Chas	is	‘stuck’	and	so	he	and	Pallenberg	proceed	to	accelerate	the	process	of	‘opening	out’	their	guest	by	feeding	him	hallucinogens	stating:		
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PHERBER: 
We’ve got to go much further…out. 
 
TURNER: 
No. We’ve got to go further back – and faster. 			 (Cammell,	Roeg,	1970)	
	Flashbacks	and	dialogue	such	as	the	above	populate	the	film	as	it	experiments	with	cinema’s	temporality	and	fully	indulges	the	frictionless	quality	of	its	images	and	bodies	as	images.	As	a	result	of	the	couple’s	‘deprogramming’	of	their	guest,	Fox’s	character	begins	a	relationship	with	Lucy	that	suggests	he	has	escaped	the	performance	of	his	heteronormative	self-image	and	the	cast	dress	him	and	experiment	with	his	identity,	as	his	image	becomes	less	stable	and	more	fluid.	His	criminal	associates	locate	him	and	arrive	at	the	house	to	take	him	away	for	execution	but	allow	him	to	return	to	Turner’s	room	before	departing.	Ceremoniously	and	in	the	manner	of	an	anointment,	Chas	shoots	Turner	in	the	crown	of	his	head	and	the	camera	makes	its	way	down	the	wormhole	forged	by	the	bullet	and	out	into	an	exterior	shot	of	the	house,	where	we	see	Chas	being	led	away	by	members	of	the	gang	to	a	waiting	white	Rolls	Royce.	Jagger	and	Fox’s	courtship	climaxes	in	their	mutual	suicide.	Or,	what	co-director	Cammell	spoke	of	as	“[a]	murder	that	is	also	a	suicide”	(Buck,	2012,	49).	As	the	car	moves	off,	Chas	glances	out	of	the	car	window	and	we	see	Turner’s	bewigged	face.	Through	their	joint	suicide	the	two	protagonists,	their	images	and	their	performances	become	laminated	into	one	cinematic	body.5			The	scene	reinforces	the	peculiar	nature	of	Performance’s	bodies	in	that	they	are	not	loyal	or	tethered	to	the	subjects	they	represent.	Whilst	Performance	was	produced	as	an	analogue	film,	it	rehearses	and	predicts	many	of	the	qualities	of	digital	cinema	in	the	way	that	its	cinematic	bodies	morph	and	become	multiple	iterations.	We	are	no	longer,	as	viewers	of	the	film,	assured	of	receiving	signifiers	that	can	be	traced	one	step	back	to	that	which	is	being	signified.	There	is	an	absence	of	an	indexical	relationship	between	that	which	we	are	viewing	and	the	bodies	and	objects	captured	on	film.	We	are	conscious	of	signifiers	becoming	that	which	is	signified,	as	the	film	assails	us	with	multiple	iterations	of	its	cinematic	
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bodies.	Because	of	this,	the	film	predicts	digital	video’s	ability	to	produce	spaces	and	bodies	internal	to	its	workings;	in	the	process,	acting	as	a	proto-digital	cinema	and,	at	another	level,	producing	what	writer	on	cinema	Steven	Shaviro	calls	the	relational	spaces	of	capital.	Shaviro	explains	that	these	are	spaces	of	the	sort	theorized	by	Leibniz	and	Whitehead,	and	more	recently	by	David	Harvey.	A	view	evidenced	in	the	following	quote	by	Harvey:	“	The	relational	view	of	space	holds	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	space	or	time	outside	of	the	processes	that	define	them	[…	]	Processes	do	not	occur	in	space	but	define	their	own	spatial	frame.	The	concept	of	space	is	embedded	in	or	internal	to	process”	(Harvey,	2006,	123).	Shaviro	underscores	the	vital	and	forceful	instability	of	the	type	of	space	that	Harvey	theorises:	“Relational	space	varies	from	moment	to	moment,	along	with	the	forces	that	generate	and	invest	it.	It	continually	alters	its	curvature	and	its	dimensions;	it	does	not	persist	as	a	stable,	enduring	container	for	objects	that	would	be	situated	solidly	within	it”	(Shaviro,	2010,	16).			The	film	undermines	analogue’s	previous	habits	of	standing	in	for	the	bodies	and	spaces	which	it	signified;	instead,	it	detects	and	puts	into	effect	the	fast	approaching	capacities	of	video	to	transform	bodies	into	endless	iterations	of	frictionless	and	affective	information.					 	
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	______________________________________________________________________________________	Fig	4.	[Top]	Fashion	models	the	Myer	Twins.	Extras	in	Performance.	Fig	5.	[Bottom]	Rosebloom	and	boss	Harry	Flowers.	Doubles	populate	Performance	as	iterations	and	‘flickering	signifiers’	(Hayles).				The	film’s	concern	with	doubles	and	reproductions	is	enforced	throughout	by,	for	example,	the	appearance	of:	fashion	models	the	Myer	Twins	delivering	a	Magritte	painting	to	Turner’s	house;	Chas’s	allusion	to	the	dead	film	star	James	Dean	through	his	adoption	of	the	name	Johnny	Dean	when	he	arrives	at	Turner’s	house;	the	naming	of	the	criminal	boss	and	his	partner:	Harry	Flowers	and	Rosebloom.	Flowers	and	Rosebloom,	in	turn,	reference	the	East	End	crime	bosses	the	Kray	Twins,	who	had	loose	associations	with	the	film.	The	affective	intensity	of	the	film	leads	the	viewer	to	experience	these	doubles	as	iterations	and	not	simply	copies	that	would	imply	an	originary	image	or	referent.	The	film	is	less	populated	by	facsimiles	and	is,	instead,	constituted	by	forceful	iterations.	
Performance	appears	to	rehearse	a	characteristic	of	video,	as	cinema	departs	from	the	analogue	as	a	continuum	of	light	towards	a	digital	cinema	that	requires	the	translation	of	light	into	the	zeros	and	ones	of	coding	and	delivers	these	packets	of	translation	as	iterations.	As	suggested	earlier	in	this	chapter,	
Performance	is	analogue	but	predicts	many	of	the	habits	of	video	in	that	the	bodies	and	senses	of	its	viewers	encounter	the	affective	bodies	of	the	film	as	discordant	patterns	of	temporal	shock,	so	that	these	cinematic	bodies	act	as	both	points	of	orientation	and	disorientation.	The	viewer	is	left	constantly	transitioning	between	these	paradoxical	moments	of	intensively	enmeshed	sense	and	non-sense.	It’s	these	intense	iterations,	or	what	Hayles	terms	flickering	signifiers,	that	Shaviro	argues	constitute	a	cinema	that	no	longer	represents	social	processes	but	actively	participates	in	them	and	helps	to	constitute	them.	Working	through	Brian	Massumi’s	translation	and	reading	of	Deleuze	&	Guatarri’s	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(Deleuze	et	al.,	2011),	Shaviro	differentiates	between	affect	and	emotion	by	suggesting	that	affect	is	primary,	non	conscious,	asubjective	or	presubjective,	asignifying,	unqualified	and	intensive.6	According	to	Shaviro,	a	cultural	production	that	employs	these	things,	these	“blocs	of	affect”	(Shaviro,	2010,	2),	are	‘machines	for	generating	affect’	and	
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for	capitalising	upon	or	extracting	value	from	this	affect.	They	generate	subjectivity	and	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	valorisation	of	capital.	Shaviro’s	claims	around	what	he	calls	Post	Cinematic	Affect	(2010)	are	discussed	further	in	the	last	chapter	of	this	thesis	in	relation	to	the	romantic	economics	of	derivatives	and	the	bracketing	of	finance	by	probability.			On	completion,	studio	executives	quarantined	Performance	and	threatened	to	burn	the	negatives,	due	to	what	was	perceived	as	its	abject	content.	The	film	was	described	at	the	time	as	a	“psycho	sexual	lab”	and	“a	seething	cauldron	of	diabolical	ingredients:	drugs,	incestuous	sexual	relationships,	role	reversals,	art	and	life	all	whipped	together	into	a	witches’	brew”	(Faithfull	and	Dalton,	2000,	150).	The	film	existed	prior	to	its	delayed	release	in	1970	and,	in	the	eyes	of	studio	executives,	as	a	cultural	object	riven	with	chaotic	and	contingent	materials	impossible	to	mine	and	extract	value	from.	It	was	considered	abject	not	simply	for	its	content	but	also	for	a	lack	of	a	form	that	would	have	made	it	market-ready	for	a	Fordist	cinema	concerned	with	depth	of	field	and	stable	bodies	in	space.	The	film’s	divination	of	a	coming	ontology	of	finance	as	an	affective	economy	had	not	yet	taken	hold	on	a	studio	system	whose	cinematic	bodies	still	retained	some	of	the	friction	and	material	resistance	of	the	subjects	they	depicted.			The	film’s	capacity	to	act	in	a	peristaltic	manner,	opening	and	closing	to	outside	and	internal	influences	at	such	speed	that	its	boundaries	are	superseded	by	this	delimited	state,	results	in	it	being	sited	entirely	in	its	historical	and	material	cusp	moment.	As	a	cultural	object,	it	is	situated	like	a	Baudelairean,	romantic,	aristocratic	figure,	poised	on	the	stairwell	in	an	era	beset	by	change.	It	is	an	object	embedded	in	forms	of	capital,	attempting	to	locate	where	value	lies,	as	cinema	and	music	present	themselves	as	media	most	readily	able	to	engage	with	the	new	demands	of	a	post-Fordist,	experience	economy,	where	products	are	no	longer	solely	consumed,	but	felt.	The	language	and	rhetoric	of	popular	revolution	and	individual	freedoms	that	the	film	mines	as	part	of	its	segueing	of	‘60s	counter	culture	into	mainstream	cinema,	chimes	with	the	social	and	political	unrest	in	Europe	in	the	1830s	and	1840s	which,	according	to	Schmitt	in	Political	
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Romanticism	(1921),	binds	revolt,	romanticism	and	individualism	together	to	become	the	overarching	principle	of	‘political	romanticism’,	so	that	all	politics	became	a	romantic	politics.	As	I	argue	in	the	second	chapter	of	this	thesis,	cinema	has,	until	recently,	been	the	art	form	most	saturated	by	the	economics	of	its	time	and,	so,	reverberates	with	an	ontology	of	finance.	Performance	is	situated	on	a	cusp	moment	that	witnesses	the	mobilisation	of	bodies,	objects	and	emotions	and	converts	them	into	energies	that	can	be	valorised.	The	methods	of	conversion	and	mobilisation	are	two	registers	of	violence.	One	is	a	narrative	of	violence,	the	other	is	the	violence	and	speed	of	the	film’s	editing;	temporal	and	bodily	distortions	that	assail	the	viewer	and	speak	of	the	chaotic	information	contained	in	the	signal.			
		Fig	6.	A	Hell’s	Angel	guard	on	stage	during	a	Rolling	Stones	concert	at	Altamont	Speedway	Free	Festival,	1969.	Photo:	Beth	Bagby.	A	romantic	violence	that	mobilises	energies,	humans	and	objects	tips	into	a	literal	violence.			
Performance	is	concerned	with	themes	of	violence	and	the	technological	and	temporal	violence	of	cinematic	bodies	as	they	move	from	one	iteration	to	another,	disrupting	the	film’s	patterning	of	visual	information.	Two	actions	occur:	firstly,	violence	as	an	expression	of	one	body	inscribing	acts	of	violence	on	
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another	body	and,	secondly,	the	dissolving,	merging	and	shattering	of	cinematic	bodies	through	editing,	superimposition	and	other	effects.	Each	of	these	actions	corresponds	with	and	narrates	the	other	throughout	the	film	to	create	the	highly	kinetic	cinema	that	assails	the	viewer.	Co-director	Cammell	underlined	this	affective	correspondence	of	categories	of	violence	in	interview	by	describing	the	film	as	“[…]	a	poetic	treatise	on	violence”	(Buck,	2012,	102).	The	film	adopts	violence	as	a	means	of	achieving	affect	and	taps	into	a	strain	of	the	‘60s	counter	culture,	romantically	fascinated	by	the	affective	potential	of	violence,	but	which	had	that	dalliance	dissolved	in	the	flash	of	gunfire	that	saw	a	concert-goer	killed	by	a	Hell’s	Angel	gang	member	at	the	Rolling	Stones’	Altamont	free	concert	(1969).	An	event	that	saw	a	romantic	violence	made	literal.	The	violence	of	
Performance	mobilises	its	bodies	and	objects	so	that	they	become	fluid,	interchangeable,	convertible,	frictionless	cinematic	visual	data	that	we	experience	as	simultaneously	forceful	but	ungraspable.			This	romantic	violence	releases	objects	from	their	previous	categories,	in	the	same	manner	that	war	can	suspend	the	original	and	designed	function	of	an	object	and	redesignate	its	function	towards	the	objectives	of	war.	A	church	spire	can	become	a	navigation	point	or	machine	gun	nest;	a	wall	becomes	a	defensive	position;	a	body	becomes	a	barrier;	the	population	of	a	village	becomes	a	human	shield;	and	fear	becomes	a	weapon.	In	a	state	of	war,	all	things	and	all	aspects	of	those	things	are	put	to	work	and	are	simultaneously	liberated	from	their	previously	fixed	designations,	creating	a	sense	of	release	that	converts	objects	to	flows	of	potential	energy.	A	highly	capitalised	cinema	takes	on	all	the	functions	of	war,	in	that	it	mobilises	everything	in	its	path	in	order	to	achieve	its	goal	of	converting	those	things	into	a	cinematic	energy.	The	romantic	violence	of	
Performance	is	romantic	because	it	appears	to	liberate	cinematic	bodies	and	objects	from	their	referents	and	convert	them	into	affective	information	that	induces	a	precognitive	moment	(affect)	in	its	audience,	which,	in	turn,	is	captured	as	experience	and	mined	as	value.	The	two	registers	of	violence	threaten	both	to	instate	corporeal	bodies	that	cause	a	tear	in	normal	time	and	space;	whilst	the	editing,	for	example,	fractures	and	displaces	time	and	bodies	and	causes	the	celluloid	substrate	of	the	film	to	be	in	correspondence	with	the	
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narratives	of	smashing	windows	and	the	cracking	and	piercing	of	bodies.	The	violence	of	the	film	threatens	to	instate	a	narrative	of	wetware	as	the	embodiment	of	agency	and	sovereignty,	whilst	simultaneously	foregrounding	the	affective,	visual	and	informatic	nature	of	that	sovereignty	via	the	fracturing	of	its	cinematic	ground.			The	violence	of	Performance	liberates	bodies	and	objects	from	their	heaviness	and	mass	and	converts	them	into	flows	of	potential	energy	in	a	way	that	anticipates	an	ontology	of	finance,	whose	ground	is	experience	and	information,	and	not	goods	or	services.	The	affective	turn	that	Performance	maps	has	its	antecedent	in	the	romanticism	of	the	previous	century	and,	in	order	to	understand	the	constellation	of	a	contemporary	romanticism	better,	it	is	necessary	to	look	in	more	detail	at	Schmitt’s	formulation	of	political	romanticism.	It	is	then	possible	to	ask	how	bodies	of	weightless	but	forceful	information	unthrone	the	‘wetware’	of	human	agency.	But,	also,	how	and	why	certain	types	of	information	are	understood	as	having	agency	and	others	are	not.	The	latter	question	is	addressed	at	greater	length	in	the	last	section	of	this	chapter.			
1.2	No	Finance	without	Romance	(Figure	as	Romantic	Ground)7			This	section	deals	more	closely	with	Schmitt’s	formulation	of	political	romanticism	and	the	strands	that	connect	its	formulation	in	the			nineteenth-century	with	its	peculiar	function	as	both	ground	and	figure	for	finance	and	cultural	production	from	1970	onwards.	The	period	of	Performance’s	production	marks	the	end	of	economies	of	real	abstraction	and	a	crisis	in	the	commodity	form	that	is	still	being	felt	today	in	the	form	of	the	derivative.	The	gestatory	period	leading	to	this	transformation	was	an	age	of	experience	and	of	the	self,	exemplified	by	political	actors	of	this	same	period	and	described	by	one	of	Carl	Schmitt’s	translators,	Guy	Oakes,	as	being	the	inheritors	of	an	early	nineteenth-century	romantic	compulsion:	“[…]	towards	self-disclosure	and	self-celebration.”	Oakes	suggests	this	is	exemplified	in	Norman	Mailer’s	chronicle	of	his	attendance	at	the	anti	Vietnam	War	protests	in	Washington,	1967	(Oakes	in	Schmitt,	1991,	xxviii)	–	an	event	that	provides	Mailer	with	an	arena	for	his	
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poeticized	experience	and	which	results	in	a	romantic	“[…]	attitude	that	suspends	practical	judgments	in	the	interest	of	preserving	the	spontaneity	of	sentiment”	(Oakes	in	Schmitt,	1991,	xxx).	This	phenomenon	of	what	Schmitt	describes	as	the	need	for	all	experience	to	be	pursued	by	the	“[…]	colourful	shadow	of	revolution”	(Schmitt,	1991,	160)	connects	the	romantic	tendencies	of	the	‘60s	with	those	of	romanticism’s	European	antecedents	in	first	half	of	the	18th	century.			Romanticism’s	development	as	a	literary	movement	in	Europe	privileged	feelings	over	rationalism	and	objective	truth	by	rejecting	classicism	and	instead	embraced	medieval	revivalism	and	its	adherence	to	nature.	This	guarantee	was	also	afforded	to	the	state	or	the	nation	so	that	the	feelings	of	the	individual	and	the	feelings	and	energies	of	the	nation	were	interchangeable.	Notions	of	truth	were,	instead,	guaranteed	by	inner	feelings	and	philosophy	would	become	a	science	of	thinking	beautifully.	An	exemplar	of	this	move	to	aestheticize	philosophy	was	the	Berlin	born	Alexander	Gottlieb	Baumgarten	who	undertook	one	of	the	earliest	systematic	philosophies	of	art	and	a	series	of	textbooks	on	metaphysics	that	became	central	to	Austrian	romanticism	(Caygill,	2013,	
Romantic	Transdisciplinarity	–	Art	and	the	New,	lecture).	These	developments	led	to	nationalist	movements,	exemplified	by	German	student	revolts	in	1848	demanding	a	united	Germany.	The	key	role	of	students	in	leading	popular	uprisings	up	to	1848	is	partly	explained	by	the	emergence	of	the	term	Bildung	(German	for:	education	and	formation),	which	refers	to	the	German	tradition	of	self-cultivation	(as	related	to	the	German	for:	creation,	image,	shape),	wherein	philosophy	and	education	are	linked	in	manner	that	refers	to	a	process	of	both	personal	and	cultural	maturation	(Caygill,	2013).	The	‘energies’	and	‘spirit’	of	the	nation	were	interchangeable	with	those	of	the	individual	and,	in	particular,	those	of	the	student	vanguard,	whose	role	it	was	to	seek	truth	through	their	personal	development	and	education.	This	spirit	of	Bildung	permeates	the	descriptions	of	self-cultivation	that	Didion	renders	in	her	account	of	the	late	‘60s.	Didion’s	actors	are	a	vanguard	of	truth	in	search	of	words	and	gestures	that	will	have	effects	on	a	macro	and	national	scale.	The	personal	becomes	political.	The	notion	that	words	and	beautiful	rhetoric,	in	particular,	can	be	impactful	is	a	continuation	of	a	
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romantic	tradition	that	believed	that	philosophy	could	produce	energies	and	effects	rather	than	describing	them	(Caygill,	2013).	Romanticism	was	not,	therefore,	a	siloed	concept	autonomous	from	other	philosophies,	but	one	that	could	capture	disciplines	and	concepts	once	it	had	aestheticized	and	converted	them	into	energies.	Art	could,	therefore,	become	a	science	and	science	an	art	(Caygill,	2013).	The	late	‘60s’	cultivation	of	the	self	was	a	resumption	and	advancement	of	Schmitt’s	subjective	occasionalism,	or	the	ability	to	see	every	event	and	object	as	an	opportunity	for	the	development	of	one’s	romantic	subjectivity.	The	work	begun	in	the	18th	century	of	aestheticizing	knowledge	production	of	all	kinds	took	purchase	again	in	the	late	‘60s,	only	to	become	accelerated	as	the	self	became	constituted	as	information.	How	the	romantic	subject	becomes	both	figure	and	ground	is,	however,	not	solely	reliant	on	a	technological	development	but,	just	as	importantly,	on	an	earlier	ontological	shift	unpacked	by	Schmitt.			In	Guy	Oakes’	account	of	Mailer’s	experience,	it	is	possible	to	see	the	reoccurrence	of	a	nineteenth-century	phenomenon,	or	what	Schmitt	argues	is	the	displacement	of	God	as	the	basic	metaphysical	principle	by	the	‘revolutionary	God’,	variously	conceived	as	the	people.	Schmitt	argues	that	God	is	equally	replaced	by	the	‘conservative	God’,	conceived	of	as	traditions	that	attempt	to	restore	what	society	has	revolutionized.	As	a	result,	God,	as	a	metaphysical	principle,	is	displaced	in	an	oscillating	process	of	revolution	and	counter	revolution,	with	the	human	subject	at	the	base	of	both	(Schmitt,	1991,	58).			Here,	I	will	briefly	outline	Schmitt’s	description	of	the	reversal	of	metaphysics’	asymmetry,	which	he	claims	takes	place	under	the	aegis	of	political	romanticism	and	which	makes	the	human	the	locus	of	an	idealization	of	action	for	the	pulsions	of	both	revolution	and	of	conservatism	from	the	late	18th	century	onwards.	This	extended	overview	of	PR	also	serves	to	further	unpack	the	term	‘subjective	occasionalism’	used	earlier	in	this	chapter	(Schmitt,	1991,	140).			Schmitt	is	careful	to	state	that,	in	order	to	place	romanticism	in	modern	intellectual	history,	it	is	essential	to	grasp	the	main	consequences	of	the	
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development	of	metaphysics	during	the	last	three	centuries,	which	is	the	displacement	of	a	transcendental	God	as	the	basic	metaphysical	principle	via	Descartes.	In	a	Cartesian	dualist	universe,	God	remains	the	cause	of	both	mental	and	physical	events	and	also	the	interactions	between	them.	This	means	that	it	is	not	the	human	that	acts,	but	rather	God,	for	whom	the	person	is	only	an	occasion.	In	this	way,	the	world	becomes	the	contingent	material	for	the	action	of	God,	the	reality.	However,	under	the	conditions	of	romanticism,	Schmitt	suggests	that	the	romantic	movement	retains	the	basic	metaphysical	schema	of	a	dualist	universe,	but	unseats	God	in	favour	of	the	romantic	subject.			The	subsequent	collapse	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century	of	a	traditional	idea	of	God	raises	the	spectre	of	a	vacuum	and	two	candidates	step	forward	to	assume	that	recently	vacated	metaphysical	principle.	These	are:	“[…]	humanity	or	the	‘revolutionary	god’	variously	conceived	as	the	people,	the	general	will,	the	public	or	society	(…)	and	‘the	conservative	god’	conceived	of	as	historically	unique	cultures,	traditions	and	nations	that	restored	what	society	had	revolutionized”	(Oakes	in	Schmitt,	1991,	xx).	Under	the	regime	of	romanticism,	everything	becomes	an	occasion	for	the	subjective	imagination;	Schmitt	writes:		 “This	is	exhibited	even	more	conspicuously	in	romanticism,	where	the	concept	of	the	 occasio	 develops	 its	 full	 disintegrative	 power.	 That	 is	 because	 now	 it	 is	 no	longer	 God,	 something	 absolute	 and	 objective,	 that	 stands	 in	 the	 centre.	 On	 the	contrary,	the	individual	subject	treats	the	world	as	the	occasio	of	his	activity	and	productivity.	For	him,	even	the	greatest	external	event	a	revolution	or	a	world	war	is	 intrinsically	 indifferent.	 The	 incident	 becomes	 significant	 only	 when	 it	 has	become	the	occasion	for	a	great	experience,	a	genial	apprehension,	or	some	other	romantic	creation.	Therefore	true	reality	has	only	what	the	subject	makes	into	the	object	 of	 its	 creative	 interest.	 By	 means	 of	 a	 simple	 reversal,	 the	 subject	 has	become	the	creator	of	the	world.	It	designates	as	the	world	only	what	served	it	as	the	occasion	of	an	experience”	(1991,	96).		Schmitt	argues	that	romanticism	positions	itself	in	relation	to	these	two	faces	of	modernity,	‘the	people’	and	‘tradition’,	by	grounding	them	both	in	the	subjective	imagination.	As	a	consequence,	God	is	replaced	by	the	private	individual	of	the	bourgeois	social	order	and	the	romantic	ego	becomes	the	final	metaphysical	authority.	The	romantic	processes	that	Schmitt	describes	are	parallel	ones	of	secularization	and	privatization.	In	this	way,	Schmitt	concludes	that	romanticism	
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may	be	understood	as	‘subjectified	occasionalism’.	In	his	own	words:	“Accordingly,	I	have	proposed	the	following	formulation:	Romanticism	is	subjectified	occasionalism.	In	other	words,	in	the	romantic,	the	romantic	subject	treats	the	world	as	an	occasion	and	an	opportunity	for	his	romantic	productivity”	(1991,	17).		Schmitt’s	later	theory	of	sovereignty	developed	in	his	1922	book	Political	
Theology:	Four	Chapters	on	the	Concept	of	Sovereignty	opposes	what	he	sees	as	political	romanticism’s	departure	from	political	objectivity	and	the	ability	to	make	the	‘decision’.	However,	his	model	of	sovereignty	teeters	towards	a	romantic	sensibility	due	to	his	personalisation	of	what	he	terms	the	‘decision’,	or	a	person	who	can	break	the	regime	of	political	romanticism	by	intervening	and	rupturing	it	from	the	outside.	This	exposes	Schmitt’s	thinking	as	being	held	within	a	formal	stranglehold	that	renders	him	and	his	remedy	to	an	apolitical	modernity	as	being,	in	itself,	politically	romantic.	Performance,	whilst	being	embedded	in	its	historical	and	economic	moment,	also	signals	how	this	historical	moment	is	infused	with	the	romantic	spirit	of	the	19th	century.	I	talk,	in	chapter	two,	of	how	a	similar	bridging	takes	place	in	the	film	Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975)	that	cites	the	18th	century	as	an	age	of	debt,	contracts	and	romantic	economics,	and	heralds	the	coming	of	a	second	18th	century.	Performance	is	similarly	engaged	in	quoting	and	drawing	on	the	energies	and	mores	of	a	previous	age,	as	it	senses	a	new	romanticism	taking	hold.			
Performance	maps	this	affective	turn	in	culture	and	economics	but	it	also	displaces	the	metaphysical	principle	of	political	romanticism	into	the	realms	of	visual,	sometimes	chaotic,	information.	If,	for	Schmitt,	the	metaphysical	authority	of	political	romanticism	replaces	God	with	the	private	individual	of	the	bourgeois	social	order	and	the	romantic	ego,	then	Performance	demonstrates	how	this	principle	shares	its	throne	with	affective	information.	The	film,	both	in	its	production	and	in	its	exhibition,	mobilises	bodies,	objects	and	emotions	so	that	every	occasion	and	every	thing	is	converted	into	energies.	All	things	become	potentially	contingent	material	for	the	film’s	production	of	affect,	which	the	film	then	valorises	and	mines.	These	developments	threaten	to	unthrone	the	
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wetware	of	Schmitt’s	political	romanticism	with	cinematic	bodies	and	a	body	of	visual	information	that	is	more	adequate	than	the	politically	romantic	subject.	As	a	consequence,	the	private	individual	of	Schmitt’s	political	romanticism	is	rendered	less	than	adequate	in	comparison	to	the	romantic	energies	of	the	cinematic	bodies	that	s/he	witnesses	on	screen.	Bodies	or	‘wetware’	become	a	warranty	for	these	super-adequate	entities	that	assume	a	sovereignty	of	affective	intensity.	However,	the	film	obscures	this	paradox	with	narratives	of	agency	and	violence	that	course	through	the	film,	obscuring	an	asymmetry	of	sovereignty	that	is	beginning	to	appear.	Performance	maintains	the	schema	of	political	romanticism	but	the	romantic	subject	is	joined	at	the	centre	of	that	constellation	by	affect.			The	visual	information	of	Performance	and	its	cinematic	bodies	assumes	a	romantic	sovereignty	with	seemingly	greater	capacities	than	that	of	the	romantic	subject.	For	political	romanticism,	a	condition	of	sovereignty	is	the	personalisation	of	agency.	This	condition	is,	however,	problematized	under	a	regime	of	affective	information	where	pattern	and	patterns	of	information	supersede	presence	as	a	condition	of	agency.	Both	personalisation	and	pattern	are	presence	of	a	kind	and	Schmitt’s	work	on	sovereignty	can	help	to	elaborate	why	this	is.	The	following	section	will	explore	this	but,	for	now,	we	need	to	remind	ourselves	of	how	the	kinds	of	pattern	and	randomness	that	Performance	transmits	relate	to	a	crisis	in	the	commodity	form	that	extends	to	the	present,	and	why	this	matters.			The	film	presents	a	post-Fordist	vision	of	cinema	and	cultural	production,	but	also	a	future	crisis	in	the	commodity	form	that	is	marked	by	the	introduction	of	the	derivative.	The	commodity	form	has	within	it	all	the	sedimented	forces	of	labour	and	machine	power	needed	to	compile	a	unitary	thing;	a	discrete	object	that:	“[…]	calls	forth	an	individual	subject	as	its	intimate	partner	in	the	market”	(Wark,	2017).	The	consumer	is	able	to	think	of	the	commodity	as	another	body,	a	body	like	their	own:	somatically	whole,	complete,	a	thing	that	can	be	addressed	and	form	attachments	with	other	things.	In	contrast	“[…]	derivatives	are	a	transmission	of	some	value	from	a	source	to	something	else,	an	attribute	of	that	
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original	expression	that	can	be	combined	with	like	characteristics,	a	variable	factor	that	can	move	in	harmony	or	dissonance	with	others”	(Martin,	2017,	Lecture).	Derivatives	allow	for	forms	of	abstraction	that	differ	from	the	commodity	form’s	condensation	of	labour	and	machine	power.	Instead,	and	in	the	case	of	derivatives,	each	of	the:			 “[…]	 component	 flows	 in	 commodification	 can	 be	 subdivided,	 valued,	 combined	and	 sold	 again	 and	 again	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 financial	 instrument.	 On	 top	 of	 the	quantitative	 abstraction	 of	 the	 energetics	 of	 production	 is	 a	 quantitative	abstraction	of	the	information	about	all	of	the	possible	future	states	of	that	system.	Each	of	which	can	be	separately	priced	and	sold”	(Wark,	2017).		This	crisis	in	the	commodity	form	presents	an	accompanying	crisis	of	embodiment	and	signification.	According	to	the	logic	of	derivatives,	value	and	power	are	no	longer	solely	gotten	from	sedimenting	certain	forces	of	labour,	for	example	in	a	commodity,	but	from	continually	wrenching	open	and	decolonising	objects,	subjects,	spaces	and	time.	The	consumer	and	consumer	citizen	are	no	longer	valuable	for	their	discrete	qualities	but	for	their	connectivity	and	capacity	for	flexibility.	For	example,	the	cell	phone	or	car	is	more	valuable	for	its	networkedness	and	is	advertised	with	this	in	mind.	Accordingly,	the	consumer	starts	to	fragment	and	their	intimacy	with	the	market	is	realised	only	through	a	fragmentation	of	one’s	capacities.	This,	however,	does	not	entirely	evacuate	notions	of	discrete	bodies	that	are	the	embodiment	of	action	and	power.	It	simply	serves	to	have	them	coexist	with	newer	forms	of	embodiment	in	order	to	obscure	the	diffuse	and	absolute	power	at	play.	Performance	ceases	to	call	forth	an	individual	subject	in	the	manner	of	previous	commodity	forms	of	cinema	or	cultural	object	and	old	metaphors	become	inadequate	in	terms	of	describing	the	newer	forms	of	capital	that	Performance	forecasts.	For	now,	we	need	to	step	back	and	look	at	Schmitt’s	work	on	sovereignty	in	relation	to	questions	of	pattern	and	randomness	to	understand	how	these	older	metaphors	persist	and	coexist	with	newer	forms	of	embodiment.			
1.3	Schmitt’s	Concept	of	Sovereignty			
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Why	is	it	that	concepts	of	sovereignty	and	agency	adhere	to	notions	of	a	discrete	body,	even	where	and	when	sovereignty	is	afforded	to	information	that	makes	that	body	mutable,	atomised	and	liquid?	Schmitt	and	Walter	Benjamin’s	direct	and	indirect	correspondence	over	the	temporal	composition	of	Hobbes’	
Leviathan	of	1651,	or	the	sovereign	figure	that	can	produce	revolutionary	time,	is	mirrored	by	Performance	and	its	speculation	on	bodies	that	are	violent	or/and	are	transformed	violently.	The	film’s	speculation	on	forms	of	embodiment	is	weaved	throughout	this	section	and	serves	as	a	means	of	unpacking	Schmitt’s	work,	but	also	provides	an	introduction	to	the	work	of	N.	Katherine	Hayles	on	pattern	and	randomness	in	information.			Schmitt’s	1922	book	Political	Theology:	Four	Chapters	on	the	Concept	of	
Sovereignty	is	concerned	with	modernity’s	assault	on	what	he	views	as	the	transcendental	trajectory	of	politics	and	its	subsequent	transformation	into	a	technical	pursuit,	aided	and	abetted	by	liberal	conversation.	He	sees	this	development	as	being	exemplified,	for	example,	in	the	work	of	one	of	his	contemporaries,	the	juridical	theorist	Hans	Kelsen,	whose	work	comes	under	a	sustained	attack	from	Schmitt.8	Schmitt	feels	that	this	development	of	the	law,	as	a	technically	pure	but	ultimately	aestheticized	set	of	practices,	will	lead	to	the	violent	excesses	of	the	state,	not	their	regulation.	In	Schmitt’s	eyes,	it	is	the	job	of	the	sovereign	to	abate	the	excesses	of	the	state	and	politics’	trajectory	towards	war.	The	two	most	frequently	cited	quotes	from	the	book	that	expose	its	main	themes	concerning	sovereignty,	the	‘decision’	and	the	underlying	theological	impulses	of	politics,	read	as	follows:		 “Sovereign	is	he	who	decides	on	the	exception”	(Schmitt,	2006,	5).		“All	 significant	 concepts	 of	 the	 modern	 theory	 of	 the	 state	 are	 secularized	theological	concepts…”	(Schmitt,	2006,	36).			The	essays	are	an	argument	for	a	pure	form	of	juridical	law	making	and	what	he	calls	‘decisionism’,	carried	out	via	a	sovereign	figure	and	dependent	on	a	borderline	concept	that	throws	the	sovereign	into	relief.	A	concept	otherwise	understood	as	the	‘state	of	exception’.	Decisionism,	Schmitt	forcefully	and	floridly	argues,	leads	to	an	eternal	Bible-like	creation	through	the	acts	of	a	prince	
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who	delivers	the	law	without	the	need	to	call	on	codified	laws.	The	demand,	Schmitt	says,	is	for	the	miracle	of	theology,	not	the	moralizing	of	New	Testament	Christianity.	This	sustained	attack	on	a	post-Enlightenment	condition	that	has,	as	he	understands	it,	replaced	God	with	the	will	of	the	people,	is	qualified	by	his	reference	to	Hobbes’	Leviathan	as	an	almost	inconceivable	but	affective	mass.	In	this	way,	Schmitt’s	notion	of	sovereignty	and	Hobbes’	Leviathan	converge.	At	the	same	time,	Schmitt	is	keen	to	emphasize	that	this	formulation	does	not	represent	an	anthropomorphism	of	the	state,	but	a	pure	juridical	construct	that	is	time	based	and	not	organically	produced;	a	point	that	he	deviates	from	later	in	his	thinking.			The	two	challenges	that	Schmitt	poses	to	the	reader	are	ones	of	transcendence	and	what	he	calls	the	situational	nature	of	law	making	(Schmitt,	2005,	15).	His	response	to	these	challenges	is	to	process	the	concept	of	the	Leviathan	through	the	filter	of	previous	Catholic	conservative	thinkers,	who	advocate	dictatorship	as	the	solution	to	the	challenges	of	the	modern	state,	as	he	pictures	them.	Before	addressing	this	fault	line	in	Schmitt’s	thinking,	we	first	need	to	understand	why	the	Leviathan	is	so	important	to	both	Benjamin	and	Schmitt	as	a	schema	for	sovereignty	and	how	this	figure	is	at	large	in	a	cultural	assemblage	like	
Performance.	To	do	this,	we	need	to	briefly	revisit	Hobbes’	invention.		
1.4	The	Leviathan			Born	out	of	the	chaos	of	the	English	Civil	War,	Thomas	Hobbes’	creation	constitutes	a	covenant	that	prioritizes	the	unity	of	the	representer	over	the	unity	of	the	represented,	as	a	means	of	ensuring	peace	in	an	otherwise	natural	state	of	war.	Through	the	figure	of	the	Leviathan,	Hobbes	inaugurates	a	modern	theory	of	the	state	to	which	all	warring	factions	in	the	English	Civil	War	could	agree	to	secede	rights,	in	return	for	security.	According	to	Hobbes,	the	state	or	sovereign	can	take	the	form	of	a	collective	or	individual	who	can	exact	force	upon	those	parties	that	do	not	behave	in	accordance	with	the	covenant,	but	the	covenant	can	be	broken	if	the	sovereign	abuses	the	powers	transferred	to	him/her/it	by	those	parties.	The	represented	must	trust	that	the	sovereign	will	not	overstep	the	
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potential	for	violence	entrusted	to	him/her/it	for	the	covenant	to	work.	The	Leviathan	is	then	an	image	and	thing	participated	in	by	its	subjects,	the	effectiveness	of	which	is	guaranteed,	not	by	a	notion	that	it	constitutes	a	collection	of	people	in	one	place	at	one	time,	but	a	succession	of	people	in	one	body	over	time.	It	is	an	entity	built	to	last	because	it	steps	over	the	mortality	of	its	participants.			The	figure	of	Hobbes’	Leviathan,	for	the	political	philosopher	Carl	Schmitt	–	often	thought	of	as	the	German	Thomas	Hobbes	–	takes	on	a	vanguardist	characteristic,	in	that	it	is	an	extraordinary	figure	that	arrives	from	the	outside	of	a	set	of	circumstances	to	create	a	break,	an	exception.	Again,	in	the	words	of	Schmitt:			 “All	 law	is	 ‘situational	 law’.	The	sovereign	produces	and	guarantees	the	situation	in	 its	 totality.	 He	 has	 the	monopoly	 over	 this	 last	 decision.	 Therein	 resides	 the	essence	of	the	state’s	sovereignty,	which	must	be	juristically	defined	correctly,	not	as	the	monopoly	to	coerce	or	to	rule	but	as	the	monopoly	to	decide.	The	exception	reveals	most	clearly	 the	essence	of	 the	state’s	authority.	The	decision	parts	here	from	the	 legal	norm,	and	(to	 formulate	 it	paradoxically)	authority	proves	 that	 to	produce	the	law	it	need	not	be	based	on	the	law”	(Schmitt,	2006,13).		For	Schmitt,	the	performative	moment	of	constructing	the	law	suspends	all	universals	in	an	exalted	moment.9	However,	the	agent	and	substrate	of	the	decision	is,	for	Schmitt,	personalised,	and	agency	becomes	inexorably	tied	to	the	human	form.	The	figure,	and	not	the	temporality	of	the	Leviathan,	takes	precedence	in	Schmitt’s	formulation	of	the	decision	and	of	sovereignty.	This	discrepancy	in	Schmitt’s	method	that	previously	underscored	that	the	Leviathan	need	not	to	be	anthropomorphic,	is	born	out	by	the	art	historian	Horst	Van	Bredekamp’s	commentary	on	Schmitt’s	interpretation	of	the	Leviathan:			 “Hobbes’	objective	is	the	permanence	of	the	Leviathan,	whereas	Schmitt	emphasizes	the	exaltedness	of	the	moment.	Schmitt,	who	attacked	occasionalism	as	a	delusion	specific	to	German	romanticism,	is	in	fact,	its	involuntary	heir.	Hobbes	is	political,	Schmitt	romantic”	(Bredekamp,	1999,	259).		Schmitt’s	“[s]hock	theory	of	the	authoritarian	avant-garde”	(Bredekamp,	1999,	263)	persists	in	Performance	and	is	embodied	by	the	character	of	Chas	–	a	figure	that	reinforces	a	borderline	concept	by	acting	as	what	Agamben	calls	the	force	of	
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law	without	law	(Agamben,	2005,39).	Chas	embodies	a	narrative	of	a	permanent	state	of	exception,	a	form	of	extra	law.	The	film,	however,	speculates	with	this	narrative	and	this	body	by	rupturing	it,	breaking	it	violently	and	cinematically,	both	through	depictions	of	violence	and	a	cinematic	violence	that	randomises	the	visual	information	that	otherwise	constitutes	this	vanguardist	figure.	The	violently	post-continuous	nature	of	the	film	and	its	temporal,	spatial	and	bodily	violence	apprehend	it	from	being	typical	commodity-form	cinema	that	we	might	crack	open	and	find	within	a	form	of	messianicity.	The	film	generates	a	‘state	of	exception’,	a	register	of	delimited	time	and	space	that	predicts	the	derivative.	The	film	does	not,	therefore,	offer	the	same	opportunities	for	critical	recuperation	that	commodity-form	capital	once	did,	and	which	contemporary	art	practices	have	enjoyed.	In	the	following	section	I	examine	the	influence	that	the	work	of	both	Schmitt	and	Benjamin	had	on	each	other.	This	will	help	to	understand	the	displacement	by	Benjamin	of	the	vanguardism	of	the	Leviathan	into	the	commodity	form	and	how	it	is	then	changed	by	the	derivative.		
	
1.5	Benjamin's	Commodity	Form	after	the	Derivative		The	dialogue	between	Schmitt	and	Benjamin’s	work	is	the	focus	of	art	historian	Horst	Bredekamp’s	paper	From	Walter	Benjamin	to	Carl	Schmitt	via	Thomas	
Hobbes	(Bredekamp,	1999).	The	paper	illuminates	the	formal	stranglehold	of	the	model	of	sovereignty	that	the	two	men	deliberate	over.	Bredekamp’s	paper	helps	to	unpack	both	the	connecting	tissue	and	differences	between	the	interpretations	of	the	Leviathan	by	Schmitt	and	Benjamin.	The	paper	also	serves	to	demonstrate	the	shortcomings	of	the	commodity	form	as	a	conception	of	capital	that	fails	to	keep	pace	with	capital’s	post-derivative	transformation.	And	which,	I	believe,	Performance	forecasts	and	transmits.	Whilst	the	commodity	invokes	the	individual	subject	as	its	intimate	partner	in	the	market,	the	derivative	breaks	down	the	parts	of	the	commodity	that	are	normally	located	in	it	as	a	discrete	object	and	invokes	a	less	stable	subject	as	its	partner.	Benjamin’s	theory	of	the	commodity	form	underscores	the	commodity’s	allegorical	potential	to	act	as	a	fragment	of	a	larger	series	of	relationships,	but	it	nevertheless	has	a	unitary	composition.	The	commodity	form	inadequately	describes	how	
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derivatives	potentially	unbundle,	value,	sell	and	sell	again	the	component	flows	of	the	commodity	as	financial	instruments,	and	how	that	process	of	financialisation	becomes	social	relations	and	forms.	An	additional	function	of	the	derivative	causes	information	about	the	potential	future	states	of	those	flows	to	also	be	sold	on.	Abstraction,	in	the	case	of	the	derivative,	is	about	undoing	the	whole	and,	therefore,	it	fails	to	invoke	a	discrete	subject	but,	instead,	and	as	I’ve	said	earlier,	it	thinks	of	commodities	and	subjects	as	distant	warranties.	The	process	of	abstraction	that	derivatives	perform	is	not	one	of	mining	certainties	but	of	mining	risk,	so	that	the	subjectivities	that	are	summoned	are	perpetually	renegotiable,	unstable	and	improvable.	The	derivative,	as	McKenzie	Wark	explains	“[…]	make[s]	available	to	capital	accumulation	what	would	be	considered	new	materialities	of	ideas	and	perceptions,	weather	and	war,	bits	of	code	stripped	from	tele-technology	or	DNA,	the	microscopic	and	cosmic.	The	derivative	organizes	the	forces	of	production	of	the	information	vector”	(Wark,	2017).	The	processes	of	financialisation	that	the	derivative	is	key	to	are,	as	Wark	says,	those	of	knowledge	aggregation:	an	economy	of	almost	pure	information.	Whilst	the	commodity	is	a	thing	alienated	from	its	means	and	places	of	production,	left	to	float	in	circuits	of	debt	and	distribution,	the	derivative	collapses	these	limits	and	produces	something	very	different	from	the	capitalism	that	we	thought	we	knew.	The	derivative,	with	its	ability	to	sit	between	the	knowable	and	unknowable,	in	a	knowledge	environment	that	aggregates	information	to	levels	that	are	beyond	cognition,	affords	sovereignty	to	patterns	in	information	whilst,	at	the	same	time,	mining	out	uncertainty.			For	now,	let’s	return	to	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	commodity	form	via	Schmitt’s	work	on	sovereignty	in	order	to	understand	whether,	within	that	connection,	something	remains	that	persists	within	derivatives.	In	addition,	it	is	helpful	to	revisit	the	commodity	in	order	to	understand	it	as	a	stage	prior	to	the	derivative	and,	therefore,	necessary	to	understanding	it.	Primary	evidence	of	the	connection	between	the	two	men’s	work	is	laid	bare	by	Horst	Bredekamp’s	paper	on	Schmitt	and	Benjamin.	Bredekamp	cites	the	discovery	of	a	letter	from	Walter	Benjamin	to	Carl	Schmitt	written	in	1930,	declaring	the	debt	that	Benjamin	owed	to	Schmitt	in	the	writing	of	his	book	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	
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Drama	in	1928.	Benjamin	declares	his	indebtedness	to	Schmitt	in	a	letter	that	was	described	by	Jewish	academic	Jacob	Taube	as:	“[a]	mine	that	explodes	our	conception	of	the	intellectual	history	of	the	Weimar	period”	(Bredekamp,	1999,	250):10			 Esteemed	Professor	Schmitt,			You	 will	 receive	 any	 day	 now	 from	 the	 publisher	 my	 book,	 The	 Origin	 of	 the	
German	Mourning	Play.	With	 these	 lines	 I	would	 like	not	merely	 to	announce	 its	arrival,	but	also	to	express	my	joy	at	being	able	to	send	it	to	you,	at	the	suggestion	of	 Mr	 Albert	 Salomon.	 You	 will	 very	 quickly	 recognize	 how	 much	 my	 book	 is	indebted	 to	 you	 for	 its	 presentation	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 the	seventeenth	century.	Perhaps	I	may	also	say,	in	addition,	that	I	have	also	derived	from	 your	 later	 works,	 especially	 the	"Diktatur,"	 modes	 of	 research	 in	 the	philosophy	of	art	 from	yours	 in	 the	philosophy	of	 the	state.	 If	 the	reading	of	my	book	allows	 this	 feeling	 to	emerge	 in	an	 intelligible	 fashion,	 then	 the	purpose	of	my	sending	it	to	you	will	be	achieved.	With	my	expression	of	special	admiration,	Your	very	humble	Walter	Benjamin.		(Bredekamp,	1999,	250)11	
	It	is	the	potential	for	‘rupture’	by	the	concept	of	the	Leviathan	that	captivated	Benjamin.	Benjamin,	however,	resists	Schmitt’s	tendency	to	personalise	sovereignty	and,	so,	reinstates	the	permanency	and	artificiality	of	the	Leviathan	that	Hobbes	had	intended.	Schmitt	requires	the	agent	of	this	rupture	to	have	a	somatic	personalized	form,	whilst	Benjamin	resists	this,	urging	instead	that	an	inorganic,	mineral-like	shard	ruptures	the	occasionalism	of	the	here	and	now	–	previously	frozen	but	awaiting	activation	so	that	the	present	is	shot	through	with	shards	of	weak	messianism.12	Meaning	that	previously	forgotten	struggles	residing	in	the	sedimented	forces	of	the	commodity	form	can	be	released	and	put	to	use,	once	again	bringing	the	past	and	the	present	into	a	form	of	torsion.	This	torsion,	according	to	Benjamin,	would,	rather	than	produce	a	state	of	exception,	bring	an	already	existing	one	(namely	Fascism)	to	halt.			Benjamin’s	present	to	Schmitt,	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama	or	Trauerspiel,	employed	the	mainly	ignored	genre	of	the	German	Baroque	theatre	of	the	1700s	to	alight	on	Marx’s	“[…]	spectral	theory	of	the	commodity	form	as	social	relation,	according	to	which	the	social	appears	as	phantasmatic”	(Diefenbach,	2006,	1).	In	
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the	first	chapter	of	Capital	(1867),	Marx	attempts	to	rationalize	the	commodity	form	as	a	set	of	“material	relations	between	persons	and	social	relations	between	things”	and	evacuates	the	commodity	form’s	mystical	qualities,	forgetting	that	this	act	of	unveiling	is,	in	itself,	fantastical	and	quasi	religious	(Marx,	1992,	I,	72-73).	Benjamin	seeks,	instead,	to	encounter	the	phantasmatic	in	the	commodity	form,	once	it	is	released	from	its	use	value	and	at	the	point	at	which	it	becomes	the	detritus,	the	glacial	moraine	of	history.	Benjamin	deploys	the	under-regarded	theatre	of	the	baroque,	seeking	to	break	open	a	seemingly	unworthy	cultural	phenomenon	and	unlock	previously	frozen	forces	within	its	cast-off	and	sedimented	form.	Through	a	dialectical	procedure	that	examines	the	detail	of	his	chosen	genre	against	the	historical	context	of	its	inception,	Benjamin	addresses	Classicism’s	totalizing	idealism	with	these	fragments	of	a	decaying,	partially	dismissed	genre	of	drama	that	incorporated	the	historical	contingencies	of	its	time.13	Benjamin’s	examples	of		baroque	theatre	are	littered	with	bodies	and	parts	of	bodies	that	take	on	an	allegorical	role,	manufacturing	a	profusion	of	meanings.	Benjamin	envisaged	that	all	art	would	become	allegory	as	it	moved	from	commodity	to	the	fetish	and	once	it	became	alienated	from	social	use.14		Bredekamp	feels	that,	whilst	Benjamin	is	seeking,	through	the	commodity	form	and	through	allegory,	a	real	state	of	exception	that	will	call	for	a	“messianic	cessation	of	happening”	and	address	Fascism,	he	remains	stuck	within	the	formalism	of	Schmitt’s	conception	of	sovereignty	(Benjamin,	1999,	254).	The	concept	of	‘decisionism’	is	so	seductive	as	a	remedy	to	the	stalemate	of	liberalism	that	they	both	fall	foul	of	being	seduced	by	the	beauty	of	the	idea	rather	than	its	political	efficacy.	According	to	Bredekamp,	it	is	for	this	reason	and	because	of	this	interface	between	Benjamin	and	Schmitt	that	Derrida	subjected	Critique	of	
Violence	(Benjamin,	1995)	to	analysis.	Derrida	addresses	a	moment	in	the	text	where	the	problem	of	time	arises	in	the	moment	of	legislation,	and	it	is	here	that	Bredekamp	feels	that	the	affinity	between	the	two	men’s	practices	becomes	apparent:			
“It	is	the	moment	in	which	the	foundation	of	law	remains	suspended	in	the	void	or	over	the	abyss,	suspended	by	a	pure	performative	act	that	would	not	have	to	answer	to	or	before	anyone”	(Derrida,	1989,	991-993).	
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	Both	thinkers,	in	Bredekamp's	view,	are	compelled	to	seek	a	means	of	embodying	the	state	of	exception:	Schmitt,	through	the	figure	of	the	Prince	who	makes	the	decision,	and	Benjamin,	through	the	commodity	form.	This	embodiment	by	Benjamin	is,	however,	the	aesthetically	manifested	state	of	exception.	A	politically	romantic	trap	that	Bredekamp	suggests	Benjamin	couldn’t	remove	himself	from,	even	when	he	was	trying	to	“turn	it	against	itself”	(Bredekamp,	1999,	265).	Both	men	reach	for	a	solution	to	the	dilemma	that	the	Leviathan	offers	as	an	entity	that	can	alter	time,	and	both	men,	according	to	Bredekamp,	“[…]	conceive	of	filling	time	with	substance”	(Bredekamp,	1999,	265).	It	is	this	compulsion	towards	embodiment	and	the	tethering	of	agency	to	that	embodiment	that	persists	in	the	informatic	realms	of	derivatives	trading.	Pattern	in	information	is	afforded	substance	and	supersedes	presence	as	the	prerequisite	for	agency.	It	is	this	question	of	pattern	and	randomness	in	informatics	that	needs	unpacking	in	the	following	section	but,	for	now,	it	is	worth	underlining	how	Performance	speculates	with	this	question	of	embodiment,	whilst	possessing	the	intensity	of	Deleuze's	paradoxical	“grin	without	a	cat,	an	intensity	that	does	not	refer	to	a	subject	or	an	object”	(2006,	10);	a	quote	that	refers	to	Lewis	Carroll’s	Alice	in	Wonderland.			
1.6	Pattern	&	Randomness	/	Presence	&	Absence			Notions	of	randomness,	chance	and	contingency	reign	supreme	in	the	narratives	that	sustain	finance	capital.	Randomness	is	equated	with	creativity,	flexibility	and	openness	to	change;	as	something	to	be	cherished,	in	contrast	to	state	planning,	which	is,	according	to	these	narratives,	ossifying,	unnatural,	undynamic	and	constraining	of	the	individual’s	freedom.	This	chimes	with	the	market’s	transition	from	an	industry	that	dealt	in	securities	to	one	that	manages	risk.	In	what	writer	Mark	Fisher	calls	‘capitalist	realism’,	financialisation	is	framed	as	post-ideological,	an	empirical	fact	or	biology	(Fisher,	2009).	The	work	of	reversing	a	nineteenth-century	critique	of	capital	as	mechanistic	can	be	mainly	attributed	to	right-wing	think	tanks	in	the	1940s,	such	as	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	that	included	such	figures	as	Friedrich	Hayek.15	Hayek	sought	to	halt	what	was	seen	at	the	time	as	a	global	slide	towards	socialism	and	Keynesian	
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 57	
planning.	Hayek’s	pushback	against	this	global	tendency	was	expressed	as	a	rolling	back	of	politics	and	the	state.	Instead,	economic	growth	would	become	the	ideological	function	of	government	–	a	function	expressed	as	post-ideological.	However,	financialisation	has	come	to	assume	a	polity	and	perform	an	extrastatecraft	that	is	more	absolute	than	the	state,	unable,	as	it	is,	to	recognise	the	limits	to	its	activities.	Its	expression	of	itself	as	non-ideological	has	become,	in	itself,	ideological,	and	randomness	and	uncertainty	are	integral	to	that	narrative.			The	work	of	think	tanks	such	as	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	took	purchase	on	the	political	landscape	in	the	‘70s	and	‘80s,	at	the	same	time	as	technologies	began	to	make	it	possible	to	automate	the	markets	and	convert	these	narratives	into	algorithmically	driven	logics.	What	followed,	in	the	case	of	derivatives,	was	the	factoring	in	of	randomness	into	processes	of	pricing.	As	mentioned	earlier	in	this	chapter,	derivatives	sit	in	the	space	between	the	knowable	and	the	unknowable	and	then	price	that	function.	Therefore,	the	technical	and	informatic	means	of	achieving	a	price	must	perform	randomness,	or	at	least	the	appearance	of	randomness,	but,	in	order	for	us	to	arrive	at	that	price,	we	must	also	be	able	to	discern	pattern.	As	a	result	of	needing	to	attain	some	certainty	whilst	maintaining	narratives	of	risk,	pricing	became	a	function	of	probability.	Future	unknowable	states	of	the	world	would	be	predicted	according	to	previous	states	of	the	world	and,	the	higher	the	incidence	of	those	events,	the	more	it	was	welcomed	as	a	certainty	from	which	a	price	could	be	ascertained.	I	talk	at	more	length	in	chapter	four	about	derivative’s	reliance	on	probability	but,	at	this	juncture,	N.	Katherine	Hayles’	work	on	informational	pattern	needs	to	be	explored	in	order	to	understand	better	how	pattern	functions	in	information	theory	as	a	function	of	probability	and	how	randomness	coexists	with	pattern.	It	is	important	to	understand	how	the	relationship	between	the	maths	that	enables	the	pricing	of	derivatives	and	the	technology	that	automates	that	pricing	amplifies	the	function	of	probability.			I	cite	Hayles	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	to	describe	how	money’s	transformation	into	information	has	meant	that	we	increasingly	access	the	
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former	as	pattern	and	not	presence.	Derivatives	similarly	mine	“information	vectors”	(Wark,	2017)	and	patterns	in	those	vectors.	But,	as	Hayles	argues,	these	are	peculiar	signifiers	that	go	beyond	Lacan’s	notion	of	floating	signifiers,	defined	by	“[…]	networks	of	relational	differences	between	themselves	rather	than	by	their	relation	to	signifieds”	(Hayles,	1999,	30).	Lacan’s	floating	signifiers	originate	from	a	time	of	print	and	the	typewriter.	In	the	realm	of	information	technologies,	the	floating	signifier	is	replaced	by	what	Hayles	calls	the	‘flickering	signifier’	that	is	subject	to	a	rich	internal	play	of	difference.	Let	me	explain.	In	the	case	of	informatics,	signifiers	can	no	longer	be	understood	as	single	markers,	like	ink	on	a	page,	but,	instead,	are	flexible	chains	of	markers	that	can	be	altered	at	the	press	of	a	button.	Small	changes	to	the	code	can	make	enormous	universal	changes,	ad	infinitum.	Whereas,	with	the	typewriter,	there	exists	a	direct	correlation	between	the	pressure	placed	on	the	keys	and	the	blackness	of	the	ink	on	the	page,	for	example;	with	the	computer,	many	levels	of	intervention	are	responsible	for	producing	the	flickering	text	on	the	screen	as	image.	This	includes	the	polarities	of	the	computer	disk,	the	operating	system,	the	processing	programme,	and	so	on	and	so	on.	This	chain	of	flexible	markers	results	in	a	signifier	at	one	level	becoming	signified	at	a	higher	level.	The	relationship	between	each	iteration	is	unstable,	impermanent,	unfaithful,	never	final	and	always	contestable.	The	typewriter	would	require	the	typist	to	change	each	line	of	writing	in	order	to	change	the	font.	In	stark	contrast,	the	word	processor	only	requires	one	universal	command	to	do	the	same.	The	longer	the	chain	of	codes,	the	more	dramatic	the	transformations.	The	amplification	that	is	afforded	even	to	very	small	changes	is,	says	Hayles,	because:	“[…]	the	constant	reproduced	through	multiple	coding	layers	is	pattern	rather	than	presence”	(Hayles,	1999,	31).			Hayles	draws	on	the	work	of	mathematician,	electrical	engineer,	cryptographer	and	father	of	information	theory	Claude	Shannon	who,	in	1948,	defined	a	mathematical	quantity	he	called	information.	Shannon’s	theory	characterises	information	as:	“[…]	a	probability	function	with	no	dimensions,	no	materiality,	and	no	necessary	connection	with	meaning.	It	is	a	pattern	not	a	presence”	(Hayles,	1999,	18).	Shannon	made	a	distinction	between	message	and	signal.	In	
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information	theory	no	message	is	sent.	What	is	sent	is	a	signal.	Instead,	a	message	has	to	be	encoded	into	a	signal	for	transmission	through	a	medium,	whether	that	is	ink	on	paper	or	the	magnetic	pulse	emitted	between	the	polarities	of	a	computer	hard	drive.	Shannon’s	quantitative	theory	of	information	installed	a	distinction	between	materiality	and	information	that	became	important	for	its	adoption	in	the	post-war	era.	A	post-war	society,	secular	in	name,	was	ready	for	theories	of	information	that	rendered	it	a	decontextualized,	quantifiable	entity.	It	was	imagined	that	this	type	of	entity	could:	“[…]	serve	as	the	master	key	for	unlocking	secrets	of	life	and	death”	(Hayles,	1999,	19).	Shannon’s	mathematical	quantifying	of	information	is	weighted	towards	its	portability	and	so	stands	in	contrast	to	the	more	local,	contextualised	and	material	theories	of	information	by	Friedrich	Kittler,	for	example,	that	consider	the	mediums	and	substrates	through	which	a	signal	passes	as	co-constitutive	of	those	signals.	But,	it	is	precisely	because	these	technological	contexts	change	that	it	becomes	possible	for	concepts	of	pattern	and	randomness	to	both	supersede	questions	of	presence	and	absence,	and	obscure	the	materiality	of	these	new	contexts.			Derivatives	are	a	case	in	point.	The	portability	of	Shannon’s	concept	of	free	floating,	reified	information	means	it	continues	to	be	attractive.	Especially	to	finance	capital’s	manufacturing	of	narratives	of	freedom	and	agency,	now	that	it	trades	in	vectors	of	information.	Does	this	narrative	not	only	obscure	the	underlying	materiality,	infrastructure	and	polity	of	the	technology	that	makes	this	narrative	possible,	but	also	choose	to	misunderstand	randomness	itself?	Is	what	normally	gets	expressed	as	unknowable	in	derivatives	trading,	in	fact,	simply	the	product	of	probability	and	of	pattern?	Are	these	narratives	of	freedom	and	agency,	in	fact,	falling	foul	of	the	same	formal	stranglehold	that	Schmitt	and	Benjamin	were	unable	to	escape?	The	need	to	fill	time	with	substance?	In	this	case,	the	substance	of	pattern.	For	derivatives,	the	pattern	is	sovereign	whilst,	for	Schmitt,	it	is	the	Prince	who	makes	the	decision	and,	for	Benjamin,	the	commodity	form	that	brings	the	past	and	the	present	into	a	form	of	torsion.	How,	then,	does	randomness	function	differently	from	these	obfuscating	narratives	and	as	a	function	of	the	material	substrates	of	information	technology?		
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	Within	information	theory,	explains	Hayles,	information	is	identified	with	choices	that	reduce	uncertainty.	She	gives	the	example	of	having	to	choose	a	book	out	of	a	list	of	ten	books	on	her	student’s	reading	list	for	that	week’s	class.	To	get	this	information	to	students	she	will	need	to	transmit	a	message.	In	accordance	with	Shannon’s	concept	of	information,	this	communication	will	consist	of	a	sender	sending	a	message	encoded	as	a	signal	through	a	channel.	In	an	email,	for	example.	The	receiver	then	decodes	the	signal	and	reconstitutes	the	message.	In	the	case	of	an	email,	the	encoding	is	as	a	series	of	binary	digits,	which	are	then	sent	to	the	server,	which	then	reconstitutes	the	message	in	a	form	that	can	be	read.	However,	the	opportunity	for	noise	to	enter	these	processes	is	ample.	These	occasions	stretch	from	the	senders	making	a	simple	spelling	mistake	to	the	server	having	a	faulty	operating	system	and	delivering	the	message	as	a	series	of	random	characters.	Pattern,	therefore,	exists	in	“[…]	dynamic	tension	with	random	intrusions	of	noise”	(Hayles,	1999,	32).	Uncertainty	enters	this	set	of	relationships	such	that,	whilst	information	is	defined	by	reducing	uncertainty,	it	also	depends	on	it.	Randomness	is	that	which	makes	it	possible	to	recognise	pattern.	Here,	most	interestingly,	probability	enters	the	frame.	Hayles	gives	the	example	of	there	being	only	one	book	on	her	reading	list	and	sending	a	message	to	her	students	to	read	that	one	book.	The	probability,	therefore,	of	choosing	this	one	book	is	1.	The	students	have	received	no	information	that	they	don’t	already	know	and	no	information	is	communicated.	The	most	unexpected	information	that	could	be	sent	would	be	random	letters.	Remember	that	information	in	this	case	has	nothing	to	do	with	meaning.	According	to	Claude	Shannon’s	mathematical	theory	of	communication,	the	amount	of	information	sent	is	not	consistent	with	the	degree	of	meaning	achieved.	Accordingly,	it	follows	that	the	amount	of	information	increases	as	the	probability	that	the	event	will	occur	decreases.	In	Shannon’s	theory,	this	quantity	is	called	the	‘suprisal’.	If	nine	of	the	ten	texts	were	from	the	same	book,	We	Have	
Never	Been	Modern,	for	example,	and	the	last	was	from	Empire,	the	students	would	receive	more	information	in	a	message	telling	them	that	reading	for	that	week	was	Empire	than	they	would	if	the	message	told	them	to	read	a	text	from	
We	Have	Never	Been	Modern.	We	Have	Never	Been	Modern	would	have	been	the	
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more	probable	event	and,	therefore,	the	least	surprising.	Hayles	goes	on	to	stress	that	electrical	engineers,	for	the	most	part,	are	not	interested	in	individual	messages	but	all	the	messages	that	will	come	from	a	single	source.	Their	primary	concern	is	not	the	surprisal	but	the	average	amount	of	information	coming	from	that	one	source.	This	average	increases	as	randomness	increases.	Were	the	likelihood	that	any	symbol	could	appear	in	any	position,	the	average	would	go	up	–	“[…]	which	is	to	say,	when	there	is	no	pattern	or	when	the	message	is	at	the	extreme	end	of	randomness”	(Hayles,	1999,	32).	Therefore,	information	should	be	understood	as	depending	on	both	predictability	and	unpredictability,	pattern	and	randomness.	On	the	other	hand,	they	are	not	valued	equally.	Pattern	has	a	value	within	vectors	of	information	as	being	that	which	requires	less	information	and	less	bandwidth,	for	example.	Pattern	is	also	what	one	needs	to	capture	in	order	to	increase	certainty	and,	in	the	case	of	derivatives,	arrive	at	a	price.	When	finance	capital	becomes	a	technological	platform,	as	it	has	done,	both	randomness	and	pattern	are	necessary,	but	pattern	hedges	against	uncertainty.			I	alight,	in	chapter	three,	on	Steve	Shaviro’s	framing	of	video	as	a	bracketed	medium	that	mirrors	the	relational	spaces	of	finance	capital.	According	to	Shaviro,	video	production	appears	to	offer	infinite	options	but	is,	in	fact,	a	modulated	medium	where	both	the	operator	and	the	software	move	rapidly	between	a	large	number	of	preset	choices	but	is	unable	to	break	the	bounds	of	those	presets.	The	rapid	oscillation	between	these	presets,	in	both	the	automated	pricing	of	derivatives	and	the	software	of	video	production,	produces	a	sense	of	disorientation,	in	danger	of	being	experienced	as	autonomy	and	freedom,	but	remains	powerfully	bounded	by	probability	and	the	material	constraints	of	managing	volumes	of	information.	The	random	part	of	the	signal,	the	noise	in	its	workings,	is	ignored	as	redundancy.	As	a	result,	finance	and	video	produce	narratives	of	speed,	decision,	autonomy	and	agency	whilst	obscuring	their	methods	of	underlying	control.	These	bounded	processes	install	our	imagined	relationship	to	production.	The	affective	intensity	of	these	narratives	no	longer	represents	social	processes	but	actively	participates	in	constituting	them.	It	is	the	obfuscated	ideological	function	of	the	derivative	and	its	materialism	that	I	wish	to	explore	in	the	next	chapter.		
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Chapter	Two:	How	Cinema	Thinks	the	Derivative		
	
The	function	of	cinema	for	this	thesis.	Cinema	as	a	refraction	of	ideology	that	shows	
us	its	thinking.	Truffaut	and	Fassbinder’s	cinema	think	ideologies,	materialism	and	
the	human	as	ideological	excess.	Performance	thinks	the	derivative’s	ideological	
materialism.	Barry	Lyndon	thinks	the	apparatuses	of	debt	and	the	contract,	whilst	
Roeg	explores	the	breaking	open	of	sovereign	currency	and	centralised	
architectures	of	value.		
	
											Fig	7.	A	frame	within	a	frame.	Kubrick’s	cinematic	Solar	Anus.	A	non-logical	matter	that	threatens	the	limits	of	the	frame.	2001:	A	Space	Odyssey	(Kubrick,	1968).		Chapter	Two	enables	me	to	explore	further	the	methodology	opened	out	in	Chapter	One	through	the	use	of	Performance	(1970)	as	an	example	of	cinema	from	this	period	that	can	think	the	emerging	logic	and	reign	of	the	derivative.	But	also	how	it	can	rethink	bodies	and	objects	as	nodes	of	energetic	information	that	point	towards	the	ideological	apparatus	they	are	folded	into	and	which	in-turn	forms	them.	This	logic	is	mirrored	in	the	work	DEAD	STOCK	completed	as	part	of	this	research	that	used	vampire	genre	literature	to	make	a	work	whose	elements	formed	an	assemblage	of	mutable,	affective	information.	Some	of	it	chaotic	and	other	parts	more	embodied	and	patterned.	This	chapter	begins	to	open	up	the	possibility	for	artworks	to	both	think	the	ideological	excesses	and	the	ideological	
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materialism	of	the	derivative	but	also	how	to	make	this	ideological	materialism	confront	the	materialism	of	information’s	engineering	and	bring	these	materialities	to	bear	on	one	another.	The	chapter	really	begins	to	explore	how	art’s	objects	can	act	as	a	false	form	of	orientation	that	stands	over	an	abyss	of	disorientating	matter	or	information	that	forces	us	to	come	into	new	human	to	information	relationships	that	extends	our	capacities	by	leaving	the	ideology	of	the	human	behind.	The	chapter	begins	to	build	towards	a	notion	of	how	cinema	and	artworks	might	think	and	intuit	complex	and	distributed	forms	of	cognition	of	which	the	derivative	is	an	impactful	example.		—		In	this	chapter,	I	claim	that	cinema	is	the	form	of	cultural	production	that	is	most	able	to	detect	and	think	the	ideology	and	materiality	of	derivatives.	The	question	here	is	not,	how	does	cinema	project	our	thinking	outwards,	exposing	to	the	light	an	otherwise	internal	conversation,	but,	how	does	it	think	in	itself?	How	does	it	speculate	and	experiment?	Not,	what	does	it	represent,	but,	what	do	its	processes	constitute	as	thought?	Cinema	is	deployed	in	this	thesis	as	a	form	of	cultural	production	that	is	most	sensitive	to	its	economics	and	its	administration.	It	is	crafted	out	of	powerful	sets	of	economic	relations	and	resources,	which	it	mobilises	towards	its	manufacture.			Its	stories	and	the	bodies	that	populate	those	stories	both	enable	and	obscure	the	underlying	ontology	of	finance	that	cinema	affectively	maps.	As	Jean-Luc	Comolli	and	Jean	Paul	Narboni	(C&N)	underscore	in	their	1969	essay	Cinema	/	
Ideology	/	Criticism:	“Because	every	film	is	part	of	the	economic	system	it	is	also	part	of	the	ideological	system”	(Comolli	and	Narboni,	2001,	60).	Cinema	serves	as	an	affective	documentary	of	its	own	technology,	economics,	legalities	and	expenditure.	As	a	consequence,	even	when	it	talks	of	or	attempts	to	recreate	another	historical	period,	it	is	situated	entirely	in	its	own	time,	economics	and	ideology.	For	cinema,	there	is,	in	effect,	no	outside	to	this	set	of	relations,	or	outside	of	ideology,	even	when	cinema	attempts	to	exit	the	mainstream.	Comolli	and	Narboni	note	how	Godard’s	claims	in	1969	of	wanting	to	work	outside	of	a	system,	take	no	account	of	how	his	adopted	meta-system	is	a	reflection	of	the	
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system	he	claims	to	have	exited.	This	separation	becomes,	then,	a	form	of	connection	and	not	disconnection.	Contemporary	cultural	production	has	taken	on	the	characteristics	of	cinema	and	the	derivative,	as	consumption	and	production,	have	merged	and	its	networks	have	taken	precedence	over	its	objects.	My	question	is,	then,	How	Does	Cinema	Think?	And,	how	can	that	‘thinking’	increase	our	understanding	of	contemporary	cultural	production	and	its	materiality,	as	the	commodity	form	unbundles	and	becomes	the	derivative?			Comolli	and	Narboni	propose	that	film	is	one	of	the	languages	through	which	the	world	communicates	itself	to	itself.	That	cinema	is	not	a	depiction	of	the	world	but	a	“refraction	of	ideology”	(2010,	60),	a	process	of	“ideology	presenting	itself	to	itself,	talking	to	itself,	learning	about	itself”	(2010,	61).	Comolli	and	Narboni	don’t	quote	Althusser	but	appear	supported	by	Althusser’s	essay	published	in	the	same	year:	Ideology	and	Ideological	State	Apparatuses	(Notes	Towards	an	
Investigation)	(Althusser,	2006).	I	will	explore	this	essay	in	the	subsection	titled	
Cinema	as	Apparatus	but,	at	this	juncture,	it’s	important	to	cite	Althusser’s	definition	of	ideology	as	the:	“[…]	imaginary	relationship	of	individuals	to	their	real	conditions	of	existence”	(2006,	86).	Unlike	Marx’s	definition	of	ideology,	for	Althusser,	ideology	always	has	a	material	existence	because	it	exists	in	an	apparatus	and	in	the	practices	that	form	that	apparatus,	and	that	are	also	reproduced	by	it.	For	Althusser,	ideology	hails	concrete	individuals	as	concrete	subjects	for	whom	ideology	is	real,	not	illusory.	The	materiality	of	ideology,	for	Althusser,	is	further	concentrated	in	ideology’s	ensuring	of	its	longevity.	Which	it	does	by	reproducing	the	conditions	of	production	as	an	ultimate	condition	of	production	through	certain	apparatuses	or	practices	and	processes.	In	Althusser’s	words:			 “It	 follows,	 that	 in	 order	 to	 exist,	 every	 social	 formation	 must	 reproduce	 the	conditions	of	its	production	at	the	same	time	as	it	produces,	and	in	order	to	be	able	to	produce.	It	must	therefore	reproduce:		1.	the	productive	forces,		2.	the	existing	relations	of	production”		(Althusser,	2006,	86).	
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	Cinema	plays	and	experiments	with	these	ideological	refractions,	acting	not	only	as	an	ideological	apparatus	that	reproduces	the	existing	relations	of	production	but	also	as	what	Comolli	and	Narboni	call	a	speculary	device,	that	performs	a	double	mirroring.	In	effect,	it	can	show	how	it	performs	this	process	of	reproduction	but	also	show	that	thinking	to	itself,	as	sets	of	material	practices.	This	is	one	aspect	of	the	way	in	which	cinema	thinks	and	is	channelled	by	this	thesis.			How	cinema	attempts	to	reconfigure	this	relationship	to	ideology,	in	particular,	how	it	installs	the	human	figure,	as	a	sun	at	the	centre	of	ideology’s	constellation,	is	the	key	aspect	of	cinema’s	thinking	that	this	chapter	and	thesis	traces.	I	will	use	Comolli	and	Narboni’s	critical	matrix	for	classifying	cinema’s	different	methods	of	mapping	and	shattering	this	relationship,	in	order	to	better	categorise	the	films	I	deploy.			Comolli	and	Narboni’s	approach	is	to	group	the	different	torsionings	of	cinema’s	thinking,	in	order	to	revise	film	criticism	after	the	reign	of	‘realism’	in	French	film	criticism,	under	the	editorial	steer	of	André	Bazin	at	Cahiers	du	Cinéma.	Bazin	advocated	depth	of	field	as	a	technique	that	installed	stable	subjects	in	cinema	but,	because	cinema	is,	above	all,	a	process	that	leaves	behind	bodies	and	places	in	order	to	free	itself	from	these	objects,	it	is	able	to	both	centre	and	eclipse	these	bodies.	It	is	this	capacity	for	cinema	to	refract	the	wetware	of	humanness	and	reconfigure	those	bodies	as	information	and	energies,	that	is	a	key	concern	of	this	chapter.	Whilst	the	narrative	of	film	appears	to	place	the	human	at	the	centre	of	the	frame,	cinema	can	simultaneously	point	to	the	process	by	which	this	happens,	whilst	departing	from	the	human.	In	doing	this,	cinema	renders	the	sovereign	human	figure	into	an	empty,	but	active,	ideological	frame	—	an	image	that	invokes	George	Bataille’s	own	in	his	second	world	war	account	of	spiritual	crisis,	Guilty	(1944).		As	the	human	figure	is	eclipsed	in	cinema	it	is	in	the	edge	of	the	frame,	the	“[…]	fiery	penumbra	[where]	meaning	is	subtly	withdrawn”	(Bataille,	1988a,	12),	and	in	which	a	truly	delimited	concept	of	sovereignty	and	agency	might	be	afforded	us.	Bodies	in	cinema	function	like	
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pattern	in	information	theory,	providing	orientation	and	a	medium	for	agency	that	distracts	us	from	the	noise	and	randomness	in	the	signals	of	light	and	sound	that	constitute	cinema.			I	will	group	the	films	employed	in	this	thesis	in	line	with	Comolli	and	Narboni’s	categorisation	of	cinema,	according	to	the	different	ways	in	which	it	is	able	to	disrupt	or	sever	itself	from	its	ideological	function.	The	additional	function	of	this	process	is	to	ascertain	how	some	of	my	cited	examples	of	cinema	overcome	the	ideological	function	of	the	human	figure	as	an	embodiment	of	sovereignty.	Comolli	and	Narboni	underscore	that	what	cinema	productively	registers	is	the	unformulated,	untheorised,	clumsy	world	of	a	dominant	ideology	and	that	this	is	what	makes	all	film	political:	“inasmuch	as	it	is	predetermined	by	the	ideology	which	produces	it	(or	within	which	it	is	produced,	which	stems	from	the	same	thing)”	(2001,	60),	and	in	certain	cases	how	it	speculates	with	those	untheorised	materials.			
a The	first	and	major	category	of	film	that	Comolli	and	Narboni	float	is	the	one	that	aligns	itself,	without	friction,	with	the	dominant	ideology.	This	is	ideology	talking	to	itself,	as	there	is	no	mismatch	for	audiences	between	the	ideology	they	experience	every	day	and	what	they	see	on	the	screen.	This	is	not	an	unthinking	ideology	but	one	that	closes	the	circuit	and	has	the	answers	ahead	of	any	questions.			
b The	second	category	is	film	that	addresses	the	first	category	by	identifying	a	political	subject,	the	signified,	who	in	some	way	addresses	the	dominant	ideology,	in	turn,	theorizing	it.	This	approach,	Comolli	and	Narboni	stress,	is	only	effective	if	the	method	of	signifying	is	also	addressed	and	the	means	of	depiction	experimented	with.	In	this	category,	political	and	formal	approaches	become	compacted.			
c Comolli	and	Narboni’s	third	category	advocates	some	form	of	recuperation	where	the	content	of	the	film	is	not	explicitly	political	but:	“[…]	becomes	so	through	the	criticism	practised	on	it	through	its	form”	(2001,	62).		
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d The	fourth	category	is	the	type	of	film	that	has	explicit	political	content	but	unquestionably	adopts	the	language	and	imagery	of	ideology.	These	are	the	kinds	of	cinema	that	look	to	counter	the	dominant	ideology	but	use	the	same	tools	to	do	this	work.			
e The	fifth	category	is	those	films	that	appear	to	belong	firmly	within	the	dominant	ideology	but	in	an	ambiguous	way.	These	films	let	us	see	and	feel	ideology	and	how	it	works	but	then	counter	that	operation	and	interrupt	its	flows.	This	internal	criticism,	it’s	suggested,	“cracks	the	film	apart	at	the	seams”	(2001,	63).	This	kind	of	film	is	able	to	describe	and	map	how	ideology	is	reflected	in	it.			
f This	sixth	category	is	‘living	cinema’	or	‘cinema	direct’	and	its	practice	arises	more	from	social	events	or	reflections	but	differs	little,	in	Comolli	and	Narboni’s	view,	from	purely	ideological	cinema,	as	it	does	not	challenge	ideologically	conditioned	methods	of	depiction.16	According	to	them,	these	kinds	of	film	suffer	from	the	illusion	that,	once	traditions	of	dramatization	are	thrown	off,	then	a	kernel	of	truth	will	reveal	itself	to	us.	These	films	apparently	suffer	from	the	notion	that	‘seeing	is	understanding’	and	witnessing	correlates	with	the	truth.	This	equating	of	seeing	with	truth,	for	Comolli	and	Narboni,	simply	extends	and	confirms	ideology’s	capacity	to	contemplate	itself	but	not	criticise	itself.	Comolli	and	Narboni	appear	to	double	down	on	the	idea	of	a	witnessing	camera	that	goes	out	for	us	and	sees	the	world	as	it	really	is	without	attempting	to	understand	how	the	presence	of	that	camera	inflects	and	alters	what	is	being	surveyed.			
g The	seventh	and	final	category	is	what	Comolli	and	Narboni	call	the	other	‘living	cinema’.	Here,	the	workings	of	cinema	don’t	simply	serve	as	the	receptacle	for	a	reality	outside	of	the	camera	but	begin	to	take	an	active	role	in	the	concrete	stuff	of	cinema.	In	this	way,	it	becomes	productive	of	meaning.			
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Before	I	apply	these	categories	to	the	examples	of	cinema	that	I	deploy,	it	is	worth	noting	that	cinema	is	used	in	this	thesis	as	a	divining	mechanism	for	cultural	production	that	straddles	epochs,	most	specifically	those	of	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	in	the	Anglo-American	world.	This	cinema	sits	aristocratically	at	the	dawn	of	a	new	era	of	financialised	capital	and	I	cite	this	cinema	because	it	is	squarely	situated	in	its	time	and	ideology.	The	key	pieces	of	cinema	used	to	bring	this	moment	into	relief	are:			
Performance	(Cammell,	Roeg,	1970)	
Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975)		
Performance	(1970)	occupies	categories	C	and	E	but	also	exceeds	these	categories.	Appearing,	on	the	one	hand,	to	not	be	explicitly	political	but	with	the	potential,	through	criticism,	to	become	so.	Category	E,	because	it	appears	to	occupy	genres	and	align	with	dominant	depictions	and	ideologies	of,	for	example,	the	gangster	film	and	the	counter-culture	film.	Because	it	brings	these	two	genres	together,	it	interrupts	the	flow	of	each	and	the	audience	is	asked	to	question	the	normative	ideology	of	each	genre.	It	exceeds	these	categories	because	of	the	way	in	which	the	passage	of	time	is	affected	by	the	intercutting	of	scenes;	average	shot	lengths	are	increased	for	sections	of	the	film	and	the	identities	of	the	two	protagonists	become	interchangeable.	The	cinematography	and	editing	by	its	co-director	Roeg	marks	the	advent	of	a	much	accelerated	and	intensified	cinema.	It	is	not	overtly	political	but	can	be	considered	as	such	because	it	can	be	recuperated	by	criticism	through	these	experiments	in	form.	The	film’s	use	of	normative	genres	locates	the	signified	and	then	hollows	out	and	eclipses	that	ideological	construct.			
Barry	Lyndon	overtly	performs	the	role	of	costume	drama	but	allows	us,	through	both	a	forensic	reproduction	of	the	era	(the	18th	century)	and	the	use	of	reverse	zooms,	for	example,	to	see	how	the	dominant	ideology	of	the	period	works.	In	addition,	the	amassing	of	the	resources	of	cinema	by	Kubrick	mirrors	the	installation	of	debt	in	the	18th	century,	which,	in	turn,	mirrors	the	transition	to	a	debt	and	risk	managing	economy	that	is	occurring	at	the	time	of	the	film’s	
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making.	The	film	appears	to	have	no	obvious	contemporary	politic	but,	through	its	form,	a	political	economy	can	be	detected,	mapped	and	drawn	into	the	present.	Like	Performance,	but	through	less	obviously	disorientating	techniques,	the	film	is	able	to	calcify	the	human	object	as	an	ideological	construct	or	armature,	constituted	by	debt	and	contracts.	The	film	maps	the	then	forthcoming	collapse	of	money	and	the	commodity	in	the	form	of	the	derivative	contract.			Other	examples	not	of	this	period	but	which	extend	the	concerns	and	operation	of	the	above	and	which	herald	a	newly	intensified	cinema	include:			
Boarding	Gate	(Assayas,	2007)	via	Shaviro	
Black	Hawk	Down	(Scott,	2002)	
	These	can	be	seen	as	examples	of	pre-2008	financial	crash	cinema	that	actively	explore	the	typologies	of	embodiment	and	signification	arising	from	global	financialised	capital.	These	films	mainly	appear	to	belong	firmly	within	the	dominant	ideology	but	only	do	so	in	an	ambiguous	way.	In	Boarding	Gate	(2007),	the	traits	of	a	noirish	thriller	genre	are	pursued	but	are	accelerated	to	an	extreme	through	the	emotional	detachment	of	its	actors	and	the	fast	cutting	rates	of	the	edit.	Black	Hawk	Down	(2002)	occupies	the	role	of	a	contemporary	war	film	but	manages,	through	a	forensic	account	of	the	processes	and	administration	of	war,	to	install	a	narrative	of	war	as	narrative	of	risk	management.	Mirroring	the	operation	of	derivatives	as	it	does	so.	The	above	examples	practice	an	intensity	and	shortening	of	Average	Shot	Lengths	(ASLs)	that	parallel	the	liquidity,	perceived	speed	and	‘decisionism’	(Schmitt)	of	finance	capital.	They	are	films	that	indulge	the	dynamism	of	supply	side	economics.17	Or,	what	Jean-Joseph	Goux	cited	as	being	post-modern	capitalism’s	ability	to	untether	itself	from	the	values	of	the	enlightenment	and	the	pious	economics	of	the	bourgeoisie.	These	films	attempt	to	exhaust	the	notion	of	exchange	in	an	atmosphere	of	always-renegotiable	contractual	arrangements.		
	In	this	genre	of	cinema,	bodies	become	contracts	of	the	kind	that	Shaviro	describes	in	Boarding	Gate	(Assayas,	2007).	They	have	all	the	qualities	of	
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decisionism,	a	temporal	violence	that	upsets	categories,	for	example,	but	remain	attached	to	bodies	in	a	way	that	keeps	the	decision	bracketed	by	the	most	powerful	ideology	of	all,	that	of	the	human	or	politically	romantic	subject.	This	category	of	film	intensifies	the	ideology	and	dynamic	of	supply	side	economics,	producing	an	ambiguity	and	potential	shattering	of	the	signifiers	employed.	Bodies	and	objects	in	these	examples	of	cinema	make	us	see	and	feel	that,	in	a	supply	side	economy,	everything	becomes	“[…]	a	potential	medium	of	exchange,	a	mode	of	payment	for	something	else”	(Shaviro	2010,	46).		
	I	will	use	Comolli	and	Narboni’s	approach	to	explore	the	materialism	that	cinema’s	speculative	play	with	ideology	produces	and	how	this	detects	the	emerging	logic	of	derivatives.	Then,	in	the	latter	half	of	the	chapter,	I	will	look	at	how	cinema	thinks	the	decolonising	of	sovereign	currency	as	it	violently	mobilises	previously	sedimented	forces	and	proceeds	to	think	of	action	as	a	material.		
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2.1	Cinema	as	Apparatus	
	
	Fig.	8.	Germany	in	Autumn	(Fassbinder,	Brustellin,	Cloos,	et	al.,	1978)	The	Repressive	State	Apparatus	and	the	Ideological	State	Apparatus	collide.			I	have	gone	some	way	to	describing	cinema’s	ideological	function	and	its	own	speculation	on	those	functions	but	need,	at	this	juncture,	to	expand	on	its	apparatic	nature.	The	film	Germany	in	Autumn	(Fassbinder,	Brustellin,	Cloos,	et	
al.,	1978)	is	a	portmanteau	exercise	with	thirteen	German	directors	producing	a	series	of	vignettes	that	describe	the	two	months	following	the	kidnapping	of	former	SS	officer	and	industrialist	Hans-Martin	Schleyer	by	the	Red	Army	Faction	(RAF).	The	film	begins	with	the	funeral	of	Hans-Martin	Schleyer	and	ends	with	the	funerals	of	the	members	of	the	RAF	at	a	cemetery	in	Stuttgart,	sanctioned	by	the	mayor	of	Stuttgart	whose	father,	Field	Marshal	Rommel,	was	given	an	elaborate	state	funeral	by	the	Nazis	after	being	forced	to	commit	suicide	by	the	National	Socialists.	For	this	and	many	other	reasons,	the	film	is	squarely	situated	in	its	historical	moment.	It	is	a	disparate	collection	of	responses,	including	a	section	by	novelist	Heinrich	Böll	about	television	executives	that	decide	not	to	air	a	dramatization	of	Sophocles’	Antigone	because	they	believe	it	
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to	be	to	‘topical’.	The	film	and	its	episodes	move	between	registers	of	documentary,	high	artifice	and	visual	lyricism.			The	section	directed	by	Rainer	Werner	Fassbinder	appears	as	a	documentary	of	the	director’s	emotional	and	psychic	upheaval	at	the	news	of	the	hijack	and	execution	of	Schleyer,	followed	by	the	deaths	and	probable	state	executions	of	the	RAF	members	in	Stammheim	Prison,	Frankfurt.	The	section	includes	a	fraught	Fassbinder	drunkenly	questioning	his	mother	in	the	light	of	this	crisis	in	what	appears	to	be	a	genuinely	emotional,	fly-on-the-wall	moment,	which	is	then	followed	by	Fassbinder	fighting	with	his	apparently	apolitical,	apathetic	boyfriend.	The	latter	appearing	as	somebody	unable	to	theorise	events,	in	contrast	to	Fassbinder’s	absorption	and	reflection	on	the	political	trauma	unfolding	in	Germany	in	this	period.	These	scenes	were,	in	fact,	scripted	but	give	the	sense	of	a	politically	romantic	moment	where	the	energies	of	the	state	and	of	the	individual	become	interchangeable.	The	film	is	effective	in	exploring	Comolli	and	Narboni	‘s	categories	of	ideological	cinema,	both	discretely	in	each	director’s	section	but	also	as	a	collection	that	juxtaposes	these	approaches,	all	the	time	ensuring	we	remain	conscious	that	the	production	is	firmly	situated	in	its	historical	moment.	It	is,	therefore,	speculative	and	experimental	in	the	way	that	it	shows	“ideology	presenting	itself	to	itself,	talking	to	itself,	learning	about	itself”	(Comolli	and	Narboni,	2010,	61).			
	 	Fig.	9.	Germany	in	Autumn	(Fassbinder,	Brustellin,	Cloos,	et	al.,	1978)	Cinematic	political	romanticism.	The	energies	of	the	state	and	the	individual	become	interchangeable.	Fassbinder’s	body	both	orientates	and	disorientates.			
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What	I	believe	Fassbinder	to	be	doing	is	intensifying	the	capacity	of	cinema	to	act	as	an	ideological	mirroring	device.	Fassbinder	is	using	film	to	affectively	explore	how	cinema	and	the	state	operate	as	ideological	apparatuses	that,	in	Althusser’s	words:	“[…]	interpellat[e]	individuals	as	subjects	in	the	name	of	a	Unique	and	Absolute	Subject”	(Althusser,	2006,	107/108),	but	also	act	as	speculary	devices	or	mirror	structures	that	are:	“constitutive	of	ideology	and	also	ensur[e]	its	functioning”	(Comolli	and	Narboni,	2006,	108).	As	I	outlined	earlier,	this	is	ideology’s	centring	operation	in	which	Fassbinder’s	character	sees	himself	in	the	Absolute	Subject	of	the	State	but	we,	the	audience,	also	see	ourselves	in	the	image	of	his	embodying	of	the	Absolute	Subject	of	the	State.	His	image	threatens	to	install	the	traumas	of	the	State	in	us.			In	Fassbinder’s	section,	we	are	explicitly	shown	the	state’s	violence	in	its	handling	of	the	burials	of	the	members	of	the	RAF.	Therefore,	it	is	made	clear	to	us	by	Fassbinder	that	the	state	can	be	a	‘(Repressive)	State	Apparatus’	(Althusser)	which	functions	in	the	main	by	‘violence’.	But	there	are,	for	Althusser,	ideological	apparatuses	that	work	alongside	the	state	apparatus	and	that	interact	and	compliment	it.	These,	for	example,	could	be	schools,	cinema,	art,	finance,	technology,	infrastructure	projects,	regulatory	bodies	and	economies	of	knowledge.	These	are	all	Ideological	State	Apparatuses	and	they	function	primarily	and	in	the	first	instance	by	‘ideology’.	This	last	apparatus	is	the	one	that	Fassbinder	engages	with	and	intensifies	through	his	scripted	faux	hysteria.	What	we	encounter	here	is	the	film	taking	on	the	categories	of	both	‘Direct	Cinema’	(the	use	of	documentary	style	camerawork	and	chaotic	scenes	from	the	burials)	that	reflects	a	realism	that	is	external	to	the	camera,	and	of	a	cinema	that	has	a	signifier	that	is	political,	that	theorises	the	events	taking	place	and	presents	this	theorising	to	us,	the	audience.			However,	each	of	these	approaches	was,	in	fact,	part	scripted	and	a	sense	of	the	uncanny	undermines	the	functions	of	both	categories	and	renders	them	ambiguous.	We	begin	to	see	in	Fassbinder’s	expressionistic	portrayal	of	the	embodying	of	the	Absolute	Subject	of	the	State,	the	appearance	of	the	Ideological	State	Apparatus	(ISA).	Fassbinder	subjects	his	body,	as	an	actor,	to	an	abjectness	
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that	is	difficult	to	watch	as	he	appears	to	get	drunk,	take	narcotics,	half	heartedly	masturbate,	becoming,	as	the	film	progresses,	a	remorseful,	narcissistic	husk.	The	overriding	effect	is	of	a	body	composed	of	emotional	ticks	that	spasm	in	correspondence	with	the	state’s	emotional	spasming.	For	Althusser,	ISAs	reproduce	productive	forces	and	the	existing	relations	to	production	through	interpellating	(bringing	into	being	through	the	habits	and	rituals	of	an	embedded	ideology)	individuals	as	subjects.	He	writes:		 “[…T]here	is	no	ideology	except	by	the	subject	and	for	subjects.	Meaning,	there	is	no	ideology	except	for	concrete	subjects,	and	this	destination	for	ideology	is	only	made	possible	 by	 the	 subject:	meaning,	by	 the	category	of	 the	 subject	and	 its	 functioning.	(Althusser,	2006,	103/104)		In	Althusser’s	view,	no	class	was	ever	able	to	secure	and	maintain	state	power	without	also	having	a	hold	on	Ideological	State	Apparatuses.	Through	the	subtle	interplay	of	the	State	Apparatus	and	ISAs,	a	class	can	manage	the	contradictions	between	the	two.	As	I’ve	said,	examples	of	these	ISAs	could	be	the	media,	schools	and	knowledge	economies,	as	subtly	disciplining	institutions.	This	makes	for	a	very	fragmented	organising	principle,	or	body,	but	one	normally	managed	by	a	class	having	access	to	each	of	these	apparatuses.	In	this	way,	the	ISA	and	Repressive	State	Apparatuses	become	conjoined	as	part	of	a	larger	State	Apparatus.	Fassbinder’s	chaotic	body	becomes	the	plain	on	which	this	subtly	unified	State	Apparatus	or	body	starts	to	fragment	and	its	contradictions	appear.	Fassbinder’s	section	of	the	film	points	to	the	director’s	body	as	an	organising	principle,	a	centring	device,	and	then	heightens	that	effect	to	the	point	of	ambiguity.	Fassbinder’s	cinematic	body	begins	by	invoking	the	‘occasionalist’	subject	of	Schmitt’s	political	romanticism	but	renders	it	into	an	hysterical	figure	that,	instead	of	performing	a	centring	function,	begins	to	point	towards	an	abyss	at	the	centre	of	that	function.	The	body,	in	this	instance,	becomes	all	apparatus	and	leaves	its	objects	behind,	those	of	the	subject	and	of	the	living	being.			Fassbinder’s	cinematic	body	acts	as	a	site	where	the	apparatus	comes	into	view	and	in	which	its	contradictions	point	towards	an	historical	separation	between	being	and	action,	ontology	and	praxis.	Agamben	unpacks	Foucault’s	term	
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‘apparatus’	as	a	concept	with	theological	origins:	a	concept	that	arose	from	the	challenge	in	the	early	church	of	how	to	conduct	the	administration	of	God	through	the	Holy	Trinity	without	reintroducing	a	polytheism	that	threatened	the	singularity	of	God	(Agamben,	2009).	Whilst	God	remains	singular,	his	body	is	disseminated	and	multiplied	through	his	government	or	administration.	This	causes	a	multiplication	of	subjects	born	out	of	a	multiplication	of	apparatuses.	Agamben	goes	on	to	propose	a	reclassification	of	beings	into	two	groups:	“[…]	on	the	one	hand,	living	beings	(or	substances)	and	on	the	other	apparatuses	in	which	living	beings	are	incessantly	captured	(2009,	13).”	This	coming	together	of	“[…]	sets	of	practices,	bodies	of	knowledge,	measures	and	institutions	that	aim	to	manage,	govern	and	control	the	behaviours	gestures	and	thoughts	of	human	beings	[…]”	(Agamben,	2009,12)	installs	man	as	an	ideological	excess.			Fassbinder	performs	both	the	effects	and	functions	of	an	apparatus	so	that	what	we	are	presented	with	is	an	armature	evacuated	of	an	originary	living	being	(or	substance).	An	overlap	occurs	between	the	apparatus	and	Agamben’s	third	classification,	that	of	the	subject.	This	thing,	the	subject,	arises	from	the	friction	between	the	apparatus	and	the	living	being.	At	times,	the	categories	of	subject	and	living	substance	appear	to	have	some	overlap.	In	fact,	subjectivities	proliferate	in	accordance	with	the	apparatuses	that	proliferate.	Not	necessarily	in	accordance	with	the	proliferation	of	living	beings.	Subjects	are,	then,	not	tethered	to	living	beings	but	are	the	product	of	apparatuses.	Cinema	can,	then,	affectively	present	this	apparatic	armature	and	frame	as	a	simultaneously	animated	but	empty	object.	A	thing	that	is	both	full	and	empty.	A	paradox	that	Fassbinder	accelerates	towards	absurdity	but	which	Performance	thinks	explicitly,	showing	us	this	thinking	as	it	does	so.				 	
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2.2	Performance’s	Method	–	The	Derivative	as	Baroque	Frame		
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	Fig.	10.	Performance	(Cammell,	Roeg,	1970.)	Co-Director	Cammell	illustrates	his	methodology.	Performance	forecasts	the	derivative	as	the	mobile	baroque	frame	that	perpetually	unbundles	the	component	flows	of	the	commodity.			
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Director	Donald	Cammell’s	exposition	of	his	own	methodology	in	the	film	
Performance	(1970)	alights	on	this	function	of	the	cinematic	body	as	an	ideological	armature.	Cammell,	however,	recasts	this	armature	as	baroque	frame	that	forecasts	the	derivative’s	function	to	produce	value	in	motion,	as	it	perpetually	unbundles	the	component	flows	of	the	commodity.	Remember,	derivatives	are	contracts	that	take	each	sedimented	component	of	the	commodity	form	and	then	sell	the	assurance	of	the	future	price	for	that	component.	They	then	take	those	contracts,	those	financial	instruments,	bundle	them	and	sell	those	bundles	as	securities	on	a	global	market.	Value	is	no	longer	stored	in	a	discrete	commodity	but	from	this	action	of	unfolding	and	of	breaking	open	enclosed	sovereign	forms.	The	role	of	cinema	in	charting	the	derivative’s	function	in	decolonising	the	commodity	form	and	sovereign	currencies	is	broached	later	in	this	chapter.			Cammell	overtly	foregrounds	and	describes	his	cinematic	method.	A	Magritte	painting	is	delivered	to	reclusive	rock	star	Turner’s	house	and	the	painting	is	rejected	in	favour	of	the	frame.	Chas,	the	gangster	in	hiding,	discovers	a	store	of	frames	in	the	cupboard	adjacent	to	his	bedroom.	In	the	last	scenes	of	the	film,	Turner’s	cadaver	is	found	along	with	the	frames	but	Turner’s	face	replaces	that	of	Chas	as	he	is	being	driven	away.	This	is	shortly	after	we	witness	Chas’	bullet	entering	Turner’s	head,	converting	the	bullet	hole	into	something	akin	to	a	Baroque	moving	frame.			Actual	frames	and	meta-cinematic	frames	in	Performance,	such	as	the	bullet	hole,	point	simultaneously	towards	and	away	from	the	subject	and	the	living	substance	we	attach	to	that	subject.	Cammell	and	Roeg’s	explicit,	almost	didactic	exposition	of	their	method	and	play	with	the	form	of	film	accelerate	the	ideological	function	of	some	cinema	to	install	subjects	to	the	point	of	violent	ambiguity.	So	much	so,	that	the	thinking	of	cinema	threatens	to	become	an	unbracketed	thinking,	in	danger	of	violently	exceeding	and	dispossessing	us.	The	film,	therefore,	understands	the	implicit	function	of	cinema	to	install	the	subject	as	a	set	of	practices	that	centres	the	subject,	but	is	able	to	foreground	the	method	of	centring	in	a	manner	that	eclipses	the	human.	It	is	in	this	eclipsing	of	the	
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human	by	cinema	and	in	the	half-light	of	the	penumbra	of	that	eclipse	that	the	apparatus	comes	in	to	view	and	its	real	energies	and	materials	become	apparent.			
	 	
	Fig.	11.	Bernini.	Altar	of	the	Chair	of	St.	Peter,	Cathedra	Petri	(1666).		Fig.	12.	Solar	Eclipse		Fig.	13.	Performance	(1970).	The	camera	pursuing	the	bullet	into	Turner’s	head	becomes	a	Baroque	meta-cinematic	frame.			The	subject	and	its	living	substance	becomes	secondary	to	the	active	frame	of	the	apparatus	in	the	manner	of	the		baroque	where:	“The	frame	casts	off	its	subservience	to	the	painter’s	art	of	representation	aspiring	instead	to	the	status	of	an	autonomous	aesthetic	object”	(Adams,	Glenn,	(Hills),	2011,	149).	But,	as	Helen	Hills	underscores	in	her	introduction	to	Rethinking	the	Baroque	(2011),	this	predominance	of	the	frame	over	the	artwork	is	not	a	stable	frame	or	a	frame	
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that	produces	stable	subjects	and	objects,	but	a	moving	and	disorientating	frame,	or	rather	a	frame	as	an	operative	system.	Deleuze’s	reading	of	the		baroque	is	not	that	it	refers	to	“[…]	an	essence	but	rather	to	an	operative	function,	to	a	trait.	It	endlessly	produces	folds”	(Deleuze,	2006,	3).	The	frame,	then,	is	an	action	of	folding	the	outside	into	the	inside	and	back	again,	such	that	we	can	no	longer	make	a	distinction	between	the	two.	It,	like	the	derivative,	is	a	frame	that	is	constantly	devouring	its	own	limits	as	it	decolonises	the	commodity.			Bodies	and	subjects	in	the		baroque	are	often	on	fire	or	bursting	into	the	air	or	the	soil,	observes	art	historian	Helen	Hills.	They	are	envisioned	more	as	texture	than	structure,	constituting	an	‘involution’	where	and	when	the	surface	becomes	matter	but	which	is	no	less	forceful	for	being	surface.	The		baroque	frame	is	exemplified	by	Bernini’s	Altar	of	the	Chair	of	St.	Peter	(1666)	where	a	series	of	framing	devices	fuse	with	one	another	to	lift	the	relic	of	St.	Peter’s	throne,	encased	in	bronze,	towards	a	stained-glass	depiction	of	an	ascending	dove.	Architecture,	sculpture	and	decoration	combine	to	give	a	sense	of	violent	liquidity	where	the	frame	becomes	a	moving,	writhing	structure	leading	to	a	sense	of	disorientation	that	is	in	danger	of	being	misread	by	the	subject	as	autonomy	and	agency.	Again,	this	dynamic	framing	both	points	towards	the	subject	and,	at	its	most	violent	extreme	eclipses	it,	rendering	it	into	a	forceful	but	empty	entity.	Hills	concludes	that:	“Deleuze’s	materialist	understanding	of	the		baroque	prioritises	dynamic	properties	of	matter”	(Hills,	2011,	31).	It	is	to	questions	of	materiality	and	the	materiality	of	the	apparatus	that	I	turn,	in	the	next	section.				 	
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2.3	The	Materialism	of	the	Apparatus	–	Truffaut’s	Vase		
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	Fig.	14.	An	object	becomes	captured	by	the	apparatus	of	film	as	depicted	by	the	apparatus	of	film.	The	total	mobilisation	of	objects	and	energies	is	demonstrated	by	the	medium	itself	(Day	for	
Night,	Truffaut,	1973).		In	his	1973	film	Day	for	Night	(French:	La	Nuit	Américaine	or	the	American	Night),	François	Truffaut	depicts	the	making	of	a	studio	film	and	the	drama	and	emotional	life	of	its	technicians,	actors	and	administrators	–	as	a	film	within	a	film.	Truffaut,	as	well	as	directing	the	film,	acts	the	role	of	the	director	of	this	
mise-en-abîme.18	Day	for	Night	indulges	the	technical	aspects	of	cinema;	revealing	its	tricks,	back	lots	and	the	overall	dialectic	at	work	in	the	fabrication	of	illusion	itself.	In	one	sense,	it	pulls	back	the	frame	to	uncover	that	which	could	be	said	to	be	behind	ideology,	were	we	to	think	of	ideology	as	simply	an	illusion	
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generated	by	a	clique	seeking	coercive	control	of	a	majority.	But	the	movie	also	shows	how	ideology	functions	through	the	mobilisation	of	all	objects,	subjects	and	energies	in	its	path	and	is,	therefore,	situated	in	material	procedures	and	processes	and	not	as	pure	illusion.			In	one	scene,	which	takes	place	in	the	hotel	where	the	crew	and	actors	are	staying,	Truffaut	is	seen	walking	the	corridors	of	the	hotel	where	he	stops	and	looks	intently	at	a	vase.	He	is	distracted	by	an	assistant	who	wishes	to	discuss	the	casting	of	an	actress	who	has	recently	suffered	a	nervous	breakdown	and	they	talk	about	her	looks	and	suitability	for	the	role.	Another	crew	member	interrupts	this	last	conversation	in	order	to	demonstrate	a	prop	that	he	has	made	that	will	give	the	impression	of	a	scene	being	lit	by	candlelight.	At	this	point,	Truffaut	lifts	the	vase	from	the	hotel	table,	taking	out	the	dried	flowers,	and	suggests	that	it	will	be	perfect	to	include	in	the	next	day’s	scene	they	intend	to	shoot.	In	this	moment	of	nomination	an	object	becomes	captured	by	the	apparatus	of	filmmaking.	Truffaut	suggests	to	the	prop	man	it	is	perfect;	in	other	words,	it	has	all	the	qualities	in	its	design	that	will	make	it	function	as	one	part	of	the	ideological	thinking	of	the	forthcoming	scene.	The	scene	we	are	watching,	where	Truffaut	nominates	the	vase,	is	an	affective	illustration	of	the	capturing	of	an	object	by	the	apparatus	of	film	and	its	transmutation	from	one	modality	into	another.	The	object	is	simultaneously	captured	and	mobilised	in	the	same	manner	in	which	the	actress	is	about	to	be	captured	or	contracted	and	cast	for	the	film.	Her	looks	and	even	her	current	emotional	state	are	thought	of	as	aligning	with	the	trajectory	of	the	project.	The	processes	of	capturing	each,	the	vase	and	the	actress,	are	put	side	by	side	as	being	equally	valuable	to	the	objectives	of	the	film.	Day	for	Night	(1973)	affectively	demonstrates	film’s	thinking	and	its	thinking	as	ideology,	rooted	in	physical	material	rituals	and	processes.	This	materialism,	however,	is	not,	as	Althusser	suggests,	the	same	as	the	materialism	of	“[…]	the	paving	stone	or	a	rifle	[…]”	but	“[…]	it	exists	in	different	modalities,	all	rooted	in	the	last	instance	in	‘physical’	matter”	(Althusser,	2008,	40).			
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Cinema’s	function	as	an	ideological	apparatus	presents	us	with	a	materiality	that	cannot	be	looked	upon	directly	but	is	material,	nonetheless.	Ideology	can,	argues	Althusser,	be	understood	as	illusory	in	that	all	reality	can	be	considered	external	to	the	object	being	represented.	However,	this	definition	can	be	complicated	by	asking	us	to	consider	the	object	which	is	being	'represented'	as	the	imaginary	form	of	ideology;	but	we	also	need	to	consider	the	materiality	of	ideology	itself	–	the	materiality	of	the	frame	and,	in	particular,	the	cinematic	frame.	It	follows	that	we	need	to	question	the	proximity	of	reality	to	ideology.	On	this,	Althusser	has	the	following	to	say:	 	'What	 is	 represented	 in	 ideology	 is	 therefore	 not	 the	 system	 of	 the	 real	 relations	which	 govern	 the	 existence	 of	 individuals,	 but	 the	 imaginary	 relation	 of	 those	individuals	to	the	real	relationships	in	which	they	live”	(Althusser,	2008,	39).		 	This	assertion	by	Althusser	follows	on	from	his	primary	claim	that	every	social	formation,	if	it	is	to	continue	to	exist,	must	reproduce	the	conditions	of	its	production	at	the	same	time	as	it	produces	and	in	order	to	be	able	to	reproduce.			In	Ideology	and	the	Ideological	State	Apparatus	(1970),	Althusser	tussles	with	the	concept	of	ideology	as	entirely	illusory.	In	a	subsection	entitled	Ideology	has	no	
History,	he	asks,	how	can	it	be	entirely	illusory,	as	this	logic	would	mean	ideology	having	no	historical	moment,	existing	only	as	a	pure	dream,	a	nothingness	with	all	reality	external	to	it?	Althusser	asks	how	the	object	is	represented	in	the	imaginary	form	of	ideology	and	what	this	means	for	a	concept	of	the	materiality	of	ideology.	The	question	remains	that,	if	ideology	is	a	representation	of	the	imaginary	relationship	of	individuals	to	their	real	conditions	of	existence:	"why	do	men	'need'	this	imaginary	transposition	of	their	real	conditions	of	existence	in	order	to	'represent	to	themselves'	their	real	conditions	of	existence?”	(Althusser,	2008,	37).	Why	is	it,	Althusser	asks,	have	men	been	given	this	potential,	independent	of	any	clique	that	we	believe	instigated	this	illusion?	Why,	and	ultimately	how,	have	they	reproduced	this	illusion?	And	are	these	acts	and	rituals	of	reproduction	not	themselves	situated	in	physical	matter?			
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In	Althusser’s	second	thesis	of	the	paper:	Thesis	II:	Ideology	has	a	Material	
Existence,	he	concludes	that:	“[…]	an	ideology	always	exists	in	an	apparatus,	and	its	practice,	or	practices.	This	existence	is	material”	(Althusser,	2008,	40).	Althusser	goes	on	to	qualify	this	assertion	by	describing	the	actions	of	individuals	in	relation	to	ideology.	Individuals	adopt	certain	practices	according	to	what	sets	of	ideas	they	decide	to	believe.	If	it	is	God,	they	go	regularly	to	church	and	kneel	before	the	altar	and	make	the	sign	of	the	cross.	We	could	extend	this	to	many	other	practices,	including	those	that	take	place	in	institutions,	but	also	those	that	install	and	reproduce	ideology	through	the	actions	of	an	individual	moving	through	less	spatially	determined	institutions.	The	checking	of	email	on	a	smartphone,	the	buying	of	coffee	on	the	way	to	work,	the	tapping	in	and	out	of	a	transit	system	using	an	electronic	charge	card.	These	contemporary	rituals	are	what	Althusser	might	have	called	the	adoption	of	‘practical	attitudes’	(Althusser,	2008,	41).	These	rituals	seem	slight	but,	as	Althusser	points	out,	the	reproduction	of	ideology	can	exist	in	examples	of	more	meagre	apparatuses,	including	attending	a	local	football	club	meeting,	a	political	party	meeting,	a	school	day,	or	a	funeral.	These	latter	instances	could	be	considered	a	smaller	part	of	any	apparatus.	These	events	and	the	attendance	at	these	events	simply	aggregates,	installs	and	reproduces	an	apparatus	and	its	ideology.	The	subject	conducting	these	rituals	is,	therefore,	acting	according	to	his	or	her	ideas	and	inscribing	those	ideas	into	their	material	practices	in	the	ritualistic	manner	that	Althusser	describes	in	the	following	manner:			 “....	 I	 shall	 therefore	 say	 that,	 where	 only	 a	 single	 subject	 (such	 and	 such	 an	individual)	is	concerned,	the	existence	of	the	ideas	of	his	belief	is	material	in	that	his	
ideas	 are	 his	 material	 actions	 inserted	 into	 material	 practices	 governed	 by	 material	
rituals	which	are	themselves	defined	by	the	material	ideological	apparatus	from	which	
derive	 the	 ideas	 of	 that	 subject.	 Naturally,	 the	 four	 inscriptions	 of	 the	 adjective	'material'	 in	 my	 proposition	 must	 be	 affected	 by	 different	 modalities:	 the	materialities	of	a	displacement	for	going	to	mass,	of	kneeling	down,	of	the	gesture	of	the	 sign	 of	 the	 cross,	 or	 of	 the	mea	 culpa,	 of	 a	 sentence,	 of	 a	 prayer,	 of	 an	 act	 of	contrition,	of	a	penitence,	of	a	gaze,	of	a	handshake,	of	an	external	verbal	discourse	or	an	‘internal’	verbal	discourse	(consciousness)	are	not	one	and	the	same	materiality”	(Althusser,	2008,	43).		Althusser	uses	this	passage	and	its	emphasis	on	ritual	to	reach	his	central	thesis:	how	ideology	interpellates	or	brings	into	being	individuals	as	subjects.	I	have	
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covered	earlier	in	this	section	this	aspect	of	Althusser’s	thesis	that	underscores	how	ideology	is	for	the	subject.	Althusser,	at	this	point,	excuses	himself	from	unpacking	these	different	modalities	of	materiality	that	he	alights	upon,	but	which	arise	again	in	his	late	work	on	aleatory	(dice-like)	materialism	or	the	materialism	of	the	encounter.19	This	rich	dimension	of	Althusser’s	work	seeks	to	uncover	a	previously	hidden	current	or	tradition	in	the	history	of	philosophy	using	such	figures	as	Hobbes	and	Machiavelli.	It	has	informed	and	been	cited	by	writers	and	thinkers	associated	with	Speculative	Materialism	but	would	require	far	more	space	to	unpack	than	can	be	afforded	here	with	out	distracting	from	the	core	object.			Truffaut’s	vase	is,	then,	captured	by	the	apparatus	of	cinema	and	becomes,	at	that	moment,	an	intensified	convergence	of	energies.	The	object	appears	as	a	mise-en-abîme	within	a	mise-en-abîme	of	the	film	within	a	film.	It	is	first	captured	by	the	film	we	are	watching	and	then	captured	again	by	the	film	within	the	film.	The	apparatus	of	film	is	suddenly	doubly	drawn	down	onto	the	object	whilst,	at	the	same	time,	we	sense	the	whole	of	the	apparatus	in	that	moment.	That	one	becomes	conscious	of	the	modes	of	consciousness	because	of	the	mirroring	operation	of	the	film	makes	the	moment	no	less	disorientating.	Whilst	Fassbinder's	cinematic	body	in	Germany	in	Autumn	(1978)	becomes	all	ideological	armature,	eclipsing	its	living	substance	and	subject	through	a	process	of	the	director	exaggerating	cinema's	apparatus,	then	Truffaut’s	vase	becomes	a	site	on	which	the	energies	of	the	apparatus	descend	in	a	hyperintensified	way.	The	materiality	of	the	vase	becomes	displaced	by	the	energies	of	the	apparatus	of	film.	The	vase,	as	a	result,	becomes	this	refractory	object	where	we	can	witness,	but	only	indirectly,	the	energy	and	materialities	of	the	apparatus	that	capture	it:	a	materiality	that	you	cannot	look	upon	directly.							 	
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2.4	Barry	Lyndon	(1975)	–	Bodies	as	Points	of	Convergence	in	a	
Schema	of	Debt		
	
	Fig.	15.	Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975).	Bodies	as	points	of	conversion	in	a	schema	of	debt,	negotiation	and	exchange.		
	Cinema’s	objects,	including	cinematic	bodies,	are	important,	not	in	terms	of	what	narratives	they	seek	to	tell,	but	the	ways	in	which	they	point	inadvertently	to	the	physics	of	the	apparatus	that	produces	them.	Certain	cinematic	objects	and	bodies	appear	to	act	as	punctuation	points	that	hold	the	grammar	of	the	film	together	but,	instead,	create	the	ambiguity	of	C&N’s	category	in	which	films	appear	to	belong	firmly	within	the	dominant	ideology	but	in	an	ambiguous	way.	These	are	the	films	that	let	us	see	and	feel	ideology	and	how	it	works	but,	then,	counter	that	operation	and	interrupt	its	flows	and	“crack[s]	the	film	apart	at	the	seams”	(Comolli	and	Narboni,	2001,	63).			This	operation	is	exemplified	in	Kubrick’s	production	Barry	Lyndon	(1975):	a	film	based	on	Thackeray’s	tale	of	an	18th	century	Irish	adventurer	who	makes	his	way	through	the	wreckage	and	turbulence	of	mid	18th	century	Europe	and	The	Seven	Year’s	War.20	The	production	is	a	highly	capitalised,	lavish	and	slavish	celluloid	reproduction	of	the	paintings	of	Gainsborough	and	Hogarth	but	the	underlying	narrative	of	the	film	is	the	getting	of	fortune	and	the	acquisition	of	debt.	The	sumptuous	quality	of	the	film,	its	regard	for	the	cinematic,	the	painterly	image,	and	its	extended	scenes	without	dialogue,	all	make	the	film	an	alluring,	affective	whole.	The	cinematic	bodies	of	its	protagonist	Barry	Lyndon	and	the	accompanying	players	exist,	not	as	autonomous	subjects,	but	as	relational	objects	within	Kubrick’s	machinic	vision.			
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This	is	emphasised	in	Kubrick’s	work	by,	for	example,	slow	reverse	zooms	that	leave	characters	adrift	in	their	settings,	de-centring	the	human.	Art	critic	and	co-founder	of	the	journal	October,	Annette	Michelson,	proffers	that	this	machinic	vision	conceives	of	Barry’s	humanity	as	something	“[…]	fundamentally	non-human,	as	something	projected	onto	Barry	by	complex	networks	of	history	and	society.	Barry,	in	effect,	has	no	subjectivity	other	than	that	provided	by	what	surrounds	him.	He	is	an	empty	vessel	waiting	to	be	made	human”	(Ayers,	2012,	116).	Michelson	suggests,	in	her	1969	essay	Bodies	in	Space:	Films	as	Carnal	
Knowledge,	that	it	is	Kubrick’s	machinic	vision	that	disorientates	and	throws	into	relief	the	cinematic	subject	as	an	ideological	construct	(Michelson,	Annette,	1969).				
	
	Figs.	16/17.	Kubrick’s	machinic	vision.	Slow	reverse	zooms	leave	characters	adrift	in	their	settings,	de-centring	the	human	whilst	simultaneously	pointing	to	the	human	as	ideological	excess.	Barry	Lyndon	(1975).	2001:	A	Space	Odyssey	(1968).			
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I	use	this	film	as	another	example	of	cinema	from	the	early	to	mid	‘70s	that	maps	capital’s	shifting	materialism	as	the	Fordist	project	stalled.	In	addition,	it	acts	as	a	form	of	divination	of	a	coming	economy	by	pointing	towards	its	prototype	in	the	18th	century	and	an	age	of	market	speculation	that	included	the	South	Sea	Bubble	crash	(Dale,	2004);	a	development	that	might	allow	us	to	think	of	the	‘70s	as	the	advent	of	a	second	18th	century.21			The	film	is	composed	of	a	series	of	contracts	that	Lyndon	enters	into	and	either	fails	to	make	binding	or	defaults	on.	During	the	first	half	of	the	film,	these	transactions	are	carried	out	in	cash	and,	in	the	second	half,	they	are	expressed	as	cheques	and	promissory	notes.	His	father	is	killed	in	a	duel;	he	is	cuckolded	by	a	woman	seeking	to	improve	her	position	by	marrying	a	rich	English	officer;	he	enters	into	a	duel	which	is	fixed	by	the	family	of	the	woman	in	question,	leading	Barry	to	run	away	and	join	the	British	Army,	only	to	desert	disguised	as	an	officer.	Barry	is	then	entrapped	by	a	Prussian	officer	who	sees	through	his	disguise	and	who,	in	turn,	has	Barry	spy	for	the	Prussians	in	return	for	not	delivering	him	back	to	the	British	Army	and	certain	execution	for	desertion.	He	then	enters	into	another	contract	with	the	subject	of	his	spying	who	becomes	his	partner	in	a	gambling	racket	that	tours	the	European	courts,	salons	and	spas.	Barry	falls	in	love	with	a	rich	English	Countess	whose	husband	dies.	Barry	marries	the	widow,	providing	him	with	a	fortune	to	squander	as	he	attempts	to	gain	enough	influence	in	English	society	to	secure	a	peerage.	In	doing	so,	he	indebts	the	estate	of	his	wife	and	invokes	the	contempt	of	his	stepson	who	later	challenges	Barry	to	a	duel	and	seizes	back	the	estates	after	wounding	him	and	sending	him	away	with	the	promise	of	an	annuity	on	the	condition	that	he	never	returns.	Promissory	notes,	cheques,	negotiation	and	the	settlement	of	debts	through	duels	figure	throughout	the	film.			Cash	exchanges	feature	early	in	the	film	and	are	then	displaced	by	an	economy	of	contracts,	promissory	notes	and	deferred	promises	in	the	second	half	of	the	film.	Barry	himself	is	captured	by	this	process,	becoming,	in	the	second	half	of	the	film,	a	point	of	conversion	in	a	schema	of	debt	and	negotiation.	A	walking	derivative.	This	points	towards	an	economy,	not	regulated	by	law,	but	by	contracts	that	
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have	all	the	qualities	of	the	law.	Here,	anything	can	be	exchanged	for	anything	else,	renegotiated	and	exchanged	again.	Shaviro	uses	the	film	Boarding	Gate	(2007)	to	describe	just	this	kind	of	world	where:		 “[…]	 everything	 is	 interchangeable,	 or	 at	 least	 exchangeable:	 sex,	money,	 drugs,	business	 trade	 secrets,	 personal	 identities,	 and	 clothing	 and	 other	 consumer	goods.	 Even	 human	 actions,	 qualities	 and	 feelings	 are	 subject	 to	 promiscuous	exchange.	[…]	Everything	is	a	potential	medium	of	exchange,	a	mode	of	payment	for	 something	 else.	 And	 all	 these	 exchanges	 are	 regulated,	 not	 by	 law,	 but	 by	contract:	 import-export	 contracts,	 murder	 contracts,	 prostitution	 contracts	 and	BDSM	contracts”	(2010,	46).		
	
Fig.	18.	Barry	Lyndon	(1975).	The	shine	of	coinage	contrasts	with	the	earth	during	a	duelling	sequence.	Lyndon	moves	from	cash	exchanges	early	in	the	film	towards	an	economy	of	contracts	and	deferred	promises	in	the	second	half	of	the	film.	The	derivative	begins	to	emerge	as	the	money	form	and	production	collapse	into	one	another.			A	marked	characteristic	of	the	film’s	choreography	of	bodies	are	the	multiple	occasions	in	which	the	figures	are	still	and	then	become	increasingly	more	still	as	the	protagonist	Barry	Lyndon	moves	from	poverty	to	fortune	–	becoming,	as	he	ascends	a	feudal	architecture	towards	a	property	owning	class,	a	glittering	object	captured	by	his	surroundings.	This	development	is	polarised	when	violent	movement	occurs	that	unsettles	this	development	from	creaturely	expressiveness	into	static	poise.	Lyndon’s	provoked	attack	on	his	stepson	causes	a	visual	eruption	of	bodies	attempting	to	restore	order	in	the	bewigged	salon	of	Lyndon’s	country	house.	An	event	that	serves	in	the	latter	half	of	the	film	to	polarise	how	Lyndon’s	body	is	otherwise	stilled	and	captured	by	the	apparatus	of	debt.					
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Fig.	19.	Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975).	Barry	becomes	a	glittering	object	captured	by	the									apparatus	of	debt.			
	Fig.	 20.	 Barry	 Lyndon	 (Kubrick,	 1975).	 Repose,	 stillness	 and	 order	 are	 temporarily	upended	and	categories	confused.	Noise	enters	the	signal	and	pattern	is	thrown	into	relief.		
	The	relational	nature	of	the	film’s	objects	and	bodies	is	underscored	by	the	ensemble	nature	of	the	film,	the	use	of	strong	cameos,	the	technical	virtuosity	and	the	casting	of	an	actor	to	play	the	main	role	possessed	of	a	limited	range	and	history	in	American	TV	drama.	The	combined	machinery	of	the	film	is	foregrounded	over	and	above	its	individual	parts.			The	character	of	Barry	Lyndon	originates	from	the	remains	of	a	semi-agrarian	feudal	economy	but	passes	into	an	age	of	accumulation,	debt	and	rationalism,	enabled	by	a	militaristic	order	stemming	from	the	Seven	Year’s	War.	The	accumulation	of	debt,	at	this	time,	becomes	the	engine	for	the	mutual	development	of	banks	and	war,	with	government	and	personal	debt	in	18th	century	England	rising	to	staggering	sums	as	part	of	a	project	of	rising	British	power.	The	sheer	scale	of	the	figures	mirrors	western	economies’	current	debt	landscape:			 “Over	the	long	eighteenth	century,	public	debt	increased	from	a	nominal	capital	of	under	£2	million	 in	 the	 reign	of	 James	 II	 to	 reach	an	astronomical	 level	 of	 £854	
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million	 or	 2.7	 times	 the	 national	 income	 when	 Lord	 Liverpool’s	 administration	returned	the	monetary	and	financial	system	to	the	gold	standard	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Napoleonic	War”	(O’Brien,	2006).		Whilst	Lyndon	is	shown	to	be	avaricious,	he	is	not	calculating,	nor	is	he	able	to	fully	comprehend	his	historical	context	and	the	seismic	shifts	that	accumulation	and	speculation	are	bringing	to	Europe,	and	in	which	he	finds	himself	captured	and	deployed	as	a	medium	for	these	forces.	Lyndon	functions	throughout	the	film	as	what	Bataille	terms	a	“principle	of	insufficiency”,	a	being	that	is	always	open	to	others	and,	therefore,	in	a	relational	state.	Bataille’s	“principle	of	insufficiency”	(Bataille,	1985,	172)	operates	as	what	he	terms	“the	labyrinth”	(Bataille,	1988a,	171),	the	most	powerful	example	of	this	principle	being	language,	which	imposes	itself	upon	us	and	puts	us	in	relation	to	others.	The	principle	is	not	simply,	then,	a	labyrinth	which	is	disorientating	and	which	we	can	hope	to	master	and	find	a	route	out	of,	but	one	which	is	itself	disorientated.	The	labyrinth’s	relationship	to	an	outside	is	not	to	a	stable	outside	but	to	an	uncertain	topography.	The	labyrinth	of	language,	for	example,	becomes,	then,	the	dispersal	of	this	‘being	in	relation’.	For	Bataille,	our	sense	of	insufficiency	and	of	being	lost	leads	us	to	attain	a	false	sense	of	sufficiency	and	of	being	autonomous.	Being	lost	in	the	labyrinth	does	not,	according	to	Bataille,	constitute	autonomy.			In	the	case	of	Barry	Lyndon,	the	labyrinth	or	apparatus	is	debt	and	its	capacity	to	capture	and	bring	into	relationship	all	the	actors	in	that	narrative.	A	dynamic	mirrored	by	the	industrial	scale	and	highly	capitalised	nature	of	the	film	production	itself.	For	Bataille,	beings	deal	with	the	instability	of	this	‘insufficiency’	by	creating	seemingly	sufficient	centres	or	wholes.	This	could	be	cities,	empires	or	gods,	which,	in	turn,	produce	an	ideal	matter	that	orientates	thought.	But	the	falseness	of	this	idealism	is,	in	Bataille’s	scheme,	always	exposed	by	the	insufficiency	of	the	periphery	that	threatens	attempts	at	instituting	a	centre	to	the	labyrinth.	In	this	way,	the	matter	of	the	periphery,	the	insufficient	matter	becomes	what	Bataille	calls	the	“nonlogical	difference”	of	matter	(Bataille,	1985,	129).	Barry	Lyndon	or	the	‘insufficient’	body	of	Barry	Lyndon	moves	through	the	film	as	a	‘nonlogical	difference’	of	matter	that	attempts	to	conform,	to	become	sufficient,	but	whose	presence	exposes	his	own	and	the	centre’s	
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‘insufficiency’.	His	matter	oscillates	between	an	ideal	and	a	criminal	matter	but	it	is	the	profoundly	non-logical	nature	of	his	matter	that	exposes	a	fundamental	instability	that	intimates	the	derivative	contract’s	shaky	claims	of	authority.			I	suggested	earlier	in	this	section	that	the	‘70s	begins	to	function	as	a	second	18th	century	with	the	growth	of	proxy	wars,	debt	and	the	instantiation	of	individuals	as	contracts	and	not	citizens.	The	‘70s	saw	neoliberals	experiment	with	and	promote	the	democratisation	of	capital	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	shareholder	democracy	that,	over	time,	converted	the	citizen	into	an	investor.22	An	investor,	as	a	homeowner,	a	private	pension	holder,	student	loan	holder	and	small	shareholder	in	previously	publicly	owned	services.	This	conversion	results	in	citizens	coming	to	be	seen	by	government	as	‘individual	measures	of	risk’	(Martin,	2014,	Lecture).	These	measures,	or	markers,	become	what	debt	is	bound	into	as	capital	transitions	in	the	‘70s	from	an	operation	that	manages	securities	to	one	that	manages	risk.			This	development	signals	the	transition	of	government’s	role	as	that	of	providing	security	to	one	of	managing	risk,	now	that	risk	has	been	transferred	down	into	the	individual.	It	follows	that,	in	the	eyes	of	policy	makers,	those	individuals	who	are	not	managing	risk	well	are	assumed	to	be	putting	the	state	at	risk.	Government	policy	becomes	one	of	continually	assessing	where	or	in	what	group	risk	lies	through	the	application	of	performance	indicators	and	metrics,	for	example.	This	produces	an	unstable	subjectivity	liable	to	experiencing	this	sense	of	risk	as	autonomy	and	freedom	but	is	an	expression	of	the	derivative’s	ability	to	bring	the:	“far	into	the	near”	(Martin,	2014,	Lecture).	To	put	it	another	way,	the	derivative	does	what	political	romanticism	does	in	terms	of	converting	and	making	interchangeable	the	energies	of	the	state	and	of	the	individual.	So	that,	what	is	felt	by	the	state	is	also	felt	by	the	individual	and	vice	versa.	As	a	marker	of	risk	s/he	is	imbricated	in	the	state	but	experiences	this	embeddedness	as	freedom	from	the	state.	Put	yet	another	way,	the	subject	is	projected	into	the	workings	of	the	state	but	experiences	this	connection	as	disconnection	and	a	process	of	colonisation	is	experienced	as	decolonisation.			
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Risk	is	pushed	down	into	the	individual	but	ameliorated	in	the	derivative	by	the	function	of	probability	in	both	the	use	of	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	Formula	and	its	algorithmic	and	informatic	automation.	However,	risk	continues	to	serve	as	both	a	narrative	and	ideological	function	of	the	derivative,	in	terms	of	creating	and	recreating	relations	to	production,	and	so	has	very	material	effects.	Individuals	align	themselves	with	narratives	of	risk	and	freedom,	reproducing	their	relation	to	production	as	they	do	so.			Returning	to	the	cinematic	body	of	Barry	Lyndon	it	is	clear	that,	whilst	depth	of	field,	stillness	and	single	point	perspective	use	the	figure	to	anchor	a	scene,	this	is	not	Bazin’s	cinema	of	stable	subjects.	Nor	does	Kubrick’s	vision	present	the	figure	as	the	intimate	partner	of	the	commodity	form	in	the	market,	as	a	store	of	value,	meaning	and	agency.	Instead,	what	we	witness	in	Barry	is	a	subject	that	appears	to	act	as	Bazin’s	stable	subject	but	instead	operates	as	what	Bataille	terms	a	“reversal	of	signs”	(Bataille,	1988a,	219).	Both	the	figure	of	Barry	and	Kubrick’s	monolith	for	the	film	2001:	A	Space	Odyssey	recall	Bataille’s	disorientated	labyrinth	and	the	need	to	provide	a	sufficiency	that	orientates	but	which,	in	fact,	points	to	an	abyss.	Both	Barry	and	2001’s	monolith	appear	as	secular	edifices	that	can	provide	a	“sufficiency”	that	will	induce	a	permanence	and	stake	space	and	time	to	the	ground	but,	instead,	they	do	a	“reversal	of	signs”	(Bataille,	1988a,	219)	in	that	they	point	to	the	abyss	over	which	they	are	suspended.	They	proffer	a	sovereign	permanence	whilst	also	being	an	object	
caught	up	in	the	moment	of	sovereign	freedom.	The	instability,	which	they	attempt	to	conceal,	is	the	very	thing	they	stand	in	for.	Visually,	the	monolith	acts	as	a	meta-cinematic	frame,	puncturing	a	hole	in	the	space	and	time	of	the	scenes	in	which	it	is	cast	so	that	its	action	is	twofold.	On	the	one	hand,	it	suggests	a	capacity	for	the	gathering	and	ordering	of	space	and	time	into	one	point,	one	centre,	but	simultaneously	threatens	the	dispersal	of	that	centre	by	the	actions	of	time	and	space.			This	double	action	parallels	the	capacity	of	derivatives	to	act	as	an	idealisation	of	risk	and	agency.	As	I	explained	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	the	function	of	probability	in	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	(BSM)	formula	used	in	derivatives	
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pricing	to	employ	previous	events	to	arrive	at	a	future	price.	It	ameliorates	risk	by	bracketing	it	and	envisioning	the	future	as	a	set	number	of	possible	outcomes.	The	function	of	probability	for	the	derivative	is	to	provide	a	sufficiency	in	the	otherwise	chaotic	space	of	the	market	whilst	sustaining	a	narrative	of	risk.	If	we	return	to	Shannon’s	theory	of	information	as	a	parallel:	noise	or	random	information	is	needed	in	any	signal	to	identify	pattern	and	pattern	is	then	afforded	agency.	Probability	demands	and	provides	assurance	of	pattern.	A	process	that	is	then	amplified	by	the	electronic	engineering	demands	of	computational	trading.	The	figure	of	Barry	as	a	living	derivative	and	contract	shows	us	film	thinking	this	false	sufficiency	of	derivatives’	ideology.	It	points	towards	the	noise	in	the	signal	whilst	also	pointing	towards	pattern	as	ideological	excess.			The	film	Barry	Lyndon	points	to	a	culture	of	contracts	and	promissory	notes	that	offers	liquidity	because	of	its	potential	for	endless	renegotiation.	The	form	of	the	contract	makes	it	capable	of	drawing	value	from	the	far	towards	the	near	and	from	the	future	into	the	present.	In	addition,	the	contract	itself	can	be	bought	and	sold	as	a	security	–	a	promissory	note	of	a	future	payout.	This	malleable	form	of	exchange	is	in	stark	contrast	to	centralised	architecture	of	sovereign	currencies.	I	talk,	in	the	first	chapter,	about	how	Performance	marks	a	post	Nixon	Shock	cinema	that	detected	a	departure	from	the	centralised	Gold	Standard;	but	how	does	cinema	think	this	process	of	breaking	open	the	sedimented	forces	of	this	kind	of	economic	architecture,	and	how	does	the	action	of	breaking	open	become	a	material	in	itself?				 	
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2.5	Cinema	as	the	Marshalling	of	the	Sedimented	Forces	of	the	
Cosmos		
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Fig.	21.	Eureka	(Roeg,	1983).	Film	thinks	the	breaking	open	and	decolonising	of	a	sovereign	currency.			The	Bretton	Woods	Conference	of	1944	sought	a	post	World	War	II	plan	for	international	and	monetary	financial	order	and	viewed	the	dollar	as	a	sovereign	currency,	essential	to	the	post-war	settlement.	The	dollar	was	pegged	against	US	gold	reserves	and	was	intended	to	act	as	a	global	currency.	This	act	of	enclosure	or	colonisation	saw	the	dollar	become	the	thing	that	anchored	financial	activity,	bringing	all	foreign	economic	activity	into	an	American	sphere	of	influence.	This	colonising	procedure	effectively	brought	all	foreign	currencies	into	the	enclosure	of	US	interests.	However,	other	forces	came	into	play	that	later	levered	open	this	colonising	procedure.	The	growing	economies	of	Europe	and	the	exponentially	expanding	power	base	of	OPEC	(Organization	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries)	meant	an	accumulation	of	dollars	outside	of	the	US.	These	could	not	all	be	guaranteed	by	limited	gold	reserves	and,	by	1973,	Bretton	Woods	was	terminated.	This	meant	the	ending	of	currency	sovereignty	and	the	decolonisation	of	the	centralised	finance	architecture.			As	I	explained	in	Chapter	One	through	Randy	Martin’s	work	on	the	derivative,	post-1973	government	began	to	think	of	devolving	risk	down	into	the	individual	or	what	was	previously	thought	of	as	the	citizen.	So	that,	whilst	the	end	of	Bretton	Woods	in	1973	was	the	disassembling	of	a	centralised	finance	architecture,	it	was	also	the	devolving	of	the	logic	of	finance	down	into	the	individual.	Therefore,	this	process	of	decolonising	a	sovereign	currency	was	also	a	colonising	of	the	individual.	The	year	that	Bretton	Woods	was	dissolved,	1973	is	also	the	year	that	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	formula	was	first	published	and	
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put	into	the	public	domain.	It	is	from	this	point	that	derivatives	begin	to	take	hold	and	radically	alter	the	temporal	and	spatial	architecture	of	finance.	How	did	cinema	think	this	decolonising	of	sovereign	stores	of	value?			The	film	Eureka	(Roeg,	1983)	is	an	exploration	by	director	Nicolas	Roeg	of	the	tale	of	Jack	McCann,	a	Klondike	gold	prospector	who,	having	struck	one	of	the	biggest	finds	of	gold	in	history,	bought	a	Caribbean	island	and	then	slowly,	unwittingly	and	subtly	invited	his	own	violent	murder.	The	early	scenes	of	the	film	show	McCann	hitting	a	liquid	seam	of	gold	deep	under	a	mountain,	then	falling	into	pools	of	gold	before	explosively	resurfacing	through	the	ice	on	the	plain	below,	anointed	and	gilded.	McCann	releases	from	the	mountain	the	sun’s	earthly	metaphor	and	bathes	in	its	energies,	having	released	a	sovereign	base	material	from	its	corralled	and	solid	state.			The	film	thinks	of	a	process	of	mining	as	a	releasing	of	matter	from	a	solid	to	a	liquid	state,	of	bringing	into	motion	value.	The	capacity	of	derivatives	to	map	space	and	time	in	order	to	abstract	the	distant	and	the	future	in	the	present	is	a	means	of	ensuring	what	is	termed	in	finance	as	‘liquidity’.	Distant	and	future	potential	revenue	streams	are	converted	into	a	priceable	product	in	the	form	of	the	derivative	contract	that	can	be	sold	in	the	here	and	now,	ensuring	a	steady	stream	of	cash	liquidity	(Martin,	2014,	Lecture).	Whilst	the	mining	of	a	mountain	for	gold	might	be	a	finite	exercise	that	potentially	exhausts	a	stable	geological	location	of	its	store	of	value,	the	derivative,	through	its	ability	to	bring	the	distant	towards	the	near	and	the	future	into	the	present,	is	able	to	mine	spatially	and	temporally.	The	derivative,	like	the		baroque	frame,	constantly	consumes	its	own	boundaries	as	it	locates	and	quarries	temporal	and	spatial	sites.	Whilst	Eureka	describes	this	process	of	decolonising	a	sovereign	currency,	it	does	so	from	the	vantage	of	cinema	that	has	a	time	consciousness	within	its	form.	It	is,	therefore,	able	to	mirror	derivative’s	latitude	to	also	speculate	with	time	and	space,	in	doing	so,	making	visible	the	emerging	logic	of	the	derivative.			As	in	the	examples	of	bodies	in	the		baroque	that	I	give	earlier	in	this	chapter,	where	figures	are	often	depicted	on	fire	or	bursting	into	the	air	or	from	the	soil,	
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an	unstable	but	forceful	form	of	embodiment	is	speculated	with	as,	again,	Roeg’s	cinema	detects	the	polity	of	the	derivative.	The	gold-rich	McCann’s	drift	towards	a	violent	death	continues	Roeg’s	directorial	habit	of	rending	bodies	apart.	McCann	knowingly	invites	his	own	death	by	denying	the	sale	of	the	island	to	representatives	of	the	Jewish	mafia	wanting	to	build	an	offshore	Casino.	The	film’s	extended	scenes	of	McCann’s	murder	involve	him	being	tarred,	feathered,	burnt	and	dismembered.	His	body	is	torn	asunder	and	broken	open	in	a	mirroring	of	his	actions	on	the	mountain	and	its	reserves	of	gold.	The	film	thinks	of	this	conversion	and	displacement	of	sovereignty	from	a	centralised	and,	in	the	case	of	the	mountain,	a	stable	body	into	a	violent	mobilisation	of	its	otherwise	sedimented	forces.			There	are,	however,	different	registers	of	violence	at	work	in	cinema.	Other	instances	of	cinema	from	the	same	period	explicitly	explore	bodies	and	characters	intent	on	violence	and	for	whom	violence	bestows	on	them	a	sovereign	power	that	cuts	through	a	retarding	indeterminacy.	These	cinematic	bodies	register	an	imagining	of	information	as	both	embodied	but	dematerialised	and	capable	of	scything	through	material	and	ideological	impediments.	The	following	chapter	will	use	an	example	of	cinema	from	the	same	year	as	Performance	(1970)	that	thinks	this	genre	of	cinematic	body	and	of	information.			 	
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Chapter	Three:	Cinema	Thinks	Violence	as	Form	and	
Force	
	
How	cinema	thinks	violence.	Violence	and	sovereign	power.	The	obscured	and	
immense	power	of	informatics.	How	cinema’s	violent	bodies	act	as	the	sovereign	
actors	of	informatic	power.	A	mythical	violence	that	gives	information	all	the	
qualities	of	the	law.		
	
	
Fig.	22.	The	Conformist	(Bertolucci,	1970).	Clerici,	the	aspiring	assassin,	is	given	a	gun	and	asked	to	be	“quick	and	decisive”.	Cinema	clumsily	but	usefully	thinks	of	the	decision	as	violence	and	violence	as	form.			Through	additional	examples	of	cinema,	Chapter	Three	further	levers	open	the	aspect	of	the	artwork	that	thinks	of	the	violence	of	information	(both	material	and	imagined)	as	being	parallel	narratives.		Narratives	of	force	on	the	one	hand,	that	install	an	embodied,	authoritarian	notion	of	agency	alongside	a	thinking	of	information’s	material	workings	that	is	more	chaotic	and	which	shatters	the	hubris	of	an	ideological	imagining	of	information.	This	chapter	really	confronts	the	challenge	that	arose	in	the	artwork	and	it’s	thinking	of	force	and	who	and	what	does	power.	This	challenge	was	polarised	when	I	was	confronted	by	the	forceful	statecraft	of	Harlow	and	how	its	artworks	extended	its	extra-law	in	order	to	become	a	town.	In	the	post-war	envisioning	of	the	town	a	decision	needed	to	be	made	as	to	how	to	construct	and	build	an	affective	architectural	
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collage	that	did	that	statecraft	which	the	town’s	author	(Gibberd)	then	duly	enacted.	Casting	back	for	answers	and	tactics	for	breaking	through	the	deadlock	of	a	contemporary	extra	statecraft	conducted	by	the	quotidian	financialised,	infrastructure	beautifully	mapped	out	by	Keller	Easterling	was	this	singular	vision	by	one	person	the	remedy	to	the	absolutism	of	the	derivative?	Could	informatic	power	be	countered	by	the	singular	vision	of	a	person	using	artworks	that	made	a	claim	for	an	extrastatecraft	or	was	the	question	more	subtle	than	this?	The	chapter	carefully	recalibrates	this	perceived	force	that	is	cinematically	expressed	at	times	as	violence	that	is	an	absolute,	Hobbesian	authoritarian	power.	But	also	at	times	a	violence	that	motions	towards	the	‘splice’	(Hayles)	that	acknowledges	our	collaboration	with	the	chaotic	aspects	of	information	and	which	extends	our	capacities.	This	notion	of	force	and	violence	permeates	through	a	work	such	as	DEAD	STOCK	and	the	developing	work	that	uses	the	affectively	violent	aspects	of	Performance	(1970)	for	example,	to	think	of	violence	as	an	oscillating	principle	that	both	instates	a	narrative	of	human	will	and	authority	but	also	expresses	a	break	from	this	conception	of	agency	as	embodied	and	authoritarian.	This	chapter	helps	to	underscore	the	emerging	politic	of	the	work	in	its	capacity	to	both	think	and	challenge	the	informatic	hubris	and	ideology	of	the	derivative	and	so	undermine	its	logic	and	the	spectre	of	Hobbes’	Leviathan	that	haunts	its	circuitry.		—	The	previous	section	explored	how	cinema	thinks	the	derivative’s	decolonising	of	sovereign	currencies,	and	I	touched	on	how	this	action	of	setting	loose	centralised	financial	architectures	was	imagined	as	a	ceaseless	and	violent	rending	open.	I	began	to	chart	this	question	of	cinematic	violence	in	the	first	chapter	and	describe	the	parallels	between	war’s	capacity	to	convert	objects	and	bodies	into	energies	and	highly	capitalised	cinema’s	ability	to	extend	this	logic.	Nonetheless,	I	left	unfinished	the	question	of	how	different	registers	of	cinematic	violence	conflate	and	think	the	sovereign	power	of	the	derivative.	I	begin,	here,	by	examining	how	sovereign	power	and,	in	particular,	power-as-information	is	made	more	powerful	by	not	laying	bare	its	material	limitations.	This	last	point	demonstrates	how	the	informatic	nature	of	the	derivative	(an	instrument	derived	from	the	mining	of	vectors	of	information)	lends	it	the	capacity	for	
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greater	sovereign	power	because	of	its	lack	of	tangible	limitations.	I	then	consider	how	cinema’s	bodies	think	of	information	as	dematerialised.	I	suggest	these	forceful	imaginings	of	dematerialised	information	act	as	the	sovereign	actors	of	the	immense	underlying	spectral	power	of	the	derivative.	However,	I	then	claim	that	we	can	encounter	examples	of	cinema	that	threaten	the	stability	of	these	sovereign	actors	and,	in	doing	so,	throw	into	relief	their	ideological	function.	Lastly,	I	briefly	explore	Benjamin’s	notion	of	a	mythic	violence	and	law.	This	conception	of	violence	and	the	law	will	help	in	our	understanding	of	how	cinema’s	affective	narratives	of	violence	best	detect	and	transmit	the	law-like	logic	of	the	derivative.	I	use	Benjamin’s	theological	framework	to	further	explore	Schmitt’s	assertion	that	all	modern	political	concepts	are	ultimately	secularised	theological	concepts.	I	extend	Schmitt’s	maxim,	however,	and	suggest	that	politics	is	now	done	by	a	forceful	informatics	that	takes	on	the	qualities	of	theological	conceptions	of	the	law.		This	section	serves	to	introduce	chapter	four’s	exploration	of	how	video	and	contemporary	art	become	functions	of	probability.	I	claim	that	this	phenomenon	mirrors	the	logic	and	underlying	control	of	derivatives,	which	is	otherwise	obscured	by	the	acceleration	and	expansion	of	those	cultural	fields.	I	suggest	that	this	obfuscation	of	control	is	a	result	of	digital	information’s	capacity	for	modulation,	or	the	potential	to	move	at	increasing	speeds	between	pre-determined	outcomes.	For	now,	let	us	return	to	violence.			
3.1	Violence	as	Form	–	The	Conformist	(1970)		Donald	Cammell	referred	to	Performance	as	a	“[…]	a	poetic	treatise	on	violence”	(Buck,	2012,	102),	but	a	concurrent	production,	The	Conformist	(Bertolucci,	1970)	similarly	speculates	with	violence.	Violence	is	explicitly	explored	in	The	
Conformist	in	a	manner	that	exposes	an	underlying	and	problematic	‘decisionism’	(Schmitt)	in	the	culture	of	the	early	‘70s.	The	film	literalises	a	founding	violence	that	sits	at	the	base	of	‘decisionism’	or	‘state	of	exception’	(Schmitt)	that	derivatives	create.	In	doing	so,	the	film	detects	and	speculates	with	an	emerging	sovereign	power	in	ways	that	are	both	different	from	Performance,	and	usefully	clumsy.	At	this	juncture,	we	need	briefly	to	revisit	definitions	of	sovereign	power.		
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	If	sovereignty	or	political	sovereignty,	in	the	Hobbesian	sense,	is	a	question	of	who	or	what	holds	ultimate	power,	it	is	also	a	metaphysical	question.	For	a	power,	in	this	sense,	to	be	final,	it	must	remain	only	partially	visible.	We	mustn’t	know	or	understand	its	physical	limitations	if	we	are	to	believe	in	it	as	having	unlimited,	almost	unimaginable	capacities	for	violence	that	can	be	used	to	restore	order	and	avert	war	as	the	logical	endpoint	of	politics.	The	institution	or	person	that	holds	power	must,	therefore,	avoid	displaying	the	finite	qualities	of	that	power	if	it,	or	they,	are	to	maintain	the	transcendence	that	gives	a	limitless	aura	of	power.	The	gestures,	rituals	and	speech	acts	of	sovereign	actors	must	also	serve	only	as	a	partial	reminder	of	the	unimaginable	scale	of	a	power	that	remains	unseen.			For	the	layperson,	derivatives	are	hard	to	represent	and	give	shape	to.	An	internet	search	for	visualisations	of	derivative	trading	yields	few	satisfactory	results	and,	yet,	their	power	and	influence,	in	terms	of	how	their	logic	gives	rise	to	certain	social	formations,	spaces	and	polity,	is	unimaginable:	their	partial	visibility,	complexity	and	the	sublime	sense	of	scale	attached	to	the	flows	of	information	they	require,	and	the	value	of	trades	they	represent,	renders	them	beyond	cognition.	Yet,	their	effects	graze	our	skin,	our	biology,	form	the	spaces	we	rest	in	and	move	through,	enact	forms	of	extra	government	without	being	asked	or	acknowledged	as	doing	so	–	but	we	find	ourselves	unable	to	address	this	power	or	locate	boundaries	so	that	we	might	turn	to	face	it.	This	set	of	qualities	lends	the	derivative	a	metaphysics	of	power	that	renders	it	as	a	contemporary	Leviathan,	an	unimaginably	massive	power.	The	Conformist	speculates	and	plays	with	registers	and	forms	of	sovereign	power,	using	a	cinema	saturated	in	the	qualities	of	illusionistic	space	and	that	fly	in	the	face	of	a	political	cinema	of	the	immediate	preceding	years.	Instead,	the	film	appears	to	divine	a	more	spectral	power	whilst	telling	(through	highly	affective	cinematic	means)	a	story	of	overt	and	explicit	power.	How	to	represent	and	do	power	that	has	a	founding	quality	is	a	question	that	weaves	its	way	through	the	overt	narrative	and	also	more	implicit,	affective	qualities	of	the	film.			
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 105	
The	Conformist,	based	on	Alberto	Moravia’s	novel	of	the	same	name,	can	be	read	as	an	existential	account	of	fascism’s	fantasy	of	embodying	the	‘decision’	(Schmitt).	But,	also,	how	the	‘decision’	is	understood	by	fascism	as	having	inscribed	into	it	a	literal	violence	that	can’t	help	but	re-enact	a	law’s	founding	violence.	The	film	mirrors	Schmitt’s	question	of	what	or	who	makes	the	decision	but	is	unable	(just	as	Schmitt	was)	to	escape	the	formal	stranglehold	of	political	romanticism.	This	stranglehold	results	in	the	‘decision’	becoming	embodied	by	the	occasionalist	subject	exacting	a	literal	violence,	seeking	to	connect	with	founding	laws’	violence.	The	film’s	protagonist	Clerici	perfectly	illustrates	Schmitt’s	maxim	that,	under	the	conditions	of	political	romanticism,	a:	“[…]	complex	of	powerful	political	energies	is	not	able	to	find	its	objective	and	strikes	an	occasional	point	with	great	force”	(Schmitt,	(1919),	1991,	147).	But	this	description	of	occasionalist	violence	could	as	easily	describe	an	informatic	entity	as	it	could	a	living	substance.	The	cinematic	body	of	Clerici	operates,	for	this	text,	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	as	a	sovereign	actor	whose	actions,	gestures	and	rituals	serve	as	a	partial	reminder	of	an	emerging,	unimaginable,	informatic	power	that	remains	unseen.	Secondly,	as	cinematic	body	that	shows	the	limitations	of	its	power	and	cannot	help	but	re-enact	a	founding	violence.	This	generative	contradiction	will	be	explored	later	in	this	section.			
The	Conformist	is	set	in	pre-war	Rome	and	Paris	and	follows	the	attempts	of	Clerici	(Jean-Louis	Trintignant),	a	weak-willed	son	of	the	bourgeoisie,	to	join	the	Italian	fascists,	restore	order	and	overcome	a	childhood	sexual	trauma	and	family	alienation	–	a	family	that	includes	a	morphine-addicted	mother	and	an	incarcerated,	mentally	ill	father,	who	may	himself	have	committed	atrocities	on	behalf	of	the	fascists.	Clerici	suffers	from	the	illusion	that,	as	a	child,	he	murdered	a	chauffeur	who	tried	to	seduce	him	using	a	gun	employed	as	part	of	that	game	of	seduction.			A	condition	of	his	acceptance	into	the	fascist	elite	is	that	he	assassinates	his	communist	former	professor,	currently	living	as	a	political	exile	in	Paris.	Clerici	travels	to	Paris	on	honeymoon	with	his	new,	apolitical	bourgeois	wife	and	meets	the	exiled	professor	under	the	pretence	of	reconnecting	with	his	mentor.	In	the	
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process,	Clerici	falls	in	love	with	the	lecturer’s	wife	who,	in	turn,	seduces	the	fiancée.	Having	secured	the	trust	of	his	old	teacher,	Clerici	sets	up	the	circumstances	for	his	assassination	but,	at	the	last	moment,	is	unable	to	carry	out	the	act	himself.	The	fascist	agents	shadowing	the	operation	are	forced	to	complete	the	mission,	stabbing	to	death	both	the	professor	and	his	wife	at	a	remote	forest	location	while	Clerici	watches,	immobilised	in	his	car.	The	film	ends	with	Clerici	and	his	blind	fascist	friend	wandering	a	decimated	Rome	and	the	Coliseum	in	the	last	days	of	the	war.	In	the	film’s	denouement,	Clerici	comes	across	the	man	that	he	thought	he	had	killed	as	a	boy.	He	proceeds	to	denounce	the	man	and	his	blind	friend	as	fascists	to	a	mob,	which	then	carries	both	men	away.			
The	Conformist	(1970),	like	Performance	(1970),	conveys	a	strongly	decadent	sensibility	at	odds	with	a	political	cinema	of	the	prevailing	years,	and	Vittorio	Storaro’s	(Apocalypse	Now,	1900,	Last	Tango	in	Paris)	lush	cinematography	transitions	between	a	palette	of	gold,	red	and	blue	with	the	assassination	scenes	descending	into	negative.	The	film	privileges	dialogue	as	much	as	it	employs	visual	strategies	to	affectively	engage	with	Clerici’s	embodying	of	the	question	of	violence	and	the	decision.	Bertolucci	was	a	protégé	of	a	Godard	but	he	uses	the	film	to	signal	a	departure	from	his	mentor;	in	one	instance,	using	Godard’s	actual	Paris	address	as	the	address	of	the	Italian	communist	professor	that	will	be	assassinated.	This	1970	film	deserts	the	overt	programmatic	politics	and	the	more	securely	anchored	emancipatory	subjects	of	Godard’s	cinema,	opting,	instead,	for	a	cinema	that	saturates	us	in	rich	visuals	in	a	knowing	reference	to	cinema	of	a	previous	period	and	of	the	period	that	it	recreates.	Like	Italian	director	Pier	Paolo	Pasolini’s	Salò,	or	the	120	Days	of	Sodom	(1976),	the	film	visually	references	Italian	fascist	era	cinema,	otherwise	known	as	Telefoni	
Bianchi	(White	Telephone	Cinema),	with	its	rigid	social	hierarchies,	art	deco	sets	and	the	presence	of	a	large	white	telephone.	An	object	unaffordable	for	the	film’s	audiences	and	which	represented	bourgeois	wealth	and	status.	It,	therefore,	thinks	overtly	but	affectively	about	how	cinema	thinks.	It	does	this,	however,	in	a	confused	but	productively	untheorised	fashion.		
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3.2	The	Imagined	Relationship	To	Dematerialised	Information		
	
The	Conformist	(1970)	places	its	methodology	in	plain	view	and,	whilst	the	film’s	narrative	is	concerned	with	the	embodying	of	the	decision,	this	is	presented	to	us	as	a	technological	and	cinematic	brilliance.	Cinema	arrives	with	us	as	refraction	of	ideology	but	the	film	also	seeks	to	explore	the	ideology	of	fascism.	Within	The	
Conformist,	violence	becomes	the	medium	for	both	the	film’s	protagonist	and	the	viewer	to	explore	their	romantic	occasionalism,	and	to	recreate	images	of	what	the	‘decision’	and	power	might	look	and	feel	like.	A	literal	violence	comes	to	be	seen	as	the	only	possible	medium	of	the	decision	and	of	self-determination,	as	the	narrative	of	the	film	travels	towards	a	climactic	murder.	Simultaneously,	however,	we	experience	this	narrative	as	knowingly	cinematic.	Its	technological	brilliance	is	foregrounded	and	we	start	to	see	the	film	as	a	documentary	of	its	technological	make	up.			Power	is	pictured	in	two	ways	by	the	film.	On	the	one	hand,	the	figure	of	Clerici	presents	himself	as	the	Prince	whose	acts	will	become	law,	by	dint	of	it	being	he	who	will	commit	those	acts.	Meanwhile,	the	sublime	technology	of	the	film’s	craft	and	certain	scenes	point	to	power	already	existing	within	and	constituted	by	matrices	of	technology.	One	such	scene	allegorizes	this	entanglement	with	power-as-technology.	In	this	scene	Anna	the	wife	of	the	political	exile	shows	Clerici’s	wife	Giulia	a	printer.			
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Fig.	23.	Clerici’s	apolitical	bourgeois	wife,	Giulia	is	urged	by	the	exiled	Professor	Quadri’s	wife,	Anna	to	print	out	anti-fascist	pamphlets.	Giulia	engages	with	a	machine	of	politics.	The	Conformist	(Bertolucci,	1970).		Anna,	as	part	her	seduction	of	Giulia,	invites	her	to	vigorously	turn	out	antifascist	leaflets	in	their	Paris	apartment.	The	scene	underlines	Giulia’s	almost	erotic	engagement	literally	with	a	machine	of	politics,	but	with	no	regard	for	its	contents.	She	becomes	entangled	in	a	thing,	a	ritual,	and	a	practice	and	becomes	constituted	by	an	ideology	in	which	she	is	momentarily	but	materially	invested.	This	image	of	entanglement	helps	to	overcome	the	notion	of	ideology	as	an	illusion	that	can	be	demystified	and	becomes,	instead,	something	in	which	we	become	materially	invested.	The	film	acts	in	a	specular	fashion	showing	us	how	we,	the	viewers,	are	using	the	machine	of	cinema,	participating	primarily	visually	but	experiencing,	as	affect,	the	rituals	and	practices	it	depicts.	By	showing	us	film’s	affective	capacities,	these	and	similar	scenes	in	The	Conformist	ask,	how	does	information	work,	over	and	above	what	it	means?	My	earlier	exploration	of	information	theory	and	informatics	helps	to	unpack	this	materiality	further.			In	chapter	one,	I	describe	how,	in	Claude	Shannon’s	(1948)	theory	of	information,	no	message	is	sent,	only	a	signal.	According	to	Shannon,	a	message	is	what	is	encoded	into	a	signal,	which	then	travels	through	a	medium.	In	addition,	Shannon	characterises	information	as	a	probability	function	with	no	dimensions,	
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no	materiality	and	no	necessary	connection	with	meaning.	Information	is,	says	Shannon	“[…]	a	pattern	not	a	presence”	(Hayles,	1999,	18).	To	continue	to	recap	from	chapter	one:	Katherine	Hayles	explains	that,	within	information	theory,	information	is	identified	with	choices	that	reduce	uncertainty.	The	key	concern	for	electrical	engineers	is	not	individual	messages	but	the	average	amounts	of	information	coming	from	a	single	source	and	how	to	keep	any	inflation	of	the	volumes	of	information	in	check.	The	more	random	and	untypical	a	message,	the	more	information	is	encoded	into	a	signal,	which	then	increases	the	overall	amount	of	information.	An	untypical	message	is	termed	as	a	‘surprisal’	by	electrical	engineers	seeking	to	avoid	volumes	of	information	swamping	the	capacity	of	a	given	system.	Managing	information,	therefore,	becomes	a	question	of	probability	and	hedging	against	uncertainty.	However,	these	material	limitations	of	engineering	information	and	the	function	of	probability	become	obscured	by	an	imagined	relationship	to	information.	This	imagined	relationship	to	information,	in	turn,	becomes	informatics’	ideological	function.	Let	me	explain.			The	fault	line	in	Shannon’s	theory	weights	the	portability	of	information	over	and	above	the	local,	contextualised	and	material	theories	of	information,	by	Friedrich	Kittler,	for	example.	Shannon’s	theory	of	information	does	not	(nor	would	it	in	1948)	factor	in	an	ideological	materialism.	An	imagined	relationship	to	information,	acquired	through	the	lens	of	Shannon’s	theory,	has	the	potential	to	view	information	as	post-material	and	post-ideological.	This	is	because	information	that	is	pictured	as	portable,	non-material	and	dimensionless	becomes	imbued	with	a	quality	of	a	truth	that	has	the	imagined	potential	to	slice	through	complexities,	unencumbered	by	material	impediments.	This	capacity	results	in	the	aspect	of	Shannon’s	theory	that	thinks	of	information	as	non-material,	obscuring	the	aspect	of	that	theory	that	thinks	of	information	as	a	probability	function	–	as	a	function	of	the	limits	of	information	engineering.	Like	the	unimaginable	mass	of	the	Leviathan,	information	takes	on	a	delimited	quality	that	affords	it	a	transcendental	power	that	obscures	its	materiality	and	its	effects.	Information	is	dematerialised	by	Shannon’s	theory	but	it	produces	material	effects.	The	phantasmagorical	bodies	that	do	a	cinematic	violence	cleave	through	limits,	creating	a	‘state	of	exception’	as	they	do	so.	These	bodies,	in	themselves,	
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by	being	explicitly	violent,	are	in	danger	of	showing	us	the	physical	limitations	of	their	power	and	so	losing	any	capacity	for	transcendence	that	transmits	the	potential	for	unlimited	power.	However,	they	also	intimate	and	act	as	refractions	and	sovereign	actors	of	a	spectral	underlying	power.		I	will	return	to	this	question	of	sovereign	power	and	decisionism	later	in	this	section	but,	for	a	moment,	I	need	to	revisit	the	film’s	foregrounding	of	its	thinking	of	cinema.	The	film	seems	overly	concerned,	even	guiltily	troubled,	by	its	own	immersion	in	the	illusionistic	nature	of	cinema	and	pushes	into	the	foreground	an	exploration	of	what	cinema	is,	as	ideology.			
3.3	Plato’s	Cave	–	Cinema	Threatens	its	Sovereign	Actors		
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	Fig.	24.	The	Conformist	(Bertolucci,	1970).	The	architecture	and	proto	cinema	of	Plato’s	cave	is	echoed	throughout	The	Conformist.	Questions	of	ideology	as	an	illusion	and	ideology	as	material	practices	compete	with	one	another	throughout	the	film,	as	it	foregrounds	the	affective	mechanics	of	cinema.		
	A	reoccurring	and,	again,	clumsy	motif	throughout	the	film	is	the	allegory	of	Plato’s	cave,	which	is	explicitly	told	in	a	scene	where	Clerici	meets	his	university	mentor	Quadri	in	his	Paris	apartment.	The	reference	continues	throughout	the	film	in	a	series	of	visual	plays	on	light,	shadow	and	architecture	that	replicate	the	architecture	and	proto	cinema	of	Plato’s	cave.	It	is	worth	reminding	ourselves,	here,	of	the	architecture	of	Plato’s	cave.	The	tightly	shackled	prisoners	of	Plato’s	allegory	are	able	only	to	see	the	shadows	on	the	back	of	the	cave	wall,	created	by	figures	passing	in	front	of	a	fire,	and	mistake	those	shadows	for	reality	itself.	Both	the	figures	and	the	fire	are	positioned	at	the	top	of	a	slope	that	rakes	away	and	upwards	from	the	backs	of	the	prisoners.			This	architecture	of	Plato’s	meta-cinema	is	replicated	again	and	again	in	the	film,	and	the	allegory	explicitly	retold	by	Clerici	in	a	scene	that	foregrounds	the	film’s	thinking.	In	one	such	scene,	Lino,	Clerici’s	blind	mentor	and	a	broadcaster	on	state	radio,	organises	a	party	attended	by	a	community	of	blind	colleagues	to	celebrate	Clerici’s	forthcoming	marriage.	The	party	takes	place	in	a	half-basement	room	with	small	windows	set	high	up	in	the	wall	on	one	side	of	the	room,	and	through	which	one	can	see	the	legs	of	passing	figures	with	the	shadow	and	light	populating	the	space	along	with	the	bodies	of	the	blind.	The	scene	culminates	with	a	fight	breaking	out	between	the	blind	attendees	in	what	is	a	heavy-handed	allegory	of	fascism	but	also	a	commentary	on	cinema.	The	scene	in	
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Quadri’s	office	begins	with	Clerici	closing	the	shutters	of	the	windows	to	tell	the	allegory	of	Plato’s	cave	and	ends	with	the	professor	extinguishing	Clerici’s	fascist	saluting	shadow	by	opening	another	shutter	and	flooding	the	spaces	with	light.	The	explicit	message	here	being:	fascism	lives	in	its	own	shadow	but	the	political	Left	ushers	in	the	light	that	will	evacuate	that	illusion.	However,	the	assassination	by	stabbing	of	the	professor	is	a	reminder	that,	in	Plato’s	myth,	any	of	those	prisoners	that	escape	the	cave	and	witness	the	sun	will	be	captured	and	killed.	Clerici	is	commissioned	to	enact	revenge	on	a	captive	of	fascism	that	would	dare	to	leave	the	confines	of	its	ideological	cave.			
The	Conformist	employs	an	overt	story	of	fascism	to	consider	what	or	who	constitutes	a	final	power	and,	to	all	intents	and	purposes,	it	is	a	story	of	the	illusory	nature	of	fascistic	ideology.	Its	implicit	and	subtler	narrative	suggests	that	sovereign	power	is	displaced	into	technological	platforms	in	more	diffused	but	intense	ways	than	state	ideology	can	imagine.	A	scene	earlier	in	the	film,	when	Clerici	is	given	a	gun	by	a	fascist	agent	to	conduct	the	murder,	shows	Clerici’s	fumbling	mastery	of	the	weapon.	It	appears	to	be	in	control	of	him	and	he	finishes	the	scene	with	a	mock	suicide,	pointing	the	gun	at	his	own	head	before	walking	out	of	the	frame.	The	gun	would	appear	to	stand	in	for	the	apparatus	of	cinema.	The	scene	suggests	that,	whilst	the	film	presents	a	body	as	the	embodiment	of	sovereign	power,	ultimately,	it	is	the	technological	apparatus	of	the	film	that	reigns	and	can	put	to	death	its	sovereign	actors.			This	last	point	sketches	out	what	may	be	the	critical	opportunity	that	the	film	offers.	Certain	cinematic	bodies	persist,	as	I	describe	in	chapter	one	and	in	chapter	two,	as	both	figure	and	ground.	They	exist	as	a	persistent	and	powerful	ideology	–	that	of	the	liberal	human	subject.	The	Conformist	speculates	with	this	figure	but	also	undermines	it	and	suggests	suiciding	it.	In	doing	so,	it	identifies	this	figure	as	a	conceptual	limit	that	must	be	breached.	Whilst	the	protagonist	views	a	literal	violence	as	a	medium	for	creating	a	‘state	of	exception’,	the	film	suggests	an	even	greater	violence.	One	that	would	evacuate	the	very	ground	of	that	concept.	The	following	chapter	gives	an	example	of	contemporary	video	that	attempts	this	evisceration	of	the	liberal	human	subject	but,	before	we	leave	
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behind	The	Conformist	entirely,	we	need	briefly	to	explore	another	definition	of	violence	that	the	film	effects;	that	which	Benjamin	called	a	mythic	violence	and	law.	It	is	this	mythic	violence	that	will	help	provide	an	understanding	as	to	why	cinematic	narratives	of	violence	become	an	expression	of	affective	information,	and	why	this	information	possesses	the	qualities	of	law.	As	mentioned	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	I	use	Benjamin’s	theological	framework	to	further	explore	Schmitt’s	assertion	that	all	modern	political	concepts	are	ultimately	secularised	theological	concepts.	I	extend	Schmitt’s	maxim,	however,	and	suggest	that	politics	is	now	done	by	a	forceful	informatics	that	takes	on	the	qualities	of	theological	conceptions	of	the	law.		
3.4	Mythical	Violence		
	
The	Conformist	speculates	with	the	question	of	how	conceptions	of	justice	and	the	law	are	in	danger	of	collapsing	together	whenever	the	law	is	interpreted	and	performed.	Clerici,	in	an	untheorised	fashion,	understands	that,	to	have	authority	and	legitimacy,	he	must	commit	an	act	that	speaks	of	justice	that	has	the	quality	of	new-testament	acts	or	founding	laws.	In	Clerici’s	intentions	and	actions,	we	can	begin	to	see	and	feel	that	conceptions	of	justice	haunt	the	law	as	an	historical	and	pre-political	act	that	installed	the	political.	These	haunting	historical	acts	of	founding	law	and	justice	invite	the	potential	for	what	Benjamin	calls,	in	Critique	
of	Violence	(1921),	a	mythic	violence,	which	is	inscribed	in	the	law	and	in	danger	of	being	literally	re-enacted	whenever	it’s	interpreted.	It	is	this	mythic	violence	that	haunts	Benjamin’s	work,	having	previously	haunted	Schmitt’s	work	on	sovereignty.	What	exactly	does	Benjamin	mean	by	a	mythic	violence	and	what	are	the	images	that	these	ideas	stem	from?	Why	does	cinematic	violence	both	detect	and	transmit	a	forceful	logic	of	the	derivative	that	feels	like	law?			For	Benjamin,	man-made	law	is	instantiated	after	the	fall	of	man	and	his	expulsion	from	paradise.	These	laws	must	be	thought	of	as	different	from	the	divine	law	of	God	but,	because	of	man’s	hubris,	this	form	of	law	attempts	to	have	all	the	qualities	of	God’s	law	and	posses	the	truth	that	only	God	has	access	to.	Benjamin	attempts,	in	Critique	of	Violence,	to	make	a	distinction	between	the	law,	
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as	we	imagine	it,	and	what	it	actually	is.	What	we	imagine	the	law	to	be	is	classed	by	him	as	mythic,	in	that	it	is	something	we	project	onto	God	but	is	entirely	man-made.	What	it	actually	is	remains	something	that	can	only	exist	in	God’s	mind.	We	cannot	know	what	God	thinks	and	so	it	is	idolatry	to	believe	that	we	can.	We	give	our	laws	all	the	qualities	of	truth	that	are	not	ours	to	give	(only	God’s)	and,	therefore,	our	laws	are	mythic	and	idolatrous.			Benjamin	offers	an	archetypal	example	of	mythic	violence	and	law	in	the	Greek	myth	of	Niobe	and	her	eternal	punishment.	In	the	myth,	Niobe	(a	mortal)	is	punished	for	challenging	the	gods’	authority	and	legitimacy.	Niobe	brags	of	having	fourteen	children,	whilst	Leto,	the	mother	of	Apollo	and	Artemis,	has	only	two	children.	In	revenge	for	Niobe’s	hubris,	Apollo	and	Artemis	kill	all	of	Niobe’s	children.	Executing	the	boys	and	girls	slowly,	alternating	between	girl	and	boy.	Niobe	is	then	transformed	into	a	weeping	rock	condemned	for	eternity	to	mourn	the	loss	of	her	children.	Benjamin	emphasises	that	Apollo	and	Artemis	are	not	only	punishing	Niobe,	but	establishing	a	new	law.	The	crying-stone	that	Niobe	becomes	is	a	physical	manifestation	of	the	law,	and	a	boundary	stone	on	the	frontier	between	gods	and	men	that	provides	evidence	of	their	power.	The	tale	of	Niobe	is	evidence,	for	Benjamin,	that	laws	created	by	men	mimic	those	of	the	gods	and,	so,	have	at	their	base	a	violence	that	is	unavoidably	re-enacted	whenever	the	law	is	interpreted.	Niobe’s	fate	is	to	suffer	this	violence	for	eternity,	having	had	the	hubris	to	challenge	the	gods’	legitimate	power.	Her	body	acts	as	evidence	of	a	metaphysical	power.			Benjamin	suggests	this	form	of	violence	and	law	never	settles	matters	for	good	and,	in	fact,	it	simply	perpetuates	itself.	‘Power’,	says	Benjamin,	is	the	principle	of	mythic	law	making	(Benjamin,	1995,	248)	and	this	kind	of	law	is	only	ever	manifested	as	force	or	violence	(the	German	word	Gewalt,	used	by	Benjamin,	applies	to	both	terms:	force	and	violence),	and	has	no	other	purpose	than	to	perpetuate	itself.	Benjamin	puts	it	yet	another	way:	“[the]	law’s	concern	with	justice	is	only	apparent,	whereas	in	truth	the	law	is	concerned	with	self-preservation”	(Benjamin,	1995,	232).	If	one	follows	this	logic,	it	is	possible	to	understand	Benjamin’s	view	that	this	form	of	law	cares	little	for	human	life.	
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Mythic	law,	suggests	Benjamin,	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	moment	of	a	judgement	that	marks	the	fall	of	man,	as	it	is	the	moment	in	which	language,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	descends	into	a	permanent	prattle	–	which	is	a	characteristic	of	myth.	Here,	Benjamin	seems	to	be	suggesting	a	form	of	law	that	combines	qualities	of	myth	with	allegory.	It	is	a	genre	of	law	and	violence	that	is	entirely	man-made	and,	therefore,	exists	in	an:	“[...]	ambivalent	limbo,	always	vulnerable	to	change	and	exposure”	or,	what	he	calls,	a	“[...]	mythic	ambiguity	of	law”	(Benjamin,	1995,	248).	Mythic	law,	as	he	suggests,	attempts	to	disguise	its	vulnerability	by	having	all	the	qualities	of	fate	and	destiny	that	would	have	us	believe	that	it	is	one	of	God’s	laws.	This	law,	says	Benjamin,	is	attempting	to	grasp	at	a	truth	it	does	not	and	cannot	possess.	That	is	for	God	to	give	and	to	which	we	might	never	have	access.	The	mutability	of	mythic	law	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	finality	of,	what	Benjamin	calls,	a	divine	or	mystical	violence	that	he	illustrates	with	a	Hebraic	counter-myth.	This	messianic	violence	has	the	capacity	to	extinguish	conceptions	of	the	law,	altogether.	Benjamin’s	complex	and	problematic	counter-myth	requires	more	unpacking	than	is	useful	here,	but	the	notion	of	mythic	violence	and	its	hubris	provides	a	sense	of	why	information	that	has	the	forceful	characteristics	of	the	law	expresses	that	force	as	violence.	Remember	that	Benjamin	uses	the	term	Gewalt	for	both	violence	and	force,	making	them	interchangeable.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	this	conception	of	mythic	law	allows	us	to	understand	the	vulnerability	of	a	power	that	needs	to	keep	demonstrating	its	force	through	sovereign	actors	and	narratives	of	violence.	This	form	of	power	is	unsure	of	its	legitimacy	and	needs	to	keep	asserting	itself,	in	order	to	reinstall	its	power	as	a	quasi-metaphysical	authority.	We	can	witness	cinema	beginning	to	think	this	paradoxical	force	and	vulnerability	in	The	
Conformist.			Narratives	of	violence,	highly	accelerated	average	shot	lengths	(ASL),	and	discontinuous	styles	of	editing	in	cinema	from	the	late	‘60s	onwards	augmented	an	experience	of	media	as	forceful.	The	Conformist	indulges	this	trend	in	its	affective	style	of	filmmaking,	but	also	begins	to	think	and	speculate	with	a	mythical	violence,	having	asked	its	audience	to	cinematically	enjoy	the	potential	for	violence	that	Clerici	offers.	It	shows	its	protagonist	to	be	tussling	with	the	
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question	of	mythic	violence,	whilst	allowing	us	to	feel,	through	the	film’s	landmark	art	direction	(Ferdinando	Scarfiotti),	the	texture,	grain	and	glamour	of	Clerici’s	hubris	and	desire	to	be	in	flows	of	power.	Performance	thinks	of	a	mythic	law	through	the	body,	attitudes	and	violent	acts	of	the	gangster	Chas	and	rock	star	Turner’s	subsequent	fascination	with	this	violence.	The	violent	temporality,	cuts	and	splices	of	Performance	echo	and	amplify	the	breaking	of	objects	and	bodies	to	create	a	sense	of	both	force	and	violence.	Force	and	violence	become	synonymous	with	one	another,	as	these	films	sense	and	think	an	emerging	logic	of	the	derivative,	not	only	as	an	informatic	phenomenon,	but	also	as	legalistic.			The	derivative	is,	like	the	law,	a	form	of	contract.	And,	like	the	law,	it	is	a	contract	that	demands	interpretation	and	reinterpretation.	As	discussed	in	chapter	two	with	regard	to	Barry	Lyndon’s	conversion	into	a	contract	within	a	schema	of	debt	and	Shaviro’s	citing	of	the	role	of	contracts	in	contemporary	action	cinema,	derivatives	are	contracts	that	have	all	the	force	of	law	but	are	in	a	constant	state	of	interpretation	and	reinterpretation,	investment	and	divestment.	They	exist,	as	Benjamin	says,	in	an	“[...]	ambivalent	limbo,	always	vulnerable	to	change	and	exposure”	or,	what	he	calls,	a	“[...]	mythic	ambiguity	of	law”	(Benjamin,	1995,	248).	These	contracts	are	never	final	but	are	experienced	and	felt	as	such.	The	derivative	amalgamates	the	dynamics	of	the	law	with	the	money	form	in	ways	that	invoke	the	forceful	qualities	of	mythic	law.	It	is	understandable,	therefore,	that	cinema,	which	detects	and	transmits	the	forceful	logic	of	the	derivative,	assumes	affective	narratives	of	violence.	Using	Benjamin’s	terms	once	again:	the	derivative,	as	a	mutable	contract,	descends	into	a	permanent	prattle	of	traded	information	–	which	is	a	characteristic	of	myth.	It	is	something	born	from	man’s	words	alone,	and	not	of	the	world	as	it	is.	However,	it	is	a	contract	that	feels	final	in	the	moment	of	pricing	because	probability	allows	it	to	convincingly	create	the	present.	It	makes	a	claim	on	the	truth	that	is	not	its	to	give,	but	makes	that	claim	decisively.	The	derivative	contract’s	mutability	requires	that	it	keep	reaffirming	its	shaky	claims	on	the	truth	and	do	so	forcefully,	in	order	to	maintain	its	quasi	metaphysical	authority.			
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Performance,	Barry	Lyndon	and	The	Conformist	point	to	their	bodies	as	potential	proxies	of	sovereign	power.	However,	they	then	frame	those	bodies’	claims	on	power,	force	and	the	truth	as	hubristic,	frail	and	vulnerable.	These	bodies	act,	then,	as	markers	of	an	underlying	contradiction	that	some	etymology	may	help	to	productively	unpack.	Horos,	the	ancient	Greek	word	for	a	boundary	marker	or	stone	(something	that	points	to	a	limit	and	horizon),	suggests	a	root	to	the	word	horror	(Small,	1995).	Horror’s	Latin	origins	(horrere)	suggest	a	trembling	or	shuddering.	The	fraying	cinematic	bodies	of	Performance	and	Barry	Lyndon	can	be	seen	as	akin	to	these	unstable	boundary	markers.	These	figures	think	the	force	and	hubris	of	a	spectral,	legalistic	and	informatic	power,	but	also	display	the	fragility	of	those	claims	for	legitimacy.	Figures	of	Horos	arise,	once	again,	in	the	following	chapter	but	in	more	recent	examples	of	culture	that	think	the	limits	of	cultural	production,	bounded	by	probability	and	its	spectral,	but	forceful,	authority.			
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Chapter	Four:	Accelerating	to	a	Standstill	–	Probability’s	
Reign		
	
The	acceleration	and	intensification	of	cinema	and	video	as	they	transmit	the	logic	
of	derivatives.	The	function	of	probability	in	both	accelerating	and	bracketing	
cinema.	The	temporal	impasse	this	bracketed	speed	installs.	Grace	Jones’s	
hyperspatial,	stuttering,	bundling	and	unbundling	body.	Exiting	Life	for	the	sake	of	
the	living.	How	the	logic	of	the	derivative	is	enacted	by	contemporary	art,	
architecture	and	infrastructure	space	and	becomes	romantic	productivity.	How	art	
becomes	informatics.	The	derivative	and	its	embedded	narratives	of	mastery.	
Evacuating	life	for	the	sake	of	the	living.	Detecting	emergent	structures	and	
distributed	forms	of	cognition.			Chapter	Four	mirrors	and	explicates	the	method	that	the	artworks	are	performing	which	is	of	intensifying	the	derivatives	logic.	The	chapter	suggests	that	one	way	of	overcoming	the	bracketed	(Shaviro)	but	highly	kinetic	production	of	contemporary	art	is	to	take	its	torsioning	of	space,	time	and	bodies	to	a	level	where	its	ideological	excesses	break	apart,	become	chaotic	and	our	relationship	with	information	is	recalibrated.	This	thinking	and	approach	was	beginning	to	be	developed	in	commissions	completed	for	the	Harlow	project	Let	
Us	Pray…	including	a	temporary	pavilion	the	design	and	decoration	of	which	violently	collapsed	together	images	of	key	buildings	in	the	town	as	a	means	of	intensifying	and	torsioning	its	built	ideology.		This	approach	has	really	taken	hold	in	the	work	DEAD	STOCK	and	the	projects	being	developed	that	use	the	examples	of	cinema	cited	in	this	text	as	raw	material	for	new	works	that	seek	an	ideological	breaking	point	in	the	perceived	but	controlled	intensity	of	that	material.	The	chapter’s	examination	of	what	it	calls	art’s	romantic	productivity	fleshes	out	the	conditions	of	art	production	according	to	the	peculiar,	binding	but	non-binding	contractual	logic	of	the	derivative	and	then	asks	what	can	be	re-couperated	from	this	paradox.	In	otherwords	what	kind	of	political	agency	can	be	derived	from	this	logic	which	is	not	already	captured	by	capital	and	then	finds	that	agency	in	the	material	workings	of	information	engineering.	I	stated	earlier	in	this	text	that	I	understood	the	sculptures	of	Harlow	to	act	as	a	form	of	
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concretised	contract	that	had	atrophied	along	with	the	form	of	statecraft	it	served.	This	chapter	attempts	to	understand	the	nature	of	a	new	less	visible	statecraft	and	contract	that	is	inscribed	into	the	space	between	contemporary	arts	objects,	the	romantic	subjectivity	of	its	audience	and	the	economic	extrastatecraft	that	they	serve.		—		
4.1	Intensification	–	Exiting	Life	for	the	Sake	of	the	Living			Chapter	one	considers	the	intensifying	of	cinema	as	exemplified	by	Performance	(1970).	Statistical	evidence	of	this	is	provided	by	American	film	theorist	and	historian	David	Bordwell	in	his	paper	Intensified	Continuity	(2002),	which	focuses	on	the	speeding	up	of	editing	rates	in	mainstream	cinema	from	the	late	‘60s	onwards.	Bordwell	conducts	a	form	of	film	criticism	termed	cognitive	
criticism	or	neoformalism.	This	approach	focuses	on	the	cognitive	processes	of	the	filmgoer,	separate	from	a	textual	analysis	of	film.	According	to	Bordwell,	the	Average	Shot	Lengths	(ASL)	of	film	departed	from	a	rate	of	8-11	seconds	in	the	1930s	to	a	rate	of	5-8	seconds	by	the	late	‘60s.	This	intensified	over	the	following	forty	years	to	the	extent	that	we	can	now	expect	current	rates	of	ASL	to	be	1.5	seconds.	A	process	enabled	by	digital	video	editing	where	ever	smaller	parts	can	be	shaved	off	a	shot.	Which	begs	the	question:	when	will	this	trend	of	intensification,	in	Bordwell’s	words,	“hit	a	wall”	(2002,	17);	when	will	cinema	become	unwatchable?	This	has	led	to	what	Bordwell	suggests	is	a	post-continuity	and	post-causal	condition	for	filmmakers	and	for	viewers.	These	developments,	as	I	will	explain	further,	signal	a	temporal	impasse	experienced	as	acceleration.			Video	as	a	medium	has	aligned	with	the	intensified	nature	of	the	financial	markets,	so	that	both	finance	capital	and	video	become	what	Shaviro	names	as	modulated	systems.	They	are	both	bracketed	by	the	underlying	fixity	of	probability	whilst	saturating	us	with	their	speed	and	seeming	liquidity.	As	I	explain	in	previous	chapters,	the	growth	and	intensification	of	derivatives-trading	since	the	period	of	the	early	‘70s	has,	in	the	main,	been	enabled	by	
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probability	based	tools,	such	as	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	model	(BSM)	and	its	digitisation	that	has,	in	turn,	led	to	high	frequency	trading,	for	example.	Meanwhile,	digital	film	production	has	become	the	product	of	‘modulation’	(Shaviro,	2010,	15)	in	that	infinite	variations	are	perceived	in	video	but	remain	tethered	to	an	underlying	system	of	control.			To	elaborate:	the	video	signal	is	expressed	as	binary	code,	formed	by	means	of	algorithmic	procedures	or	commands,	with	all	its	outcomes	predetermined	by	that	code,	its	software	and	the	laws	and	regulations	that	determine	it	as	that	particular	piece	of	software,	and	not	another.	In	turn,	the	sheer	capital	outlay	for	the	development	of	that	software	and	the	anticipation	of	a	financial	return	by	its	developers	ensures	that	the	actual	underlying	means	of	production	are	quarantined	from	the	user	with	only	limited	means	of	‘glitching’	the	code	and	its	outcomes.	This	leads	to	a	bracketed	series	of	outcomes,	unable	to	move	outside	of	these	parameters	but	which	saturate	us	with	a	sense	of	a	frictionless	movement	and	unlimited	choice.	All	outcomes	become	predetermined	outcomes,	but	deliriously	so.	The	video	signal	carries	greater	extremes	of	information	than	the	analogue	signal,	adding	to	the	sublime	sense	of	a	deluge,	but	one	that	masks	an	underlying	disposition	for	control.			The	modulated	limitations	of	digital	video	differ	radically	from	those	of	analogue	video	and	film,	for	example.	In	the	analogue,	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	colours	that	can	be	painted	or	sounds	and	tones	produced	and	heard,	but	in	the	digital	these	are	finite	and	preset	in	ways	that	are	markedly	different	from	analogue	audio,	for	example.	The	controls	are	set	in	advance	of	use.	For	example,	an	analogue	sound	wave	represented	on	a	graph,	with	the	horizontal	axis	being	time	and	the	vertical	being	voltage,	would	be	represented	as	smooth	and	continuous.	The	signal	might	be	pegged	to	minimum	and	maximum	values	but	there	can	be	an	infinite	number	of	variables	within	that	range.	50	volts	be	can	become	50.4	and	then	50.42	and	then	50.424,	for	example,	with	these	in-between	values	becoming	increasingly	infinite	and	precise	values.			
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	Fig	25.	Analogue	Sound	Wave				In	contrast,	a	digital	signal	must	have	a	finite	set	of	potential	values.	These	values	can	be	between	the	number	two	and	a	very	large	number,	but	not	infinity	(∞).	A	digital	signal	will	typically	be	one	of	two	values:	either	0	volts	or	5	volts,	for	example.	A	graph	with	a	time	axis	illustrating	this	kind	of	signal	will	appear	as	a	series	of	blocks.			
	Fig	26.	Digital	signal	expressed	as	preset	values.	0-5	volts.				When	an	attempt	is	made	to	represent	a	digital	signal	in	a	waveform,	an	appearance	is	given	of	a	smooth	and	continuous	wave,	but	closer	inspection	
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reveals	small	discrete	steps	in	the	wave,	as	the	digital	signal	tries	to	approximate	values.			
	Fig	27.	Digital	signal	presented	as	a	sound	wave.			This	material	peculiarity	of	the	digital	signal	is	augmented	by	proprietary	software.	A	commonly	experienced	example	would	be	the	filters	on	Adobe	Photoshop	that	give	a	seemingly	infinite	range	of	effects	but	little	room	to	find	variance	in	between	those	preset	options.	This	logic	is	further	exacerbated	by	filters	for	both	Adobe	Photoshop	and	After	Effects,	for	example,	aping	the	look	of	analogue	cinema	and,	in	the	process,	denying	digital	video	an	aesthetic	that	gives	full	representation	to	its	own	dynamics.			The	logic	of	the	digital	video	signal	with	its	discontinuous	blocks	or	shocks	of	signal	appears	to	percolate	up	into	digital	post-production,	where	the	viewer	is	assailed	by	discontinuous	images	that	no	longer	sustain	analogue	cinema’s	habits	of	duration.	Like	the	films	of	Michael	Bay	(Transformers,	2007-	onwards)	who	purportedly	takes	the	view	that:	“any	two	shots	spliced	together	will	work”	these	films	install	the	sensation	that	effect	precedes	notions	of	cause	(Shaviro,	2010,	80).	This	discontinuity	happens	with	digital	video	in	ways	more	dramatic	than	analogue	film’s	attempts	at	overcoming	its	own	grammar,	in	part,	because	of	the	sheer	throughput	of	information	that	a	digital	signal	allows.	Added	to	this	is	the	effect	of	the	signal’s	potential	to	be	converted	from	sound	to	image	and	
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then	back	to	sound	again,	so	that	all	values	become	convertible	values	but	do	not	have	to	sit	within	a	chain	of	cause	and	effect.			What	results,	in	multiplex	cinema	and	increasingly	in	television	and	online/on-demand	productions,	is	a	swirling,	disorientating	sense	of	power,	movement	and	action,	experienced	as	bursts	of	bundled	effects	that	are	emphatic,	unquestioning	and	unreflective.	We	experience	these	as	moments	of	decision	that	feel	final	in	the	moment	of	viewing,	but	are	superseded	by	the	finality	of	the	consequent	block	of	signal.	Suspended	from	a	sense	of	continuity,	each	of	these	condensations	feels	delimited,	empowering	and	unconstrained.	The	resulting	sense	of	delimited	power	is	in	contrast	to	the	underlying	control	of	the	video	signal.	As	a	consequence,	what	video	does	and	what	the	derivative	does	are	markedly	different	from	what	they	purport	to	do,	and	what	we	experience	as	them	doing.			Probability	installs	an	imagined	relationship	to	information	and	data	that	perpetuates	a	narrative	of	freedom	and	self-determination,	whilst	sustaining	an	underlying	and	obfuscated	control.	This	double	action	is	probability’s	ideological	potential.	Armen	Avanessian,	in	his	paper	Today	is	Tomorrow,	declares	that,	in	the	age	of	the	derivative,	we	are	“[...]	left	bereft	of	a	future	or	of	a	present”	(	Avanessian	2015,	2).	By	this,	Avanessian	means	that	all	potential	possibilities	have	already	happened	in	the	digital	and	financial	regime,	according	to	the	very	system	of	probability	that	these	economies	rest	on.	Avanessian	is	describing	a	temporal	impasse,	perceived	as	an	acceleration.	Whether	it	is	the	carefully	modelled,	out-in-space	catastrophe	of	the	film	Gravity	(Cuarón,	2013)	or	the	high-frequency,	algorithmic	derivative	trade,	each	arena	has	exponentially	expanded	and	speeded	up	to	a	standstill.	Steven	Shaviro	describes	in	more	detail	the	modulatory	effects	of	probability	on	video:			 “[...]there	is	no	proliferation	of	meanings,	but	rather	a	capture	of	all	meanings.	Every	event	is	translated	into	the	same	binary	code	and	placed	within	the	same	algorithmic	grid	of	variations,	the	same	phase	space”	(Shaviro,	2010,	13).				
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		Fig	28.	Grace	Jones	aligns	with	the	forces	of	capital	and	risks	evacuating	the	human.	Corporate	
Cannibal,	still	from	music	video	(Jones,	Hooker,	2008).			Shaviro	is	optimistic	that	there	exist	examples	of	video	that	can	short-circuit	this	impasse;	but	this	entails	evacuating	the	human.	Shaviro	alights	on	director	Nick	Hooker’s	video	Corporate	Cannibal	(2008)	for	the	singer	Grace	Jones,	as	an	example	of	video	that	accelerates	an	otherwise	modulated	media	towards	a	productive	‘torsion’	of	video’s	relational	spaces.	His	claim	is	that	this	spatial	temporal	‘torsion’	is	produced	by	delivering	Jones’s	subjectivity	to	the	actuality	of	digital	image	production	and	away	from	a	human-centred	ontology.	The	video	appears	to	turn	Jones’s	body	into	a	viscous,	abstract	liquid,	moving	over	the	screen	like	mercury	with	only	the	occasional	punctuation	of	an	eye,	mouth	or	teeth	to	give	the	identity	of	the	singer	away.	In	time,	with	the	bass	of	the	soundtrack,	the	pool	of	matter	shivers	and	slides,	threatening	to	become	corporeal	before	dispersing,	once	again,	to	the	chorus	of	a	sustained	rim	shot.	In	Shaviro’s	words:		 “She	 [Jones]	 embodies,	 and	 transmits,	 flows	 of	 affect	 that	 are	 so	 intense,	 and	 so	impersonal	and	 inhuman,	 that	 they	cannot	be	contained	within	 traditional	 forms	of	subjectivity”	(2010,	20).			Shaviro’s	assertion	is	that	Jones	is	able	to	identify	so	absolutely	with	digital	image	production	that	she	becomes	an	iteration	that	affirms	video’s	capacity	to	produce	a	space	internal	to	its	own	processes,	as	opposed	to	being	tied	to	any	indexical	referents,	including	that	of	the	human.	If,	unlike	classical	cinema,	video	is	about	the	composition	of	forces,	as	opposed	to	the	duration	of	bodies	and	images,	then	Corporate	Cannibal	detaches	Jones	the	image	from	Jones	the	person	completely.23		
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	Shaviro	underscores	that	‘affect’	is	something	that	escapes	critique	because	of	its	ungraspable	nature	but	that	this	might	be	the	very	reason	to	engage,	perform	and	manufacture	‘affect’.	The	‘allure’	of	video	is	something	always	present,	material	but,	at	the	same	time,	beyond	us	–	a	non-conceptual	and	non-cognitive	event.	The	pop	star,	Jones,	in	this	instance,	simply	acts	as	some	form	of	temporary	anchoring	point	or	eddying	concentration	of	intensity	and	‘interaction’	(2010,	10)	–	a	characteristic	of	pop,	which	is	also	an	aspiration	towards	stillness	and	solidity	whilst	remaining	fluid	and	mobile.	This	generative	contradiction	exposes	the	desire	by	Jones	to	assume	an	object	form,	but	only	as	an	evocation	of	underlying	forces	and	as	a	temporary	pooling	of	intensities.	Jones’s	video	body	becomes	a	marker	of	an	underlying	disposition	and	organisation	of	power.	I	will	unpack	the	terms	‘marker’	and	disposition’	with	regard	to	Keller	Easterling’s	work	on	infrastructure	space	further	on	in	this	chapter.			For	Shaviro,	Corporate	Cannibal	(2008)	so	identifies	with	the	workings	of	capital	that	it	reclaims	and	gives	new	life	to	its	reifications.	He	suggests	that	this	process	leads	to	an	implosion	of	these	forces:	“[…]	some	kind	of	stuttering	…	some	sort	of	hyperspatial	torsion	and	distortion”	(2010,	24).	According	to	Shaviro,	Jones	and	director	Nick	Hooker	make	the	decision	to	turn	towards	the	“[...]	malaise	of	the	digital”	in	order	to	give	us	a	stronger	dose	of	the	same	so	that,	whilst	they	map	that	malaise,	it	arrives	with	us	as	an	affective	topography.	Within	this	terrain,	there	exist	materials,	perhaps	less	saturated	by	capital	than	we	think,	but	that	are	captured	and	weaponised	by	it.			Shaviro	claims	that	Jones’s	‘hyperbolic’	video	figure	is	manufacturing	its	form	in	real	time,	despite	it	being	pre-recorded.	The	spaces	of	video	become	what	David	Harvey	terms	as	the	relational	spaces	of	capital	that	vary	from	moment	to	moment	in	response	to	the	forces	of	negotiation	and	renegotiation,	investment	and	divestment.	A	process	of	extended	deferral	like	that	of	the	derivative.	Relational	space	continually	alters	“[...]	its	curvature	and	its	dimensions;	it	does	not	persist	as	a	stable,	enduring	container	for	objects	that	would	be	situated	
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solidly	within	it”	(Shaviro,	2010,	16).	The	video	body	arrives,	instead,	as	a	condensation	of	temporal	and	spatial	abstractions	that	are	akin	to	the	bending	of	time	and	space	by	the	derivative.	Corporate	Cannibal	manages	to	become	(in	video	terms)	a	baroque	body	which,	rather	than	ascending	and	bursting	into	flames,	pools,	collects	and	disperses	as	an	expression	of	the	derivative’s	spectacular	deluge.	In	the	eddying	mercurial	plane	of	Jones’s	liquified	body	we	can	detect	the	dispositions	of	an	underlying	power	and	control.			Shaviro	claims	that	Corporate	Capital	is	practising	accelerationism	as	a	form	of	aesthetic	provocation.	By	accelerationism,	I	refer	to	the	school	of	thought	stemming	from	the	work	of	philosophers	Sadie	Plant,	Nick	Land	and	the	Cybernetic	Cultures	Research	Unit	(CCRU)	(1995)	and	the	loose	association	of	writers,	musicians	and	artists	whose	work	is	informed	by	CCRU,	including	Mark	Fisher	and,	more	recently,	invoked	in	the	Left-orientated	Manifesto	for	an	
Accelerationist	Politics	(2013)	by	Nick	Srnicek	and	Alex	Williams.	Within	the	terms	of	Shaviro’s	reading	of	Corporate	Cannibal,	the	video	becomes	an	expression	of	the	accelerationist	maxim	that,	in	order	to	leave	capital	behind,	we	must	accelerate,	travel	and	synthesise	with	its	machinic	and	technological	trajectories.	Accelerationism	claims	that	to	pursue	some	form	of	hypercapitalist	subjectivity	that	would	stop	resisting	capital’s	momentum,	would	also	rupture	the	limits	of	capital.	To	do	this	would	be	faithful	to	Marx’s	view	that	capital	is	simply	a	stage	that	we	must	move	through.	This	would	also	entail	acknowledging	that	certain	technologies	had	a	life	before	capital	and	are	less	imbricated	in	its	logic	than	we	think.	These	technologies,	it’s	argued,	need	to	be	liberated	from	the	restraints	of	capital	that	always	seeks	to	install	old	means	of	drawing	down	value	from	technological	advances.	To	accelerate	is	to	leave	capital	behind.			Accelerationism’s	key	characteristic	is	its	understanding	of	capital	as	a	mainly	technological	platform	and,	as	a	consequence,	to	accelerate	this	platform	means	also	leaving	the	liberal	human	subject	behind.	This	threat	of	breaching	the	bounded	human	and	allowing	the	self	to	dissolve	in	a	deluge	of	informatics	is	
Corporate	Cannibal’s	aesthetic	provocation.	It	is	a	provocation	aimed	at	a	traditional	Left	aesthetic	that	has	sought	to	reinstall	the	human	when	faced	with	
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the	alienating	forces	of	capital.	However,	rather	than	leaving	the	human	behind,	as	it	and	accelerationism’s	provocation	may	suggest,	Corporate	Cannibal	may,	in	fact,	be	asking	us	to	think	of	a	recalibration	between	human	and	non-human	forms	of	cognition	that	is	less	anthropocentric	and	recognises	the	material	reality	of	informatics	as	a	distributed	form	of	cognition.			The	video	body	of	Grace	Jones	operates	within	a	vein	of	cinema	and	moving	image	bodies	that	think	their	underlying	economics	and	informatics.	The	violently	fraying	and	unstable	bodies	of	Turner	in	Performance	and	the	stilled	but	then	violent	body	of	Barry	Lyndon	in	Kubrick’s	tale	of	18th-	century	debt	and	contracts	act	as	cinematic	precedents	to	this	digital	informatic	body.	The	mythical,	violence	that	these	bodies	practise	threatens	to	evacuate	life	as	an	ideological	excess.	These	bodies	are	violently	rendered	liquid	and	unbounded,	shake	and	shimmer	becoming	in	the	process	a	combination	of	both	Horos	the	ancient	Greek	boundary	marker	and	the	Latin	horrere	–	a	shuddering,	trembling	entity.	Jones’s	body	dispenses	with	the	human	narratives	and	metalized	bodies	of	a	Michael	Bay	CGI	juggernaut	(Transformers)	that	act	as	the	stories,	which	occlude	the	films’	logic	of	disorientation	and	control.	As	a	consequence,	it	lays	the	dynamics	of	these	films	bare	so	that	we	can	detect	and	feel	the	underlying	polity	of	the	derivative	and	of	residing	within	the	ebb	and	flow	of	informatic	space.			Before	unpacking	the	terms	‘markers’,	‘disposition’	and	‘distributed	cognition’	further,	we	need	to	pause	and	consider	how	the	logic	of	derivatives	functions	for	contemporary	art	and	its	objects.	Do	these	seemingly	analogue	objects	function	in	similar	ways	to	the	borderline	objects	and	bodies	of	cinema	and,	as	a	consequence,	think	the	ideology	and	informatic	materiality	of	the	derivative?			
4.2	Art’s	Romantic	Productivity			Avanessian	proffers	that,	because	contemporary	art’s	objects	are	irreducible	to	price,	this	makes	them	the	perfect	object	of	speculation	and	also	the	ideal	“[…]	transmission	mechanism	of	financialisation	permeating	all	aspects	of	society”	
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(Avanessian,	2015,1).	Put	another	way,	art’s	objects	can	be	seen	as	both	stores	of	value	but,	at	the	same	time,	they	have	many	more	component	flows	than	a	typical	commodity,	and	these	can	be	unbundled	exponentially	over	time.	This	process	of	unbundling,	between	the	art	object	as	a	store	of	value	and	its	markers	of	effect,	becomes	a	to-ing	and	fro-ing	of	information	that	sustains	volatility.	This	volatility	is	expressed	through	contingent	aspects	of	the	work,	such	as	its	visibility,	its	critical	standing,	its	association	or	lack	of	association	with	other	artworks	and	their	value.	In	order	for	contemporary	art	to	both	perform	and	transmit	the	function	of	the	derivative,	its	content	needs	to	provide	as	little	friction	as	possible	to	ensure	its	circulation.	Without	its	circulation	and	movement,	it	is	simply	a	commodity	and	not	in	this	state	of	unbundling.	This	latter	process	mirrors	the	conjoining	of	distribution	and	production	where	circulation	and	the	production	of	value	become	one	and	the	same.	A	process	that	not	only	shortens	the	supply	chain	but	almost	entirely	evacuates	it.			This	development	has	important	ramifications	for,	not	just	contemporary	art,	but	also	other	arenas	of	cultural	production,	knowledge	production	and	governance.	The	ways	in	which	the	financial	markets	under	the	conditions	of	BSM	has	come	to	be	enmeshed	in	and	transmitted	by,	for	example:	the	creative	industries,	video	production,	parametric	architecture	and	planning,	statecraft	and	extrastatecraft	coming	out	of	the	development	of	infrastructure,	or	the	measuring	of	‘impact’	by	research	in	Universities,	has	been	creeping	and	dynamic.	These	apparently	dynamic	systems	appear	underpinned	by	two	forces.	The	first	is	that	which	is	common	to	creative	industries	and	to	derivatives	trading,	which	is	the	demand	for	a	departure	from	a	Fordist	routine	in	order	to	flexibly	and	imaginatively	find	ways	of	distinguishing	oneself	from	other	workers	and	competitors.	A	characteristic	expressed	in	derivatives	trading	as	volatility.	The	other	factor	is	the	damping	down	of	risk	by	the	use	of	probability,	so	that	the	demand	to	be	creative	and	for	volatility	results	in	a	bracketed	creativity.	This	demand	is,	in	turn,	performed	by	actors	as	something	we	can	recognise	as	creative	and,	in	the	case	of	derivatives,	something	we	recognise	as	volatility.	Under	these	circumstances,	the	ability	to	recognise	what	is	creativity	and	what	is	volatility	
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usurps	the	breaking	of	any	actual	limits	that	would	disrupt	the	ground	on	which	these	judgements	are	performed.				
	Fig.	29.	Top	row,	from	left:	All	You	Hear	Is	Beads	Rattling	(2012),	by	Leo	Gabin;	Untitled	#0904	(2009),	by	John	Bauer;	Untitled	(JS06198)	(2006),	by	Josh	Smith.	Bottom	row:	ST-AA	(Transfer	
Series)	(2013),	by	Angel	Otero;	Big	Squid	Ink	(2014),	by	Jamie	Sneider;	I	(2011),	by	Rosy	Keyser.		Art	critic	Jerry	Saltz’s	rumination	Zombies	on	the	Walls:	Why	Does	So	Much	New	
Abstraction	Look	the	Same?	(2014)	provides	anecdotal	evidence	of	this	phenomenon	of	contemporary	art	transmitting	the	dynamics	of	a	derivatives	market,	based	on	probability.	Saltz	points	to	the	proliferation	of	what’s	been	termed	‘crapstraction’	as	proof	that	the	markets	are	risk	averse	and	artists	are	complicit	in	doing	a	recycling	of	abstraction’s	greatest	hits.	And	that	they	do	this	in	order	to	capture	an	increasing	bubble	in	a	market	that	supplies	the	1%	with	an	investment	that	is	interior-design	friendly	or	acts	as	a	backdrop	to	the	art	fairs	and	‘places	of	exception’	that	international	capital	requires.		
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	A	slide	show	by	Saltz	of	this	‘zombie	abstraction’,	from	the	last	five	years	shows	six	works	by	six	artists	that	demonstrate	an	uncanny	resemblance;	washed	out	greys,	moiré	effects,	references	to	the	stretcher	that	say	“I	know	I	am	making	a	painting.”	Saltz	cites	two	of	the	main	attractions	of	abstraction	for	the	agents	of	this	trend:	abstraction’s	potential	for	a	handsome	elegance	and	its	non-portrayal	of	difficult	subjects;	its	referencing	of	canons	of	painting,	including,	for	example,	colour-field	painting,	minimalism	and	post-minimalism,	that	act	as	a	store	of	stable	value	that	can	be	abstracted.	To	these	core	characteristics	are	added	a	knowing	reflexivity	that	demonstrates	to	the	viewer	the	painter’s	post-modern	credentials.	In	addition,	forms	of	metacritique	are	inserted	that	promise	‘edge	quality’	and	a	politic	which,	in	turn,	produces	a	unique	selling	point	(USP)	and	differentiates	this	zombie	abstraction	from	another	zombie	abstraction.	For	example,	it	is	claimed	the	canvas	employed	was	used	by	homeless	people	as	a	shelter	in	Colombia	(Oscar	Murillo).	The	works	are	commonly	sold	sight-unseen	and	therefore,	suggests	Saltz,	lend	themselves	to	be	viewed	on	the	artfair-iPad	or	buyer’s	iPhone,	arriving	to	market,	as	they	do,	in	a	predominantly	vertical	format.	In	conclusion,	the	works	offer	little	material	or	conceptual	resistance	and	easily	become	a	form	of	currency.	Something	that	Saltz	suggests	makes	‘crapstraction’	the	bitcoin	of	the	artworld.			This	conclusion	should	be	taken	with	a	measure	of	caution	as	art	has,	in	the	recent	past,	been	considered	as	not-liquid-enough	by	auction	houses	wishing	to	make	the	dealing	of	art	‘high-frequency’,	to	the	same	degree	as	derivatives	trading	(Zorloni,	2013).	The	reasons	are	various	but,	in	the	main,	include	the	need	for	the	object	to	be	transported	between	buyers,	the	acquisition	of	status	associated	with	the	purchase,	meaning	the	retention	of	work	by	the	buyer	and	limited	access	to	key	works	by	buyers.	In	short,	the	supply	chain	is	complex	and	costs	are	incurred	over	the	length	of	that	chain.	These	factors	require	a	social	intimacy	that	slows	trading	down	and	apprehends	the	art	market’s	automation.			These	factors	do	not,	however,	impede	the	mixed	economy	and	affect	that	arises	from	the	showing	of	contemporary	art.	Whether	that	be	tourism,	art	handling,	
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media	and	press,	production	houses,	lifestyle	associations	–	so	that,	whilst	costs	are	incurred	at	many	intervals	in	the	supply	chain,	value	can	also	be	extracted	at	points	along	the	work’s	journey	to	market	and	during	its	time	with	a	collector,	as	part	of	experience	and	knowledge	economies.	It	is	this	last	factor	or	stream	of	value	that	is	most	liquid	and	points	to	the	role	of	the	artwork	as	an	enabler	of	these	potentials	for	extracting	value:	acting,	as	it	does,	to	create	intimacy	amongst	communities	of	interest.			Contemporary	art	functions,	then,	as	the	interface	between	production	and	consumption	and,	whilst	some	of	its	requirements	for	face-to-face	contact	resist	the	automation	of	long-tail	economics,	many	of	its	behaviours	are	in	correspondence	with	those	technologies	and	anticipate	similar	metrics	of	value	including	attention	(Pine	&	Gilmore,	2011),	experience,	and	the	frictionless	circulation	of	the	work’s	image,	if	not	its	stuff	or	substrate.	The	individual	works	of	zombie	abstraction	no	longer	act	as	expressive	solitary	‘stones	in	the	stream’	but	a	product	that	can	be	rolled	out	internationally	as	one	aspect	of	the	‘spatial	products’	that,	argues	writer	and	urbanist	Keller	Easterling,	constitute	‘experience	architectures’	(Easterling,	2014).			Included	in	Easterling’s	long	list	of	examples	of	these	proliferating	archipelagos	of	market	determined	activity	are:	tourist	complexes,	free-trade	zones,	theme	parks,	technological	and	industrial	campuses,	airports;	but	might	easily	also	include	the	art	fair	or	the	museum.	This	form	of	club,	that	temporarily	inhabits	the	city,	acts	as	state	within	a	state	or	what	Easterling	calls	a	‘place	of	exception’.	Here,	one	can	pay	not	for	a	thing	but	for	the	experience	of	being	in	this	‘place	of	exception’	where	lifestyles	can	be	experimented	with	and	the	artworks	act	as	a	dynamic	architectural	element	within	a	series	of	spaces	that	court	a	‘formalised	informalism’	and	herald	the	accumulation	of	cultural	capital.	According	to	Easterling,	the	client	of	American	entertainment	spaces	is	not	meant	to	buy	anything	yet,	but	to	pay	to	have	access	to	the	experience	of	inhabiting	the	space	itself.	This	new	‘spatial	product’	provides	islands	of	experience	that	occur	as	internationally	distributed	havens	between	which	the	actors	can	move,	safe	in	the	knowledge	that	each	space	will	provide	what	Agamben	has	called	‘the	
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encampment’	(1998)	within	the	emerging	global	neoliberal	market	–	spaces	that	afford	positive	states	of	exception	to	the	elite	few.	Here,	in	‘the	camp’,	laws	and	politics	can	be	suspended,	in	order	that	the	camp’s	international	and	highly	mobile	community	can	make	its	own	rules,	laws	and	forms	of	organisation	within	its	hermetic	confines	that	paradoxically	act	as	forms	of	‘interior	exteriority’	(Preciado,	2014).	In	other	words,	the	life	that	goes	on	there	is	neither	public	nor	private	but	segues	into	what	we	historically	called	public	space,	through	its	role	as	a	laboratory	for	living	and	organising	life.			The	parallel	development	of	art-as-bitcoin	and	these	‘places	of	exception’	demonstrates	how	contemporary	art’s	objects	shift	from	being	autonomous	content	towards	becoming	nodes	within	a	matrix	of	forces	and	information.	Contemporary	art’s	objects	begin	to	take	on	some	of	the	characteristics	of	Easterling’s	architectures	of	infrastructure	space.	On	the	one	hand,	these	objects	and	investment	vehicles	act	as	stories	that	obscure	the	extra	law	of	finance,	which	enacts	forms	of	soft	power	through	the	triangulating	effects	of	international	encampments	of	art.	On	the	other	hand,	these	objects	also	act	as	what	Easterling	terms	as	‘multipliers’,	in	that	the	existence	and	presence	of	these	works	enable	a	multiplication	of	global	encampments.	International	development	companies	combine	signifiers	of	local	and	international	architectures	and	employ	these	stylistic	amalgams	as	skins	that	veil	the	exponential	growth	of	replicable	and	fully	tested	‘spatial	products’.	Similarly,	‘hot’	local	and	international	political	narratives	are	weaved	into	the	programmes	of	the	art	encampment,	whilst	‘colder’,	more	prosaic,	but	far	more	pervasive	forms	of	power	are	conducted	through	the	proliferation	of	art	and	capital’s	infrastructure.			Easterling	uses	the	example	of	the	car	and	the	elevator	as	objects	that	have	acted	as	multipliers	for	architecture	and	urban	space.	Their	existence	causes,	in	the	case	of	the	elevator,	an	increase	in	tall	buildings	and,	in	the	case	of	the	car	and	increased	car	ownership	in	the	USA	in	the	1950s,	the	expansion	of	the	suburbs	and	particular	typologies	of	building.	Certain	objects	in	certain	relationships	to	one	another	have,	then,	the	power	to	effect	and	put	in	motion	processes	of	power,	
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without	being	the	single	source	of	that	power.	Their	composition	reinterprets	space	as	information.	Similarly,	contemporary	art	becomes	a	multiplier,	but	also	a	marker	of	an	underlying,	inexpressive,	highly	bureaucratic	and	technocratic	power,	whilst	also	being	a	‘story’	that	obscures	these	effects.	To	put	this	in	yet	another	way:	the	introduction	of	mass	car	ownership	has	produced	houses	with	garages,	changed	the	layout	of	rooms	and	altered	the	city	and	its	communal	spaces.	Similarly,	but	in	a	less	impactful	way,	the	objects	and	practices	of	contemporary	art	have	helped	to	produce	specific	typologies	of	public	space	and	public/private	institutions.	As	the	derivative	converts	the	qualities	of	commodities,	people	and	space	into	information,	so	the	logic	of	infrastructure	space	turns	art’s	objects,	spaces	and	institutions	into:	“[…]	collections	of	objects	and	volumes	that	demonstrate	a	disposition”	(Easterling,	2014,	72).	A	simple	metaphor	that	Easterling	uses	to	describe	‘disposition’	would	be	the	image	of	a	ball	at	the	top	of	an	incline.	Here:	“The	geometry	of	the	ball	and	its	relative	position	are	the	simple	markers	of	potential	agency”	(2014,	72).	The	ball,	even	by	being	static,	is	doing	something	by	occupying	that	position.	Its	potential	for	movement	in	the	future	is	having	effects	in	the	present.	Its	very	presence	is	promoting	an	unfolding	relationship	between	potentials	and,	as	a	result,	information	is	coursing	through	and	between	those	potentials.	Objects	begin,	then,	to	act	as	markers	of	these	underlying	potentialities	and	shifting	currents	of	information.	Easterling	uses	the	metaphor	of	the	eddying	surface	of	the	Mississippi	River	to	describe	the	function	of	these	markers.	The	surfaces	of	the	river	was	read	by	author	Mark	Twain,	during	his	time	as	a	steamboat	captain,	as	markers	of	underlying	dangerous	currents	and	shifting	river	beds.	Twain	was	reading	information	from	the	face	of	the	water,	the	occasional	ripple	here,	or	bulge	there,	which,	in	totality,	indicated	the:	“inherent	agency”	(2014,21),	or	the	disposition	of	its	organisation.	Objects	and,	in	the	case	of	this	text,	art’s	objects,	can	begin	to	be	read	in	a	similar	fashion,	as	markers	of	an	underlying	organisation	of	capital	and	culture.	The	shape	and	content	of	artworks	becomes	secondary	to	the	ways	in	which	they	indicate	the	organisational	patterns	quietly	but	persistently	occurring	below	the	surface.	As	Easterling	very	importantly	underlines,	we	need,	in	these	circumstances,	to	be	able	to	read	the	declared	intent	against	the	underlying	disposition.	In	this	case,	between	what	art	is	saying	
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and	what	art	is	doing.	Paradoxically,	the	underlying	disposition	is	hidden	in	plain	view	but	its	edges	are	hard	to	detect,	leaving	us	only	with	these	markers	of	the	extra	law	at	work	that,	in	turn,	lead	to	the	extra	spaces	of	art.			The	museum,	like	the	art	fair,	becomes	the	club-type	space	which,	as	I’ve	outlined	earlier,	is	neither	public	nor	private	but	comes	to	act	as	a	laboratory	for	living	and	organising	life	(Preciado,	2014).24	What	used	to	be	called	the	wholly	public	sector	now	survives	in	a	mixed	economy,	taking	on	the	characteristics	of	the	encampment	and	laboratories	for	living.	These	spaces	become	the	‘places-of-exception’	that	Easterling	suggests	are	the	engines	of	neoliberal	statecraft.	The	polity	of	the	market	begins	to	occupy	public	spaces	through	an	informal	intermingling	in	an	atmosphere	of	social	experimentation.	In	turn,	the	museum	serves	to	legitimise	the	informal	practices	of	the	encampment	and	communities	of	interest	that	move	between	them.	In	these	now	quasi-formal/quasi-informal	spaces,	practices	that	had	a	friction	and	a	politics	find	these	qualities	converted	into	energies,	which	are	then	used	to	decolonise	and	perforate	the	enclosures	of	once	sovereign	institutions.	These	once	wholly	critical	practices	become	subtle	and	informal	mediums	for	breaking	open	the	centralised	architectures	of	sovereign	cultural	value.			Marginal	cultures	and	social	movements,	radical	film	and	video	collectives,	anti-universities	and	experiments	in	arts	education,	the	digital	commons,	early	examples	of	artists	working	in	industry	and	government,	identity	politics,	mail	art,	radical	design	collectives,	the	minor	archive,	institutional	critique,	minor	futures,	a	faraway	and	remote	location,	become	the	occasion	for	artists	and	curators	to	engage	in	a	romantic	productivity	that	breaks	open	the	sovereign	architectures	of	art.	The	qualities	of	these	histories	are	unbundled	in	an	atmosphere	of	formalised	informality	that	reconfigures	the	gallery,	museum	or	institution	as	laboratory.	This	doesn’t	lessen	the	intent	and	seriousness	of	the	work	but	its	qualities	are	used	to	lever	open	architectures	and	allow	for	the	infiltration	of	a	more	rhizomatic	polity	that	remains	largely	invisible	for	being	in	plain	view.	Put	another	way,	the	work	is	captured	by	an	apparatus	that	exists	as	a	form	of	extra	law	doing	its	work	through	mainly	technical	and	legal	
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 136	
instruments.	The	temptation	to	be	avoided	here	is	to	think	of	this	atomisation	of	the	artwork	and	the	extension	of	its	capacities	through	informational	prosthesis	as	entirely	in	the	negative	or	as	entirely	modern.	There	are	pre-modern	examples	of	art	that	demonstrate	a	distributed	cognition,	but	this	derivative	styled	approach	to	informatics	has	seeded	in	it	a	notion	of	mastery,	autonomous	will	and	an	illusion	of	control.	More	on	this	a	little	further	down	the	page	where	I	will	talk	more	about:	“[…]	dynamic	partnerships	between	humans	and	intelligent	machines”	(Hayles,	1999,	288)	and	information.	To	return	to	the	question	in	hand,	one	such	example	of	this	phenomenon	of	a	minor	history	being	abstracted	was	the	appropriation	and	reassessment	of	minor	modernisms	during	the	early	2000s	which	captured	the	work	of	such	artists	as	Martin	Boyce,	Goshka	Macuga,	David	Thorpe,	Eva	Rothschild,	David	Noonan,	and	Florian	Pumhösl.	Some	of	these	works	suggested	the	unearthing	of	futurities	yet	to	be	fully	enacted	but	found	these	futures	being	mined	out	in	order	to	realise	a	curatorial	value	in	the	present	–	as	something	to	be	captured	as	stable	stores	of	value,	cleansed	of	the	contingencies	of	their	time.	This	accorded	with	a	political	project	in	the	UK	during	the	‘90s	of	‘New	Labour	Modernism’	(Hatherley,	2011	)	that	took	on	some	of	the	architectural	signifiers	of	post-war	state	building	but	which	served	to	thinly	disguise	aggressive	property	speculation.	These	related	abstractions	of	modernism	are	an	expression	of	a	temporal	impasse,	or	what	Mark	Fisher	calls	the	“[...]	slow	cancellation	of	the	future,”	(Fisher,	2014,	2)	through	a	neutralisation	of	modernism’s	chaotic	dynamics	and	internal	contradictions.	This	annulling	of	the	future	through	an	emptying	out	of	its	signs	and	signifiers	is,	of	course,	what	accelerationism,	as	an	aesthetic	and	programmatically	political	project,	sought	to	overcome.	Whilst	its	own	imaging	of	the	present	and	the	future	fell	into	the	formal	and	stylistic	strangleholds	that	I	mentioned	earlier,	its	thinking	with	regard	to	the	splicing	of	human	and	informatic	entities	provides	some	scaffolding	for	the	final	part	of	this	text.	In	the	meantime,	let	us	return	to	the	question	of	contemporary	art’s	transformation	into	an	informatic	entity.			Questions	of	site	and	materiality	come	into	play	when	these	become	affective	information,	in	an	information	environment	that	anticipates	the	drawing	down	of	value	across	the	whole	spectrum	of	a	cultural	object’s	lifespan.	An	artwork’s	
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development,	production,	placement,	critical	reception	and	discursive	value	become	opportunities	for	drawing	down	value	at	multiple	points.	As	a	consequence	of	this	unbundling,	the	work	is	atomised	across	space,	time	and	platforms	and	becomes	a	series	of	intensities	rather	than	a	stable	form	of	sedimented	forces.	These	circumstances	raise	the	question	of	what	it	is	that	we	confront	when	we	encounter	an	artwork.	In	the	case	of	the	work	of	an	artist	engaged	with	notions	of	site	and	the	archive,	for	example,	both	of	those	things	provide	an	occasion	to	engage	the	romantic	subjectivity	of	the	artist,	so	that	the	site	that	we,	the	viewer,	then	encounter	is	the	romantic	subjectivity	of	the	artist.	It	is	the	artist	who	has	experienced	and	been	emotionally	grazed	by	the	archive	or	the	remote	location	and	it	becomes	this	‘subjective	occasionalism’	that	we	experience.	In	turn,	this	affective	site	becomes	an	occasion	to	engage	our	own	romantic	subjectivity,	which	we	feel	as	material	because	of	its	affective	capacities.	The	materiality	of	the	work	arises	from	a	series	of	informational	encounters	that	assail	us	from	multiple	platforms.	In	the	past	we	might	have	thought	of	this	information	as	ancillary	and	simply	the	stuff	that	orbits	an	art	work	situated	at	the	centre	of	a	constellation	of	art’s	practices.	Instead,	the	spectral	apparatus	of	contemporary	art	as	a	mainly	informational	network	eclipses	the	sovereignty	of	the	artwork	and	its	source	materials.				
	Fig.	30.	Data:	Top	10	Countries	in	Contemporary	Art	Auction	Sales	–	SAGE	Business	Researcher.	Contemporary	Art	Market	Sales	by	revenue	July	2014	–	June	2015.	Contemporary	artists	are	defined	as	artists	born	after	1945.		
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	In	2014,	art	sales	globally	reached	66	billion	dollars	(Kazakina,	2014).	This	financialisation	of	contemporary	art,	as	an	activity	that	can	be	measured	in	terms	of	its	financial	outcomes,	has	led	to	the	demand	for	public	institutions’	other	qualities	and	effects	to	be	equally	measurable.	As	a	consequence,	museums	and	public	spaces	in	the	UK,	for	example,	from	the	early	‘90s	onwards	found	their	value	being	increasingly	measured	by	Arts	Council	England	(ACE),	against	a	potential	for	socio-economic	‘impact’,	the	provision	of	‘experiences’	and	the	requirement	to	express	these	things	easily.	Knowledge	production,	under	the	auspices	of	the	museum	or	public	spaces,	found	itself	taking	on	the	same	dynamics	as	probability	based	derivatives	trading.	Museums	began	to	trade	in	and	re-enact	images	of	their	own	productivity	in	order	to	hedge	against	risk	and	keep	funding	in	place.	Risk	began	to	be	devolved	down	onto	the	museum	instead	of	the	funding	body	in	ways	that	meant	that	institutions	could	be	deemed	more	or	less	of	a	risk	to	the	state.			This	pragmatic	absorption	by	art’s	institutions	of	the	logic	of	the	derivative	has	resulted	in	the	cultural,	architectural	or	intellectual	product	coming	to	serve	as	a	signal	of	the	“[...]	underlying	pattern,	movement	and	inherent	agency”	of	the	derivative	(Easterling,	2014,	21).	In	this	sense,	the	artwork	is	made	to	behave	according	to	the	logic	of	the	derivative	and	becomes	a	marker	of	the	“[…]	disposition	of	the	market”	(Easterling,	2014,	21),	but	simultaneously	acts	to	obscure	those	mechanisms	in	much	the	same	way	that	architectural	facades	and	cladding	tell	obfuscating	narratives.	This	phenomenon	points	to	artworks	increasingly	acting	as	the	substrate	to	an	economy	of	information,	as	those	vectors	of	information	are	mined.	Against	this	background,	art’s	informatic	potential	becomes	intensified	by	these	dynamics	as	its	qualities	are	spooled	out	and	displaced	across	networks	in	ever	more	increasing	degrees.			I	discuss	in	the	section	on	violence	how	cinema	could	think	of	its	bodies	as	a	limit	that,	once	approached	as	an	ideological	threshold,	its	form	becomes	conceptually	unstable	and	revealed	as	excess	–	it	shakes.	This	body,	constituted	by	information,	acts	and	has	effects	but	has	within	it	informational	noise	that	is	
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random	as	well	as	patterned,	formlessness	as	well	as	form.	Latour	writes	that	form	is	“[…]	simply	something	that	allows	something	else	to	be	transported	from	one	site	to	another	[…]	To	provide	a	piece	of	information	is	the	action	of	putting	something	into	form”	(Latour,	2007,	39).	To	mistake	this	form	as	a	technology	that	extends	the	capacities	of	being	human	and	of	autonomous	will,	is	to	forget	that	results:	“[…]	actually	come	about	through	chaotic	dynamics	and	emergent	structures”	(Hayles,	1999,	288).	These	structures	might	not	be	known	to	us	but,	through	social	interaction	and	activity,	categories	and	organisation	begin	to	appear.	Therefore,	to	think	of	these	forms	as	an	extension	of	the	liberal	humanist	subject	is	to	tether	that	form	to	a	narrative	of	the	human	in	which:	“[…]	conscious	agency	is	the	essence	of	human	identity”	(Hayles,	1999,	288).	Yet,	this	is	not	the	post-human	view	but	neither	is	the	post-human	view	one	that	needs	to	leave	the	liberal	human	subject	behind,	or	be	understood	as	antihuman.	Instead,	the	post-human	view	and	the	work	of	CCRU,	for	example,	offer	ways	and	means	of	rethinking	the	calibration	between	human	and	informatic	agency.	Instead	of	a	binary	separation	between	the	human	and	non-human	Hayles	describes	a	constant	and	on-going	calibration	that	she	terms	as	the	‘splice’.	How	can	a	more	thorough	working	through	of	the	derivative’s	logic	illuminate	both	the	underlying	narrative	of	mastery	contained	in	its	use	of	probability,	whilst	exposing	its	more	contingent	and	chaotic	materials?	But	also	how	might	we	find	ourselves	in	correspondence	with	these	chaotic	materials	which	were	previously	thought	of	as	without	agency	and	meaning	because	of	their	seeming	lack	of	form.					 	
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4.3	A	Contract	with	all	the	Weight	of	the	Law		
	
	
	
			
		Fig.	31	Early	derivative.	Globular	clay	envelope	with	a	cluster	of	accounting	tokens.	Sumerian	clay	tokens	and	corresponding	vessel.	The	derivative	begins	as	an	embossed	clay	informatic.	(Mathers,	William	S,	2013)		
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Fig.	32.	Barry	Lyndon	(Kubrick,	1975).	One	of	the	many	scenes	in	which	contracts,	promissory	notes	and	cheques	are	ceremonially	written	out.	Kubrick	portrays	the	18th	century	as	an	age	of	debt,	contracts	and	deferred	promises.	The	derivative	becomes	an	ink	and	paper	informatic.			Fig.	33.	An	online	Black-Scholes	calculator	used	to	get	values	for	both	calls	and	puts	(the	right	to	buy	and	the	right	to	sell).	Users	enter	the	required	fields	and	the	calculator	does	the	rest.	The	derivative	becomes	a	digital	informatic	and	its	substrate	and	materials	become	data	and	network.				In	this	text	various	claims	have	been	made	for	the	derivative;	what	it	does,	how	it	functions	and	what	its	effects	are.	These	claims	need,	at	this	stage,	to	be	qualified	with	more	detail	and	examples	but	also	balanced	by	an	account	of	work	by	specialists	in	the	field	of	derivatives	whose	own	claims	bump	against	my	own.	I	claim,	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	the	logic	of	derivatives	has	in	it	an	underlying	decisionism	that	is	reflected	in	and	transmitted	by	cinema,	contemporary	art,	architecture	and	infrastructure	space,	for	example.	How	the	actual	derivative	performs	this	decisionism	and	how	probability	plays	a	role	in	this	needs	further	explanation.	The	distinct	differences	to	the	commodity	that	the	derivative	confronts	us	with	as	an	iteration	of	capital	are:	the	ways	in	which	it,	as	a	contract,	acts	as	both	a	currency	and	asset;	its	never-resting	hyperspatial	and	hypertemporal	effects	that	exceed	the	spatial	and	temporal	distortions	of	the	commodity;	and,	lastly,	its	potential	for	privileging	informatics,	so	that	we	receive	objects,	relationships	and	space	as	information.	As	a	consequence	of	this	last	point,	what	we	previously	thought	of	as	bounded,	circumscribed	objects	and	persons	(as	‘stones	in	a	stream’)	become	things	that	have	a	disposition	for	changing	matrices	and	circuits	of	information.	This	chimes	with	social	scientist	and	cybernetician	Gregory	Bateson’s	analogy	of	a	man,	a	tree	and	an	axe	as	an	information	system	(Bateson,	2000,	464).	All	parts	of	this	diagram	become	constitutive	of	the	circuit	it	presents,	and	talks	of	a	distributed	cognition	that	is	embodied	and	evolutionary.	Here,	(and	using	Bateson’s	terminology)	“thinking”	is	done	by	both	human	and	non-human	actors	(Bateson,	2000,	464).	In	our	present,	we	occupy	information	environments	that	exceed	the	complexity	of	the	man,	a	tree	and	an	axe	analogy	and	outweigh	our	cognitive	capacities.	To	insert	a	narrative	of	mastery	into	any	account	of	our	ability	to	construct	and	work	in	these	environments	is	to	ignore	what	Hayles	refers	to	as	a	history	of	emergent	
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structures	as	the	story	of	what	propels	human/technology	interfaces	towards	a	genuine	futurity.	Before	considering	the	contingent	and	chaotic	materials	of	the	derivative	that	may	represent	its	emergent	structures,	we	need	to	look	further	at	the	processes	that	produce	the	forms	and	narratives	of	mastery	that	obscure	these	materials.			In	chapter	one,	I	outline	how	the	probability	based	Black	Scholes	Merton	(BSM)	model	assisted	derivatives	pricing	and	trading	and	how	it	became	the	only	tool-in-the-box	for	the	markets,	rather	than	the	aid	for	pricing	it	was	intended	to	be.	BSM	partly	enabled	the	explosion	in	derivatives	trading	and	the	appearance	of	a	highly	kinetic	market,	enthralled	to	its	own	dynamism	but	locked	into	a	set	of	outcomes,	dictated	by	past	events,	rewritten	as	potential	outcomes	–	a	function	of	probability.	I	also	talk	about	how	derivatives	are	seemingly	final	contracts	but	constantly	in	a	state	of	bundling	and	unbundling	the	temporal	and	spatial	components	of	an	asset,	the	financial	instrument	itself,	and	the	vectors	of	data	that	derivatives	mine.	These	contracts	are	the	hyperspatial	and	hypertemporal	‘blocs	of	affect’	that	Shaviro	claims	Jones’s	video	maps	and	gives	representation	to.	At	this	juncture,	we	need	to	unpack	these	claims	about	the	derivative,	using	examples	and	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	its	composition.	I	will	look	at	how,	in	particular,	the	pricing	of	derivatives	is	achieved	through	this	multi-temporal	process	and	give	an	example	of	the	bundling	and	unbundling	I	describe.	This	will	offer	an	understanding	of	what	genre	of	contract	the	derivative	is,	and	give	texture	to	the	temporal	and	spatial	violence	it	does.	Whether	it	does	a	mystical	or	mythical	violence.	Firstly,	I	feel	it	would	be	useful	at	this	juncture	to	give	a	clear	and	straightforward	(vanilla)	example	of	how	probability	is	used	in	derivatives	trading.			The	complex	history	of	the	development	of	probability	and	its	application	in	the	sciences	from	the	seventeenth-century	and	then	resurgence	in	the	twentieth-century	would	be	the	focus	of	a	more	technical	text	than	the	speculative	one	presented	here.	Despite	this,	it	is	worth	stating	that	early	probability	theory	was	motivated	by	attempts	to	solve	a	gambling	problem	(Pierre	Fermat	&	Blaise	Pascal)	and	remained	on	the	edges	of	respectable	mathematical	discourses	until	
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the	twentieth-century.	Work,	in	the	interim	period,	on	probability	to	do	with	statistical	modelling	and	gases	later	informed	work	on	Brownian	Motion	and	stochastic	processes	(understanding	randomness),	which	in	itself	informed	work	on	signal	processing.	The	earliest	theoretical	application	of	probability	theory	to	the	financial	markets	was	in	1900	by	Louis	Bachelier,	modelling	price	changes	on	the	Paris	Bourse.	Subsequent	work	amongst	Russian	mathematicians	became	the	basis	of	modern	probability	theory	but	Bachelier’s	work	continued	to	sporadically	resurface	over	the	next	60	years	before	gaining	considerable	traction	on	approaches	to	financial	modelling,	subsequent	to	the	translation	of	his	1900	work	into	English	in	1964.	Let	us	return	to	a	prosaic	example	of	the	application	of	probability	to	the	markets.			If	we	were	attempting	to	value	or	price	a	stock	or	security,	we	might	look	at	the	performance	of	that	stock	over	a	period	of	time	and	see	how	it	performs	in	various	states	of	the	economy.	Our	conclusions	might	lead	us	to	say	that	the	stock	will	pay	£50	in	a	boom,	£30	in	a	stable	period,	and	£0	in	a	recession.	We	then	look	at	the	probability	of	these	outcomes	happening.	We	subsequently	conclude	that	25%	of	the	time	we	see	a	boom,	50%	of	the	time	we	see	stable	and	regular	outcomes,	and	25%	of	the	time	we	see	a	recession.	Using	these	figures,	we	can	express	today’s	value	of	that	stock	as	(0.25	x	50)+(0.5	x	30)+(0.25	x	0).	The	sum	of	those	terms	is	£27.50	and	this	is	our	expected	price	or	return.	This	simple	example	demonstrates	the	claim	that	previous	states	of	the	world	are	folded	into	the	present,	in	order	to	build	complex	systems	that	hedge	against	uncertainty.	This	logic	can	be	built	upon	and	made	infinitely	more	complex	by	adding	more	and	more	variables	and	data.	At	the	point	at	which	calculations	are	managed	computationally,	the	capacity	for	input	and	speed	of	valuation	becomes	limited	by	information	engineering	and	physical	restraints	such	as	data	storage	and,	in	the	case	of	high	frequency	trading,	the	proximity	of	servers	to	exchanges,	for	example.	It	is,	however,	and	by	its	nature,	an	approach	that	is	incapable	of	predicting	what	has	been	termed	in	finance	as	the	Black	Swan	event.	Not	only	is	it	incapable	of	predicting	these	events	but	also	it	produces	an	image	of	the	markets	as	a	closed	system	in	which	external	material	contingencies	recede	into	the	distance.	A	Black	Swan	is	an	event	that	is	unknowable,	unpredictable	and	
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previously	unthinkable	–	but	still	material.	Nassim	Nicholas	Taleb,	a	finance	professor,	writer	and	former	Wall	Street	trader,	uses	the	term	Black	Swan	(2010)	to	critique	systems	of	thought	in	markets	too	fragile	to	endure	an	unthinkable	external	event	such	as	9/11.	It	is	also	the	title	of	his	book	on	this	subject,	which	is	part	of	a	series	that	includes	Fooled	by	Randomness	(2001).	A	book	that	explores	how	random	events	are	misread	as	causal.	The	term	Black	Swan	is	derived	from	a	widely	used	Latin	term	meaning	the	unthinkable	or	that	which	exists	outside	a	matrix	of	thought	and	whose	existence	threatens	that	system	of	thought.	I	will	return	to	a	development	on	Taleb’s	work	later	in	this	section.	Let	us	now	return	to	the	question	of	what	is	a	derivative	and	what	makes	it	different	from	a	commodity;	what	gives	it	simultaneously	such	weight	and	such	a	lack	of	discernable	form?		Derivatives	or	options	are	exactly	that,	the	purchase	of	the	option	to	buy	a	commodity	at	a	later	date.	Some	options	(plain	vanilla	options)	are	designed	to	have	straightforward	payoff	schedules,	whilst	other	more	exotic	options	are	linked	to	more	complex	arrangements	or	‘sequenced	payoff	schedules’,	‘linkages	between	different	assets’,	and	so	on.	The	volatility	of	the	instruments	in	themselves,	and	in	relation	to	each	other,	produces	the	tradable	price	for	these	instruments;	but	also,	the	maturation	of	the	instrument	in	relation	to	the	underlying	asset	is	also	productive	of	prices.	“Valuation	[then]	is	the	completion,	exhaustion	and	conclusion	of	the	pricing	process”	(Malik,	2013,	764).	Derivatives	differ	from	a	normal	contract	of	sale	for	a	commodity,	for	example,	because	of	this	period	of	maturation.	Writer	on	financialisation	and	art	Suhail	Malik,	in	his	essay	The	Ontology	of	Finance	(2014),	marks	out	this	temporal	characteristic	as	the	distinguishing	feature	of	derivatives,	in	that	the	contract	of	sale	becomes	a	malleable	entity	because,	as	Malik	explains,	the	challenge	of	derivatives	is	to	set	a	price	for	an	asset	that	will	mature	in	the	future:			 “The	distinctive	 feature	of	 all	 derivative	 structures	 […]	 is	 that	 they	are	 constructed	and	 traded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 price	 differential.	 […]	 At	 the	 simplest	 level	 of	 price	derivative	construction,	the	delivery	price	of	the	forward	contract	(K)	anticipates	the	future	 price	 of	 the	 underlying	 asset	 (St);	 […]	 The	 primary	 question	 for	 derivative	pricing,	then,	is	how	the	delivery	prices	K	are	set	for	derivatives,	given	that	they	can	
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only	 be	 anticipations	 of	 future	 eventualities	 that	must	 be	unknown	at	 the	 time	 the	price	 is	 set	 but	 which,	 per	 the	 doctrine	 of	 market	 rationality,	 are	 nonetheless	supposed	 to	 determine	 the	 asset	 price.	 The	 answer	 is	 straightforward	 but	 wholly	counter	conventional.	It	is	not	that	markets	set	the	delivery/excise	price	but	[…]	that	the	 contract	 constitutes	 the	price	differential	 between	delivery	 and	 strike	prices	 at	the	specified	future	moment	in	time”	(Malik,	2014,	689).			This	deferring	produces	a	temporalization	of	the	vending	of	the	asset	and	confers	on	the	contract	a	status	and	weight	that	it	would	otherwise	not	have.	Time	constitutes	the	contract	of	sale.	Into	this	period	of	maturation	the	contract	can	take	on	a	sovereignty	of	its	own,	independent	of	the	underlying	asset.	The	contract,	or	the	logic	of	the	contract,	ceases	to	stand	in	for	a	commodity	or	an	asset.	Rather,	it	becomes	a	privileged	informatic	entity	with	material	effects.			Shaviro	describes	a	displacement	of	this	characteristic	of	derivative	contracts	in	his	series	of	essays,	Post	Cinematic	Affect	(Shaviro,	2010),	suggesting	that	contemporary	cinema	expresses	all	relationships	and	exchanges	as	malleable	contracts	that	can	be	renegotiated	at	any	time	according	to	the	shifting	requirements	of	the	films’	protagonists.	As	a	consequence,	Shaviro	helps	us	to	draw	parallels	between	the	derivative’s	conversion	of	all	things	into	affective	information	with	the	ways	in	which	the	digital	signal	can	be	converted,	for	example,	from	one	type	of	output	into	another	–	such	as,	from	image	into	sound	and	back	into	image	again.	Cinema	of	this	kind	embodies	and	narrates	both	its	underlying	finance	and	its	technology	and	we	begin	to	understand	its	bodies	as	markers	of	these	dispositions.			According	to	mainstream	action	narratives	of	contemporary	cinema,	the	cashing	out	of	the	contract	is	always	deferred	through	acts	of	negotiation	and	renegotiation,	but	the	contract	remains	binding.	In	chapter	two,	I	introduce	Shaviro’s	use	of	the	film	Boarding	Gate	(Assayas,	2007)	as	an	example	of	contemporary	action	thriller	that	makes	us	see	and	feel	that,	in	the	financialised	extra	spaces	of	global	capital,	everything	becomes	“[…]	a	potential	medium	of	exchange,	a	mode	of	payment	for	something	else”	(Shaviro	2010,	46).	Suitably	transnational	in	its	look,	with	the	action	taking	place	between	Paris	and	Hong	Kong,	the	film	tracks	the	convoluted	deals	and	counter	deals	between	a	criminal	
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entrepreneur,	his	previous	associate	and	hitwoman,	and	a	young	couple	who	become	her	employers.	Extortion,	drug	running,	BDSM	contracts,	murder	contracts	and	revenge	plots	run	through	a	frenetic	plot,	characterised	by	a	B-movie,	hand-held	camera	aesthetic	where	reversals	and	counter	deals	become	the	disorientating	norm.	Similar	dynamics	occur	in	director	Michael	Mann’s	1995	film	Heat,	where	a	complex	bank	heist	beautifully	describes	the	information	networks	and	infrastructure	spaces	of	Los	Angeles	as	a	hub	within	a	globalised	economy	of	container	ports	and	electronic	money.	Deals	and	contracts	are	defaulted	on	and	new	ones	forged	in	the	transit	spaces	of	what	was	beginning	to	be	called	a	Pacific	Rim	City.	A	title	that	levered	the	city	state	away	from	the	nation	state.	In	the	film,	career	criminals	become	meta-architects,	able	to	acquire	and	read	security	schematics	for	banks	and	bonded	warehouses,	grabbed	from	the	airwaves	and	spectral	networks	above	Los	Angeles.	The	final	bank	heist	of	the	film	sees	crew	boss	Neil	McCauley	(Robert	De	Niro)	lecture	to	the	bank’s	customers	that	their	money	is	insured	by	the	government,	underlining	to	his	victims	that	even	the	heist	is	part	of	a	series	of	contracts	and	that	crime	plays	its	part	in	that	economy	of	contracts.	Deals	to	fence	bonds	fail	and	contracts	to	provide	new	identities	and	lives	abroad	are	altered	or	defaulted	on.	Both	films	reinforce	the	sense	that	all	arrangements	are	mutable	contracts.	Whilst	a	final	cashing	out	of	a	contract	is	always	deferred,	these	films	present	regimes	in	which	the	act	of	deferral	forces	other	ways	and	means	of	drawing	down	value	in	the	present.	This	deferral	becomes	a	crucial	aspect	of	the	derivative’s	make	up,	affording	it,	as	a	contract,	the	qualities	of	law	that	risks	narratives	of	justice	collapsing	into	that	temporal	gap.			Price	arises	from	this	deferral	or	‘interval’,	as	Malik	terms	it:	“[…]	the	‘interval	itself’	is	the	derivative	qua	pricing	contract:	the	becoming-price	of	time	or	the	becoming-time	of	price”	(Malik,	2014,	691).	In	this	way,	price	comes	to	stand	in	for	a	present	by	virtue	of	what	it	is	not,	in	terms	of	a	future	or	a	past.	Price	can	(according	to	Malik)	come	to	be	seen	to	matter	in	how	its	formulation	constitutes	our	construction	of	a	present.	To	reconfigure	the	method	of	this	construction	of	a	present	is	also	to	regain	and	engage	with	a	futurity.	The	example	Malik	gives	concentrates	on	the	pricing	mechanism	for	more	straightforward	derivatives,	
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but	the	complex	instruments	that	do	the	bundling	and	unbundling,	that	is	the	other	feature	of	derivatives,	need	illustrating.	This	will	help	to	exemplify	further	how	the	derivative	marks	a	radical	shift	from	the	commodity	form	and	how	a	certain	weight	is	conferred	onto	the	contract,	which	is	normally	associated	with	the	commodity	or	asset.			Financial	journalist	and	son	of	singer	Marianne	Faithfull,	Nick	Dunbar,	writes	in	his	book	The	Devil’s	Derivatives	(2011,	14)	of	derivatives	that	hedge	and	displace	risk	in	complex	ways.	Dunbar	describes	how,	in	the	early	‘90s,	a	clear	split	began	to	form	in	the	cultures	of	finance:	on	the	one	hand,	there	existed	the	long-term	world	of	lending	banks,	insurers	and	pension	funds	and,	on	the	other,	the	short-term	world	of	trading	firms	and	hedge	funds.	The	long-term	school	of	thought	recorded	the	value	of	its	loans	as	the	amount	originally	lent	out.	The	short	termists,	the	investment	banks	and	hedge	funds,	used	what	is	called	‘fair	value’	accounting	to	record	the	value	of	loans	and	bonds	on	its	books.	This	latter	form	of	recording	is,	typically,	the	market	price	of	the	loan	and,	as	a	consequence,	this	figure	can	go	either	up	or	down,	depending	on	how	the	market	favours	or	disfavours	the	loan.	Each	culture	has	argued	that	the	other	party’s	approach	poses	risks	that	their	own	culture	can	detect	and	head	off.	However,	in	the	early	‘90s,	both	cultures	came	under	pressure	to	move	risk	off	their	books.	Over	the	horizon	came	a	radically	new	financial	instrument	that	could	help	these	two	cultures	divest	themselves	of	that	risk.	This	instrument	was	the	credit	derivative.			A	bank	looking	to	make	corporate	loans	or	to	own	bonds	without	the	associated	risk	could	think	of	the	risk	in	two	parts.	One	part	could	be,	for	example,	a	loan	to	a	government	(a	bond)	that	will	be	paid	back	on	time	and,	because	of	the	low	level	of	risk	associated	with	this	kind	of	loan,	a	low	rate	of	interest	is	charged	to	the	borrower.	This	loan	is	offset	by	the	sale	of	an	insurance	policy	or	indemnity,	for	which	a	risky	borrower	pays	a	premium	for	the	high	level	of	associated	risk.	However,	some	collateral	may	also	be	earmarked	to	use	as	payment	in	the	event	of	a	default	on	this	kind	of	loan.	Bundled	together	the	two	instruments	become	a	risky	corporate	bond	or	loan.	The	risky	part	of	that	package	can	be	shed	by	unbundling	the	two	parts	and	giving	the	risky	part	to	someone	who	is	able	and	
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prepared	to	carry	that	degree	of	exposure.	It	was	found	that	people	could	be	found	in	both	the	cultures	to	buy	those	risky	loans	–	those	that	worked	according	to	the	actuarial	approach	(that	recorded	the	loan	as	the	amount	originally	loaned)	and	those	that	recorded	the	loan	according	to	its	market	valuation.			The	first	type	of	group	would	use	a	centuries	tested	method	and	sell	the	loan	to	a	third	party,	issuing	a	traditional	letter	of	credit.	In	the	‘90s,	a	number	of	these	arrangements	were	sold	to	fund	the	production	of	Hollywood	movies,	including	the	Truman	Show	(1998).	This	included	the	Chase	Manhattan’s	Global	entertainment	group,	which	was	able	to	loan	some	$600	million	to	produce	films,	by	persuading	an	executive	at	French	insurance	giant	AXA	to	write	policies	against	poor	box	office	results	(Dunbar,	2011,	15).	In	this	instance,	the	instrument	was	unbundled	but	the	two	parts	were	informally	linked	at	a	later	stage.	The	risk	remained	the	same	but	was	devolved	to	another	party,	whilst	the	profit	potential	stayed	in	place.			For	those	that	preferred	the	market	approach	to	valuing	a	loan,	ways	and	means	were	made	available	to	detach	completely	the	risk	element	of	a	package.	The	credit	default	swap	(CDS)	could	do	just	this	by	relieving	the	insurance	part	of	the	package	from	of	its	original	role	of	acting	as	a	hedge	against	a	risky	loan,	for	example.	These	could,	then,	be	used	to	place	anonymous	bets	on	disasters	like	the	death	of	a	company.	Dunbar	likens	this	to	buying	a	life	insurance	policy	on	someone	else’s	life.	A	financial	double	indemnity.	These	instruments	could	be	bought	in	secret	and	in	large	volumes.	The	term	‘swaps’	kept	these	trades	off	the	regulatory	radar	and	what	followed	was	a	huge	growth	in	the	market	for	these	instruments.	This	turned	the	market	approach	for	valuing	debt	into	the	enormous	force	it	became	and	contributed	to	building	the	bonfire	that	came	alight	and	caused	the	financial	crash	of	2007/2008.	I’ve	used	this	example	to	demonstrate	how	mutable	space	and	time	become	in	the	service	of	the	derivative	as	it	bundles	and	unbundles	its	parts,	suspending	causal	relationships	as	it	does	so,	but	ensuring	that	profits	are	kept	online,	despite	what	happens	to	the	market.			
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This	constant	spooling	and	unspooling,	design	and	redesign	of	derivative	instruments	entails	voraciously	transgressing	boundaries,	but	also	transgressing	the	derivatives’	own	transgressions.	The	contract	becomes,	to	all	intents,	a	baroque	frame	folding	previous	boundaries	in	on	itself.	What	remains	constant	is	the	market	and	profit.	As	a	result,	what	appears	as	a	permanent	state	of	exception	practices	an	absolutism	bounded	by	the	application	of	probability.	The	‘state	of	exception’	that	the	market	performs	is	its	ideological	function	and	its	effects	are	material	in	the	ways	in	which	it	installs	and	replicates	practices.			The	derivative’s	disorientating	transgressions	are	experienced	by	the	market’s	actors	as	autonomy,	as	being	in	the	world	and	in	the	market.	But,	as	Malik	has	underlined,	the	pricing	of	the	derivative	does	not	take	place	in	the	market.	It	takes	place	through	a	deferral.	This	is	where	time	and	the	becoming	of	time	enter	the	equation	and	constitute	the	price	and	the	formation	of	our	present.	Into	this	temporal	gap	enters	probability	and	its	persuasive	narratives	of	mastery.	Whilst	the	contracts	and	promissory	notes	of	Barry	Lyndon	begin	as	actual-paper-things,	the	contract’s	logic	becomes	atomised	and	dispersed	into	other	fields	and	social	relations,	but	remains	binding	and	present.	There	is	no	locus	of	ideology	for	this	contract,	no	urtext.	The	Schmittian	politically	romantic	contract	is	written,	not	on	parchment,	but	on	the	romantic	experience	of	the	poeticised	subject.	In	this	case,	and	in	our	present,	this	poeticised	subject	experiences	the	poetry	of	finance	and	its	sublime	amplification	as	data.			Probability,	then,	performs	a	similar	function	to	the	cinematic	body	of	Clerici	in	
The	Conformist,	in	that	it	personalises	the	decision.	What	Clerici	feels	and	wants	to	experience	as	action	is,	in	fact,	a	romantic	image	of	action.	What	the	derivatives	trader	wants	to	experience	as	action	is	felt	as	action	but	is	supplied	by	probability	from	a	list	of	previous	events	and	re-enacted.	Clerici	and	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	formula	are	a	romantic	evocation	of	the	decision	and	of	a	delimited	concept.	Probability	has	an	ideological	function	within	the	markets	to	provide	pattern	and	orientation	that	push	and	devolve	risk	away	from	its	key	objectives.	Despite	probability’s	role	in	providing	pattern	and	orientation,	it	may,	as	we	will	find	out	in	the	following	section,	stand	over	an	abyss	of	chaotic	matter.	
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The	work	of	financial	technologist,	former	trader	and	writer	Elie	Ayache	points	to	the	possibility	that	probability	stands	in	opposition	to	the	materiality	of	markets	–	a	materiality	that	is	not	commensurate	with	our	past	experiences	of	the	world.			
4.4	Narratives	of	Mastery	versus	Chaotic	Materials			In	Ayache’s	book	Blank	Swan	(2010),	and	in	an	interview	carried	out	for	this	text,	he	claims	that	probability	is	used	in	derivatives	trading	in	such	a	way	that	obscures	the	true	materialism	of	the	markets	–	a	materialism	that	is	far	more	contingent	and	chaotic	than	we	can	think.	Ayache	uses	philosophy	and,	in	particular,	aspects	of	Speculative	Realism	(SR)	including	philosopher	Quentin	Meillassoux’s	work,	to	reframe	the	market	as	an	ontology,	in	contrast	to	thinking	of	it	in	purely	epistemological	terms.	Put	another	way,	he	argues	that	we	cannot	think	of	the	market	only	in	terms	of	a	linguistic	or	social	construction,	and	that	probability	causes	us	to	think	of	it	in	this	way.	Like	Suhail	Malik,	he	agrees	that	the	pricing	of	derivatives	under	the	current	regime	of	probability	does	not	take	place	in	the	market.	Instead,	it	takes	place	through	a	reversal	of	probability’s	logic	and,	so,	converts	our	perception	of	the	market	into	a	mainly	epistemological	entity.	Probability	allows	previous	states	of	the	world	to	constitute	the	price.	Normally,	he	suggests	one	would	think	of	probability	as	coming	out	of	events.	Instead,	and	as	a	result	of	the	introduction	of	the	Black	Scholes	Merton	formula,	this	process	is	run	backwards.	Probability	is	used	to	produce	events,	prices	and	calculate	risk.	The	processes	used	to	encounter	and	think	the	materiality	of	the	market,	become	the	thing	we	mistake	for	the	market.			Ayache	infers	that	the	reality	and	materiality	of	the	market	is	far	weirder	and	less	anthropocentric	than	we	can	imagine.	His	approach	to	the	markets,	therefore,	counters	conventions	with	regard	to	what	speculation	means	in	each	field.	To	reemphasise:	“[financial	speculation]	rests	on	the	unquestioned	assumption	that	the	future	will	be	commensurate	with	the	present.	In	contrast	metaphysical	[philosophical]	speculation	confronts	not	risk	but	irreducible	uncertainty”	(Shaviro,	2014,	45).	A	common	thread,	within	the	loose	knit	
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association	of	philosophers	identified	with	SR,	is	an	attack	on	what	is	termed	as	correlationism.	In	brief,	the	Copernican	Revolution	that	renders	the	human	not	at	the	centre	of	the	universe	is	replaced	with	Kant’s	placing	of	the	human	thinking-that-thought	at	the	centre	of	that	universe	–	so	that	correlationism	becomes	the	new	cosmology.	Ayache’s	work	takes	up	a	common	thread	between	the	SR	thinkers	in	that	it	rejects	the	assumption	of	a	correlation	between	mind	and	world.	Before	briefly	describing	a	counter	position	to	correlationism	we	need	to	unpack	the	the	term	itself.	Meillassoux	defines	correlation	as:	“[...]	the	idea	according	to	which	we	only	ever	have	access	to	the	correlation	between	thinking	and	being,	and	never	to	either	term	considered	apart	from	the	other”	(Meillassoux,	2008,	5).	Knowledge,	according	to	the	rubric	of	correlationism,	is,	therefore,	restricted	to	appearances,	as	we	lack	the	capacity	to	assume	a	third	person	perspective	that	would	allow	us	to	contrast	things	as	they	appear	to	us	and	things	as	they	are.	This	latter	diagram	of	correlationism	is	summed	up	in	the	following	quote	by	Meillassoux,	who	begins	from	an	image	of	correlationism	as	an	object	that	occludes	the	world:			 “Correlationism	rests	on	an	argument	as	simple	as	 it	 is	powerful,	and	which	can	be	formulated	in	the	following	way:	No	X	without	givenness	of	X,	and	no	theory	about	X	without	 a	 positing	 of	 X.	 If	 you	 speak	 about	 something,	 you	 speak	 about	 something	that	is	given	to	you,	and	posited	by	you.	Consequently,	the	sentence:	‘X	is’,	means:	‘X	is	 the	 correlate	 of	 thinking’	 in	 a	 Cartesian	 sense.	 That	 is:	 X	 is	 the	 correlate	 of	 an	affection,	or	a	perception,	or	a	conception,	or	of	any	subjective	act.	To	be	 is	 to	be	a	correlate,	a	term	of	a	correlation	.	.	.	That	is	why	it	is	impossible	to	conceive	an	absolute	
X,	i.e.,	an	X	which	would	be	essentially	separate	from	a	subject.	We	can’t	know	what	the	
reality	of	 the	object	 in	 itself	 is	because	we	can’t	distinguish	between	properties	which	
are	supposed	to	belong	to	the	object	and	properties	belonging	to	the	subjective	access	
to	the	object”	(Meillassoux,	2012,	409.	My	emphasis).		Meillassoux	argues	that	correlationism	has	been	the	central	tenet	of	philosophy	ever	since	Kant.	This	claim	arises	from	Kant’s	thesis	that	installs	an	image	of	objects	conforming	to	the	mind	as	opposed	to	the	mind	conforming	to	objects.	As	a	consequence	the	mind	is	understood	to	be	actively	structuring	reality,	rather	than	simply	reflecting	it.	Kant	concludes,	therefore,	that	we	cannot	really	know	reality,	as	it	is	separate	from	us.	We	can	only	really	know	reality	as	it	appears	to	us.	Our	inability	to	detach	ourselves	from	this	correlate	makes	it	difficult	to	
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distinguish	between	what	is	a	product	of	our	own	minds	and	what	is	a	quality	of	something	as	it	really	is.	This	mind/world	rubric	denies	us	a	perspective	that	would	allow	us	to	think	of	things	as	they	are,	without	us.	Whilst	Meillassoux	maintains	that	correlationism	is	embedded	in	philosophy	since	Kant,	not	all	philosophy	since	Kant	can	be	said	to	be	Kantian.	Put	differently,	not	all	philosophy	is	focussed	on	a	relation	between	mind	and	being.	For	example,	in	Derrida	and	Lacan,	philosophy	would	be	a	relation	between	language	and	being	and,	in	Foucault,	it	would	be	a	relation	between	power	and	knowledge	and	being.	Being,	however,	cannot	be	thought	of	as	apart	from	language	or	power	in	each	of	these	claims.	A	point	that	makes	correlationism	a	ground	for	philosophy	post-Kant,	but	variegated.			Various	strains	of	anti-correlationism	are	developed	by	thinkers	loosely	grouped	under	the	SR	banner	who	seek	to	unseat	epistemology’s	historical	privilege	of	coming	before	questions	of	ontology.	Ayache’s	text	implies	an	alignment	with	an	anti-correlationist	position	by	inferring	that	probability	becomes,	in	the	cosmology	of	the	financial	markets,	the	object	of	human	thought	that	obscures	the	materiality	of	the	market.	For	Ayache,	the	markets	are	a	contingent	medium	of	practices	and	things,	the	nature	of	which	can	change	without	us	knowing	why	they	change.	Steven	Shaviro,	quoting	Maynard	Keynes	in	his	Speculative	Realism	
–	A	Primer	(2014),	points	to	a	pre	1970’s	view	of	the	markets	that	chimes	with	Ayache’s	own:			 "But	 uncertainty	 cannot	 be	 quantified	 in	 probabilistic	 terms.	 We	 have	 no	 way	 of	knowing	which	outcomes	are	possible	let	alone	how	many	of	them	there	are	and	how	likely	any	of	them	is”	(Keynes	via	Shaviro,	2014,	46)		This	quote	and	framing	of	the	market	is,	says	Shaviro,	largely	forgotten	or	ignored	by	contemporary	economists	and	derivatives	traders.	The	work	of	Meillassoux	demands,	instead,	a	radical	contingency	that	asks	us	to	think	of	things	prior	to	humanity	before	they	could	be	thought	and:	“[…]	have	that	thought	installed	in	them”	(Shaviro,	2014,	46).	Meillassoux	reverses	Kant	by	suggesting	that	the	unknowability	of	things	is	a	positive	characteristic	of	things.	
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This	approach	does	not	evacuate	thought	but	asserts:	“[...]	that	thought	can	think	what	there	must	be	when	there	is	no	thought”	(Meillassoux,	2008,	36).			Markets,	according	to	Ayache,	can	only	be	truly	material	if	the	process	of	pricing	takes	place	in	the	contingent	space	and	time	of	the	markets.	This	is	a	space	and	time,	which,	for	Ayache,	is	not	knowable.			The	political	economy	of	Ayache’s	work	is	unclear	and,	to	be	explicit,	I	am	not	aligning	this	text	with	the	aims	of	Speculative	Realism	or	of	Ayache’s	project,	but	there	exist	productive	contradictions	in	Ayache’s	project	that	motion	towards	a	politic.	He	talks	of	writing,	and	the	writing	of	the	book	Blank	Swan,	as	a	form	of	materiality	in	ways	that	are	reminiscent	of	Althusser’s	ideological	materialism	–	as	sets	of	practices	that	are	material.	However,	this	account	of	writing	as	material	is	also	reminiscent	of	information	theory	and	a	post-human	view	that	thinks	of	human/technology	interfaces	as	emergent	structures.	Form	arrives	from	out	of	these	structures	through	a	correspondence	between	human	and	non-human	actors,	both	of	which,	according	to	Hayles	(with	reference	to	Latour),	are	required	to	think.	This	conception	of	materiality	would	seem	to	be	completely	at	odds	with	Ayache’s	materiality	that	is	relieved	of	a	correlation	between	mind	and	world.	Writing	is	not	termed	by	Ayache	as	informatics,	but	the	text	thinks	of	writing	as	material	and	we	can’t	help	but	understand	that	as	an	informatic	conception	of	information	–	as	an	embodying	of	information	that	gives	it	form,	so	that	that	information	can	travel	from	one	place	to	another.			In	the	same	breath,	writing	is	considered	by	Ayache	as	a	material	constituted	by	unknowable	forces.	This	claim	has	parallels	with	Claude	Shannon’s	theory	of	information	that	features	in	the	first	chapter.	Shannon	talks	of	a	signal	having	within	it	both	patterned	and	random	information.	To	recap:	pattern	exists	in	“[…]	dynamic	tension	with	random	intrusions	of	noise”	(Hayles,	1999,	32).	Uncertainty	enters	this	set	of	relationships	such	that,	whilst	information	is	defined	by	reducing	uncertainty,	it	also	depends	on	it.	Randomness	is	that	which	makes	it	possible	to	recognise	pattern.	To	put	it	yet	another	way,	writing	is	also	constituted	by	noise	in	its	signal	that	has	yet	to	categorised,	or	patterns	of	
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organisation	to	be	found	in	it.	The	generative	contradictions	of	Blank	Swan	and	the	displacement	of	the	work	into	theories	of	information	attest	to	probability’s	function	within	the	markets	and	in	the	engineering	of	information	as	occupying	a	position	of	mastery.	Hayles	posits	that	there	exist	in	feminist	critiques	of	science	(including	Donna	Haraway)	that	cite	a	relationship	between	a	desire	for	mastery,	an	objectivist	account	of	science	and	the	imperialist	project	of	subduing	nature,	opportunities	for	the	post-human	to	offer	other	accounts	of	science.	In	this	account:		 “[…]	 emergence	 replaces	 teleology;	 reflexive	 epistemology	 replaces	 objectivism;	distributed	cognition	replaces	autonomous	will;	embodiment	replaces	a	body	seen	as	support	 system	 for	 the	 mind;	 and	 a	 dynamic	 partnership	 between	 humans	 and	intelligent	 machines	 replaces	 the	 liberal	 humanist	 subject’s	 manifest	 destiny	 to	dominate	and	control	nature”	(Hayles,	1999,	288).			Whilst	the	logic	of	the	derivative	under	the	sign	of	probability	creates	distributed	versions	of	ourselves	and	of	the	materials	and	objects	that	constitute	our	informatic	space,	this	does	not	need	to	be	seen	as	a	relinquishing	of	human	capacities.	Distributed	cognitive	systems	made	up	of	informatic	entities,	of	which	we	are	but	one	variety,	are	capable	of	effecting	our	full	capability.	To	remove	systems	of	control	and	mastery	is	to	acknowledge	the	splice	that	makes	this	possible	and	evacuates	the	story:	“[…]	that	consciousness	tells	itself	to	explain	results	that	actually	come	through	chaotic	dynamics	and	emergent	structures”	(Hayles,	1999,	288).	If	we	accept	that	these	information	environments	are	what	our	subjectivities	emerge	from,	then	cutting	our	connection	with	a	narrative	of	mastery	is	what	we	depend	upon	to	move	forward.			Some	of	art	and	culture’s	objects	and	distributed	informatic	bodies	shake	and	fray	with	random	materials	that	are	less	governed	by	a	mastery	that	privileges	form	with	a	sovereign	power.	It	is	in	these	objects	that	a	truly	delimited	state	of	exception	exists	and	which	offers	subjectivities	that	are	emergent,	chaotic	but	that	may	also	serve	to	ensure	our	survival.	It	is	these	materials	that	have	the	potential	to	short-circuit	a	decisionism,	which,	in	turn,	threatens	a	mythical	and	literal	violence.	To	locate	and	foreground	these	random	and,	as	yet,	
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uncategorised	informatics,	is	to	hold	out	for	another	kind	of	justice	that	leaves	behind	a	literal	and	structural	violence.	These	materials	may	offer	the	violent	‘split’	(Hayles)	or	edit	that	stems	the	systemic	violence	and	logic	of	the	derivative.	This	split	may	evacuate	the	romantic	ground	of	a	mythical	violence	and,	in	the	process,	eliminate	life	for	the	sake	of	the	living.				 	
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Conclusion		The	written	aspect	of	this	submission	is	understood	as	both	an	interrogation	of	an	impasse	in	my	artistic	methods	but	also	a	means	of	aggregating	materials	that	will	become	new	works	that	in	the	main	employ	video.	These	works	will	explore	the	core	concerns	of	the	research,	building	on	developments	in	the	practice	that	have	been	made	over	the	course	of	the	project.		As	a	result,	the	text	aspect	of	this	submission	is	not	intended	expressly	for	publication	but	as	preparation	for	audio	visual,	sculptural	and	affective	manifestations	of	this	research.	These	new	artworks	will	act	as	visual,	audio	and	sculptural	mobile	assemblages	where	conflicting	ideologies	become	more	concentrated,	more	viscous	and	intensely	felt	to	the	point	of	ambiguity.			There	are	several	strands	of	this	new	work	arising	from	the	research.	The	first	seeks	to	challenge	contemporary-art	genres	of	the	video	essay,	psychogeographical	cinema	and	artist’s	video	tackling	financialisation	for	example.	The	second	strand	of	developing	work	uses	the	visual	and	auditory	‘noise’	found	in	the	examples	of	cinema	that	I	appropriate	to	amplify	the	less	embodied	information	in	that	material	and	foreground	that	cultural	object’s	thinking.	The	third	strand	of	work	continues	my	own	obsession	with	the	spatio-temporal	torsioning	of	the	film	Performance	(Roeg,	Cammel	1970)	and	its	interior	spaces	through	a	remaking	of	the	films	rooms	in	model	form,	in	CGI	and	as	sets.	The	final	strand	of	work	stemming	from	this	research	has	led	to	my	working	with	literary	critic	and	feminist	writer	on	technology	Katherine	N	Hayles	towards	a	lecture	and	event	at	the	Institute	of	Contemporary	Art,	London.	This	last	initiative	will	use	artworks	as	well	as	lectures	to	consider	the	implications	of	Hayle’s	notions	of	distributed	cognition	for	art’s	objects	and		practices.	The	event	will	also	attempt	to	think	these	questions	in	the	light	of	the	derivative’s	informatic	regime	and	the	opaque	complexities	that	the	derivative’s	logic	seeds	in	cultural	production.			The	first	strand	of	developing	work	that	speculates	with	the	phenomenon	of	the	video	essay,	psychogeographical	cinema	and	artists	video	tackling	
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financialisation	has	taken	hold	in	galleries,	museums	and	on	broadcast	television	over	the	last	twenty	years.	Examples	of	these	phenomenon	might	include	Patrick	Keiller’s	psychogeographic	study	of	what	the	protagonist	of	his	1994	film	London	(1994)	calls	the	‘problem	of	London’;	Mark	Leckey’s	collaging	of	what	he	terms	‘found	online	memories’	in	his	account	of	post	war	British	culture,	Dream	English	
Kid,	1964-1999	AD	(2015);	Elizabeth	Price’s	account	of	consumption	and	desire	in	her	video	study	of	the	60’s	designed	house	of	a	cosmetics	magnet,	At	the	House	
of	Mr	X	(2007);	The	sub	temporal	and	romantic	evocations	of	Britain	in	Ben	Rivers’	I	Know	Where	I’m	Going	(2009);	the	paranoid	circuitry	and	conspiracy	narratives	of	Adam	Curtis’	The	Mayfair	Set	(1999)	that	seek	to	uncover	elusive	centres	of	political,	ideological	and	economic	power;	finally	artist	Melanie	Gilligan’s	dramatization	of	financialisation	in	her	video	Crisis	in	the	Credit	System	(2008).	The	new	work	draws	on	some	of	these	developments	in	artist’s	video	and	film-makers	approaches	to	the	visual	essay	in	addition	to	key	developments	in	my	own	work	that	include	the	installation	for	Cubitt	Gallery,	Designs	Towards	
a	Meeting	Place	for	Future	Events	of	Universal	Truth	and	the	work	Dead	Stock.	The	newly	evolving	work	will	seek	to	overcome	some	of	the	politically	romantic	tendencies	of	the	above-mentioned	works	that	are	characterised	by	for	example:			
• a	tendency	to	think	of	objects	within	object	orientated	ontologies	(OOO)	as	having	to	have	anthropomorphic	characteristics	if	we	are	to	collaborate	with	them	(Leckey).		
• that	the	usually	opaque	origins	of	extra-statecraft	can	be	tracked	down	to	centres	of	power	formed	by	small	groups	of	thinkers	and	policy	makers	and	their	truth	revealed	to	us.	As	opposed	to	these	powers	existing	within	more	quotidian,	atomised	legalistic	and	informational	assemblages	(Curtis).		
• that	the	stories	of	financialisation	and	the	markets	can	be	depicted	using	a	media	(video)	that	has	the	same	internal	logic	of	financialisation	without	addressing	the	form	of	that	media	(Gilligan).		
• that	throw	into	question	the	authorship	and	humanness	of	the	voice	narrating	the	video	but	simultaneously	allow	a	sense	of	human	agency	to	
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remain	the	dominant	ground	of	an	exploration	of	material	and	technological	histories	(Price).		
• that	there	exists	places	outside	the	entanglement	of	financialisation,	places	unaccounted	for	by	the	information	logic	of	the	derivative	and	its	temporality	and	that	art	can	present	these	romantic	exceptions	without	being	captured	by	that	logic	(Rivers).			The	perceived	tendencies	I	point	out	are	made	to	underscore	an	ontology	of	cultural	production	that	this	research	addresses	and	not	to	find	deficit	in	significant	artworks.	My	concerns	may	be	less	urgent	for	these	practices	or	of	no	relevance	to	the	key	objectives	of	those	artworks.	However,	my	research	and	developing	artworks	anticipate	challenging	the	politically	romantic	subjectivities	that	persist	in	contemporary	art	practices	more	generally	and	sit	in	the	background	of	these	artworks.	In	addition	my	approach	looks	to	nuance	the	tempting	but	typically	unsubtle	modes	of	challenging	a	human	orientated	ontology	for	cultural	production.	By	this	I	mean	a	Politically	Romantic	(Schmitt)	ground	for	art	is	oft	challenged	using	a	falsely	binary	counter	argument	that	pits	the	machinic	and	the	computational	against	the	human.	This	repeatedly	comes	in	the	guise	for	example	of	a	call	for	alienation	and	the	posthuman	framed	as	a	corrective	to	the	excesses	of	a	human	centred	ontology	for	art.	Examples	of	this	might	include	aspects	of	left-accelerationism	(Srnicek)	and	the	Laboria	Cuboniks	collective	Xeno	Manifesto25.	This,	I	believe	inadvertently	reinstates	the	human	(establishes	a	connection	as	it	attempts	to	disconnect)	and	instead	my	own	developing	work	seeks	to	frame	cultural-production’s-thinking	along	the	lines	of	Katherine	Hayles’	concept	of	distributed	cognition.			Hayles’	claims	that	human	potential	is	only	realised	when	we	understand	it	to	be	in	collaboration	with	machinic,	computational	(and	I	might	add	legalistic)	forms	of	cognition	within	distributed	and	mobile	assemblages	of	thought.	She	is	quick	to	add	that	these	assemblages	neither	evacuate	human	agency	or	demand	its	primacy	in	the	face	of	complex	machinic	intelligence	but	that	the	interface	is	always	in	flux.	In	addition	and	most	importantly	in	terms	of	my	own	work’s	politic	this	approach	acknowledges	that	this	distributed	thinking	is	less	reliant	
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on	patterned	and	embodied	information	than	we	might	think,	with	its	potential	resting	more	on	the	chaotic	elements	or	‘noise’	coursing	through	the	materials	I’m	appropriating.	In	this	sense	the	developing	work	is	seen	as	both	a	mapping	and	thinking	of	technologies	of	power	but	also	a	liberating	of	energies	and	logics	that	we	have	yet	to	enter	into	a	relationship	with.	These	emerging	energies	and	logics	are	persistently	obscured	by	narratives	of	embodied	consciousness	with	their	accompanying	and	powerful	stories	of	will	and	dominance	that	deny	the	chaotic	and	material	reality	of	those	interfaces.	Fundamentally	this	‘noise’	exists	not	just	in	the	visual	or	the	auditory	or	just	as	a	product	of	technical	devices	but	also	in	the	hard	material	things	(buildings,	urban	spaces,	artworks,	manufactured	objects)	that	form	the	mobile	informatic	assemblages	which	constitute	the	fabric	of	our	surroundings	and	the	objects	we	touch	and	view.			We	could	on	the	one	hand	assume	that	these	info-architectures,	like	those	that	Keller	Easterling	describes	in	her	book	Extrastatecraft	(Easterling,	2014)	are	riven	with	the	logic	and	extra-law	of	the	derivative’s	regime.	On	the	other	hand	we	should	also	consider	that	not	all	parts	of	these	info-architectures	are	as	riven	and	saturated	with	that	logic	as	her	book	suggests.	If	these	architectures	and	objects	mirror	the	material	practices	of	information	then	they	to	reverberate	with	the	noise	as	well	as	the	patterns	on	which	information	depends	for	its	efficacy.	For	these	reasons	video	is	understood	as	only	a	component	of	the	developing	art	works	that	will	also	comprise	of	elements	that	make	up	an	informatic	assemblage	as	opposed	to	discrete	visual,	auditory	or	sculptural	works	that	could	be	seen	as	un-entangled	with	informatics	and	the	derivative’s	regime.	The	work	DEAD	STOCK	is	to	date	the	clearest	expression	of	this	development	whilst	the	earlier	work	Designs	Towards	a	Meeting	Place	for	Future	
Events	of	Universal	Truth	is	considered	a	speculative	but	less	informed	approach	to	the	questions	in	hand.	Both,	however	attempt	in	a	usefully	clumsy	and	then	less	clumsy	form	to	think	of	the	artwork	as	a	mobile	assemblage.			Returning	to	the	first	strand	of	developing	work:	two	mainly	video	works	are	currently	being	worked	on	that	use	as	their	starting	form	the	video	essay.	The	first	seeks	to	fully	explore	the	themes	of	the	Harlow	project	but	understands	the	
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syndrome	of	Harlow	as	one	that	persists	in	the	fabric	of	contemporary	Britain.	By	syndrome	I	mean	how	the	technologies	of	political	theology	and	power	that	the	town’s	original	post	war	statecraft	performed	are	now	achieved	through	finance	and	informatics.	This	first	work	will	employ	the	original	title	of	the	Harlow	project	Let	Us	Pray	for	Those	Now	Residing	in	the	Designated	Area	but	use	the	lense	of	Harlow	to	consider	the	problem	of	England	in	the	post-Brexit	and	post	Grenfell	Tower26	era.	By	the	problem	of	England	I	refer	to	the	ways	in	which	Harlow’s	master	planner	Frederick	Gibberd	conducted	an	affective	collaging	of	architectural	and	artistic	elements	in	order	to	invoke	an	extra-law	and	how	this	has	persisted	but	in	a	diffuse	fashion.	I	parallel	Gibberd’s	mapping	and	speculating	with	an	extra	law	with	A	Clockwork	Orange	Alex’s	collaging	of	theological	and	romantic	elements	in	his	bedroom	that	also	acts	as	his	laboratory	of	affect	and	signals	a	democratisation	of	Gibberd’s	class	ridden	entitlement	to	call	on	an	extra	law.	The	work	will	use	CGI	animation	developed	over	the	course	of	the	PhD	research	depicting	Herman	Makkink’s	figurines	pictured	in	Alex’s	bedroom	in	A	Clockwork	Orange	(1971).	The	sculpture,	Christ	Unlimited	
(Makkink,	1970)	that	depicts	three	interlinked	figures	of	Christ	striking	a	pose	from	Stravinsky’s	Rite	of	Spring	(Stravinsky,	1913).	The	ongoing	work	is	a	divination	of	the	problem	of	England,	its	politically	romantic	statecraft,	economy	and	technologies	of	power.	Other	elements	include	for	example	a	reworking	of	the	recording	of	the	anthem	to	Elizabeth	II’s	coronation	by	composer	Sir	Charles	Hubert	Hastings	Parry's	I	Was	Glad	When	They	Said	Unto	Me	(1902)	and	its	acclamation	Vivat	Regina	that	employs	Ecclesiastical	Latin	to	powerfully	chorus	the	coronation	of	the	monarch.	The	ceremony,	its	ritual	and	music	is	alluded	to	as	something	constructed	handmade,	standing	in	between	Gibberd’s	official	statecraft	and	Alex’s	laboratory	of	effect.	But	also	a	ritual	filled	with	hubris	that	invokes	an	aesthetic	and	affective	force	in	order	to	instate	and	keep	reinstating	its	claim	on	power	and	to	act	as	the	law.			The	second	mainly	video	work	will	use	the	title	of	this	PhD	text:	I	Am	the	Sun	and	
Cannot	be	Gazed	Upon	Fixedly.		The	work	will	appropriate	examples	of	cinema	that	are	cited	in	this	text.	The	video	will	simultaneously	explore	how	these	cultural	objects	think	the	emergence	of	the	derivative’s	information	logic	whilst	
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also	seeking	the	materials	within	those	objects	that	we	perceive	as	noise	but	are	less	saturated	by	the	derivative’s	performance	of	power.	This	process	of	drawing	out	these	chaotic	and	less	embodied	materials	will	reconfigure	the	films,	architectures	and	theory	that	I	have	cited.	This	re-forming	will	expose	embedded	narratives	of	will	and	dominance	whilst	entering	into	a	dialogue	with	the	moments	of	violence	in	those	materials	that	think	the	‘splice’	(Hayles)	or	edit	that	evacuates	the	story:	“[…]	that	consciousness	tells	itself	to	explain	results	that	actually	come	through	chaotic	dynamics	and	emergent	structures”	(Hayles,	1999,	288).	These	violent	splices	or	edits	will	instead	be	intensified	in	my	own	work	as	a	means	of	entering	into	a	correspondence	with	the	chaotic	materials	within	each	of	these	films	in	such	a	way	that	rethinks	the	calibration	between	human	and	informatic	agency.			The	second	strain	of	work	will	take	examples	of	the	cinema	cited	in	the	text	and	use	both	the	scoring	principles	of	Tony	Conrad’s	film	Flicker	(1966)	and	artist	and	feminist	film	maker	Lis	Rhodes’	Light	Music	(1975)27	to	rearrange	the	often	violent,	visual	and	auditory	noise	that	weaves	through	these	films.	It	is	envisaged	that	these	works	will	become	multi-channel	abstract	video	installations	that	rework	each	film	and	amplify	the	thinking	I	believe	them	to	be	doing	but	which	are	obscured	by	the	dominant	narratives	of	(often	male)	embodied	violence.	In	this	way	the	reworked	films	will	draw	out	the	ways	in	which	each	film	I	believe	is	in	dialogue	with	emerging	technological	and	economic	ontologies	and	the	material	as	well	as	ideological	aspects	of	those	ontological	convulsions.			A	third	strain	of	work	is	a	conceptual	unpacking	of	the	installation	for	Cubitt	Gallery,	Designs	Towards…	This	work	continues	the	fascination	with	the	fictive	interior	spaces	of	Performance	(Cammel,	Roeg,	1970)	as	a	laboratory	for	living	and	experimenting	with	affect	and	technologies	of	power.	As	well	as	this	film’s		torsioning	of	time	and	space	as	an	divination	of	the	derivative’s	oncoming	logic.	For	this	work	I	concentrate	on	the	main	salon	of	Turner’s	house	portrayed	by	the	film	as	being	the	interiors	to	25	Powis	Square	but	was	in	fact	filmed	inside	15	Lowndes	Square,	Knightsbridge.	The	cinematic	spaces	have	been	studied,	mapped	and	remade	as	a	CGI	animation	but	also	as	an	architectural	model	that	
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adds	to	a	seemingly	endless	series	of	iterations	of	this	skewed	cinematic	space.	These	elements	will	be	combined	in	a	single	channel	video	work	and	the	model	displayed	alongside	that	video.	The	developing	work	seeks	to	immerse	and	dirty	itself	with	the	spatio-temporal	logic	of	the	derivative	and	also	the	ways	in	which	
Performance	(Cammel,	Roeg,	1970)	speculated	and	played	with	its	emerging	metaphysics.	My	processes	of	immersion	seek	to	find	the	limits	of	this	logic	and	its	mode	of	thinking	and	knowledge.	A	further	more	ambitious	iteration	of	the	work	is	planned	that	develops	the	set	like	elements	featured	in	the	installation	at	Cubitt	Gallery.	A	film-set-like	appropriation	of	the	interior	spaces	will	be	installed	in	a	sealed	gallery	with	the	audience	only	able	to	view	the	installation	by	closed	circuit	television	in	a	neighbouring	space.	The	continual	deferment	of	a	direct	encounter	with	the	space	suggests	both	that	it	exists	as	the	potential	locus	of	power,	the	nature	of	which	might	be	revealed	to	us	were	we	to	directly	encounter	it	but	that	it	also	exists	as	a	black	box	that	signals	the	limits	of	the	mode	of	thinking	being	performed.		Lastly	I	am	currently	in	discussions	with	Katherine	N	Hayles	having	invited	her	to	deliver	a	lecture	for	Kingston	School	of	Arts	Stanley	Picker	Public	Lecture	
Series	at	the	Institute	of	Contemporary	Art	(ICA)	in	the	spring	of	2019.	We	are	discussing	how	her	most	recent	book	Unthought	-The	Power	Of	The	Cognitive	
Unconscious	(Hayles,	2017)	can	become	the	basis	of	a	lecture	and	series	of	ancillary	events	that	considers	how	the	humanities	can	elucidate	complex,	sometimes	opaque	forms	of	cognition	on	which	we	rely	as	a	species	and	what	the	ramifications	of	this	are	for	art’s	objects.	Of	particular	relevance	is	a	chapter	of	Hayle’s	book	that	scrutinises	the	temporal	‘fold’	that	derivatives	practice	and	which	is	then	made	further	complex	by	the	use	of	high	frequency	trading	(HFT)	algorithms	which	in	Hayle’s	words	creates	‘infinite	micro	temporalities’	(Hayles,	2017,	144)	which	are	increasingly	inaccessible	to	human	cognition.	As	part	of	this	inquiry	the	chapter	also	provides	a	short	but	urgent	analyses	of	Elie	Ayache’s	work	on	derivatives	and	the	contingency	of	markets;	Blank	Swan:	The	
End	of	Probability	(2010).	I	examined	some	of	the	claims	of	this	book	earlier	in	this	thesis	and	the	book	has	of	late	become	of	increasing	interest	to	a	number	of	artist	researchers.	The	event	and	materialist	slant	of	Hayle’s	work	will	help	
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polarise	the	significance	of	this	work	on	derivatives	and	probability	for	contemporary	art	without	it	running	the	often	reoccurring	risk	in	contemporary	art	of	fetishizing	the	opaque	complexity	of	derivatives.	The	event	will	instead	frame	the	questions	that	derivatives	pose	for	cultural	production	as	ones	of	cognition	and	more	precisely	distributed	cognition	and	as	ones	that	culture	is	already	thinking.	In	this	sense	Hayles	recent	work	substantiates	my	own	claims	that	certain	cultural	objects	(films	and	novels	for	example)	can	intuit	and	divine	seemingly	opaque	informatic,	economic	and	powerful	forms	of	distributed	thinking	such	as	the	derivative.	I	believe	this	work	with	Hayles	will	help	critical	practices	in	the	contemporary	arts	come	to	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	human-to-machine	and	machine-to-machine	interfaces	and	conceptions	of	what	cultural	production	does	when	it	thinks	these	interfaces.	In	order	to	do	and	think	the	forms	of	cognition	Hayle’s	claims	the	humanities	performs	in	relation	to	complex	technological	systems	I	will	be	discussing	with	Kingston	PhD	candidates	and	invited	contributors	(for	whom	Hayle’s	thinking	has	had	an	impact)	about	how	to	make	works	in	response	to	her	recent	writing.	The	intention	is	that	these	will	be	shown	in	advance	of	the	talk	and	in	a	plenary	session	planned	for	the	same	day.	We	anticipate	that	the	argument	that	Hayle’s	makes	for	the	humanities	intuitive	capacities	can	be	embodied	in	these	responses	and	then	exist	online	at	the	Kingston	School	of	Art,	Contemporary	Art	Research	Centre	website:	The	Centre	for	Useless	Splendour	(https://uselesssplendour.wordpress.com/.	I	also	plan	to	contribute	to	these	responses	both	through	showing	versions	of	the	artworks	I	describe	above	and	also	delivering	a	lecture	framing	the	event,	Hayle’s	talk	and	those	of	other	guest	contributors.		I	believe	I	have	laid	out	for	the	reader	a	sense	of	how	the	artworks	completed	during	the	course	of	this	research	and	the	newly	developing	works	build	on	developments	in	contemporary	art	that	seek	to	engage	with	and	frame	ontological	shifts	in	economics,	culture	and	technology.	However,	I	also	trace-out	how	my	own	artworks	begin	to	critically	address	the	politically	romantic	ground	on	which	other	contemporary	arts	practices	often	rest.	And	in	addition	how	contemporary	art	can	repeatedly	risk	replicating	the	‘subjective	occassionalism’	(Schmitt)	of	the	derivative’s	logic	and	the	conceptions	of	embodiment	and	will	
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that	pursue	contemporary	art’s	objects	and	actions	so	that	they	remain	pursued	by	a	romantic	spirit	and	Schmitt’s	“[…]	colourful	shadow	of	revolution”	(Schmitt,	1991,	160).	This	romantic	spirit	in	contemporary	art	and	in	finance,	constantly	reinstates	an	a-symmetry	in	favour	of	the	human,	obfuscating	the	actual	mechanics	of	power	at	work	in	each	of	these	activities.	The	objects	and	sites	that	I	choose	as	the	materials	for	the	work	instead	act	as	nodes	or	concentrations	of	otherwise	atomised	and	hard	to	visualise	assemblages	of	cognition	and	power.	Within	the	objects	and	sites	I	nominate,	differing	economic	and	cultural	ontologies	collide	and	polarise	one	another.	The	work	seeks	an	oscillating	asymmetry	that	neither	favours	the	machinic,	the	legal	or	the	human	but	shows	these	arrangements	to	be	in	flux	with	the	result	being	that	art’s	objects	act	like	a	strobe,	capturing	and	showing	us	an	intense	moment	in	otherwise	large,	dynamic	and	dispersed	systems	of	cognition	where	human	thought	is	not	sovereign.		Although	some	of	the	methodologies	and	forms	I’m	utilising	bear	a	strong	resemblance	to	previous	arts	practices	(appropriation,	post	structuralist	film/video,	re-enactment,	the	video	essay,	curation	as	arts	practice)	these	approaches	are	combined	and	act	as	mobile	assemblages	that	‘think’	and	foreground	the	modes	of	thinking	they	assemble.	To	put	it	yet	another	way	these	methodologies	intuit	and	think	complex	forms	of	distributed	cognition	and	these	forms	of	intuiting	can	be	thrown	into	relief	through	their	juxtaposition.	This	approach	not	only	frames	and	brings	into	collision	differing	ontologies	of	cultural	production	but	also	seeks	to	overcome	the	sense	of	a	linear,	empty,	homogenous	time	that	the	derivative	regime	instates.	Instead	the	work	does	something	of	Benjamin’s	jetztzeit28	or	reconfiguring	of	revolutionary	time.	It	does	so	by	detaching	certain	images,	artistic	methodologies,	words	and	objects	from	the	dominating	but	also	disorientating	temporality	of	the	derivative	and	seeking	instead	to	genuinely	free	those	things	from	a	bracketed	freedom	and	logic	mistakenly	experienced	as	autonomy,	first	in	financialisation	and	then	in	cultural	production.	Seemingly	feint	informational	noise	in	the	appropriated	materials	is	amplified	by	the	work	so	that	we	might	recognise	and	begin	to	collaborate	with	sub	temporal	energies	that	lie	embedded	in	the	informatic	code,	
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that	we	can	then	use	to	overcome	the	derivative’s	temporality	and	spectral	power.		I	believe	the	event	being	planned	for	and	with	Katherine	N.	Hayles	signals	an	initiative	on	my	part	to	nuance	how	the	contemporary	arts	address	the	derivative	regime	and	financialisation	more	generally.	The	event	being	planned	asks	how	culture	presently	thinks	and	might	think	in	the	future,	increasingly	complex	systems	and	urgently	address	the	forms	of	power	arising	from	those	systems	without	reverting	to	human-machine	binaries.	The	strongly	materialist	approach	that	Hayle’s	brings	to	discussions	regarding	cognition,	derivatives	and	human-to-machine	interfaces	offers	a	specificity	that	is	attractive	to	artists	wanting	to	enter	into	a	dialogue	with	theory	around	these	topics	but	through	the	empiricism	of	their	own	material	practices	and	not	exclusively	through	conventional	academic	approaches.	To	this	end	Hayles	recent	book,	Unthought	–	
The	Power	of	the	Cognitive	Nonconscious	(Hayles,	2017)	provides	in	itself	an	argument	for	what	the	arts	previously	framed	as	intuition	as	in	fact	a	way	of	mapping	complex	forms	of	distributed	cognition.	There	is	a	growing	sense	amongst	communities	of	artist	researchers	that	current	practices	in	both	museums	and	galleries	do	not	fully	comprehend	how	the	effect	of	informatics	accelerated,	been	disseminated	by	the	pervasive	logic	of	derivatives	for	example	and	altered	the	sense	of	art’s	objects	in	subtle	but	powerful	ways.	Instead	there	exists	a	burgeoning	realisation	that	art	and	culture’s	objects	exist	as	concentrated	nodes	of	otherwise	distributed	forms	of	thinking	that	are	not	constituted	entirely	by	humans.	This	challenges	the	spatio-	temporal	conditions	for	making	and	showing	art	and	the	nature	of	the	institutions	formatted	along	the	lines	of	these	spatio-	temporal	arrangements.	The	planned	event	with	Hayles	at	the	ICA,	London	will	in	a	multidisciplinary	and	speculative	and	playful	way	platform	these	challenges	for	contemporary	art.		As	an	important	aside,	I	am	intending	that	the	planned	event	underscores	the	importance	of	feminist	writing	on	technology	for	contemporary	arts	practices	concerned	with	informatics	and	the	forms	of	subtle	but	impactful	power	and	extra	law	it	conducts.	Feminist	theory	(Donna	Haraway,	Katherine	Hayles,	Sadie	Plant,	Esther	Leslie)	and	feminist	writing	on	information	technology’s	material	
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histories	is	able	to	address	the	questions	of	embodiment	and	decisionism	that	have	pursued	the	question	of	how	informatics	does	power	and	how	we	imagine	it	having	power	that	have	pursued	this	research	and	its	ramifications	for	arts	practices.	This	work	runs	through	my	own	and	the	debt	owed	to	these	insights	is	immeasurable	in	terms	of	breaking	the	formal	stranglehold	that	Schmitt	and	Benjamin’s	work	on	decisionism	created	in	my	own	understanding	of	the	spectral	info	power	of	derivatives.		I	believe	that	the	above	outline	of	the	developments	in	my	artworks	and	research	captures	how	the	combined	research	has	travelled	from	a	question	regarding	art	and	urban	planning	to	one	of	informatics	and	how	informatics	has	changed	conceptions	of	space,	time	and	of	course	art’s	contingent	objects	and	practices.		I	believe	that	have	sketched	out	and	captured	how	the	research-as-art		has	engaged	with	the	info-power	of	the	derivative	and	located	the	work	in	relation	to	other	practices	in	the	contemporary	arts	also	concerned	with	financialisation,	the	posthuman,	statecraft	and	informatics.	But	also	how	the	practice	differs	to	these	approaches	and	nuances	contemporary	arts	responses	to	the	challenges	posed	by	the	info-regime	of	the	derivative	and	in	the	course	of	that	journey	recuperating	a	viable	aesthetic	strategy	for	confronting	its	power.		—	I	began	this	thesis	and	its	exploration	of	the	spectral	power	of	the	derivative	by	referencing	the	project	that	I	devised	for	a	post-war	British	new	town,	Harlow	that	used,	as	its	overarching	title,	a	text	I	appropriated	from	the	town’s	1948	prayer	of	dedication:	Let	Us	Pray	for	Those	Now	Residing	in	the	Designated	Area.	The	prayer	alluded	to	the	collapsing	together	of	theology	and	a	technocratic	polity	that	was	characteristic	of	post-war	and	Festival	of	Britain	projects,	of	which	Harlow	was	one	example.	What	was	then	called	the	new	Elizabethan	age	sought	to	combine	the	image	of	Shakespeare’s	scepter’d	Isle	with	a	quasi-mystical	conception	of	technology,	reminiscent	of	Prospero’s	controlling	sorcery	in	Shakespeare’s	The	Tempest.29	Commissioned	to	provide	an	artist’s	reading	of	the	town’s	original	post-war	vision,	create	and	commission	temporary	artworks	and	advise	on	revisions	to	its	master	plan,	I	found	myself	embedded	in	the	governmental	and	private-sector	processes	that	were	attempting	a	
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contemporary	statecraft	in	the	period	up	to	and	including	the	financial	crash	of	2008.	This	experience	threw	into	relief	how	space,	objects	and	living	substances	have	been	changed	by	that	which	has	come	after	capital	–	the	derivative	and	the	amplification	of	its	effects	by	informatics.	Capital’s	transformation	after	1971	into	something	more	fundamentally	experienced	as	ideological,	material	and,	most	importantly,	as	information	continues	to	produce	a	spectral	statecraft	and	polity.	Government	had	become	infrastructure	and	money	an	energy.			What	I	have	called	in	this	text	the	spectral	power	of	the	derivative	was	experienced	as	an	ungraspable,	diffuse,	immense	but	forceful	polity	that	contemporary	art’s	political	romanticism	served	only	to	occlude.	The	period	of	the	town’s	inception	meant	its	original	design	was	intended	for	a	Fordist	conception	of	life	and	work	but	the	town	had	matured	in	the	period	when	the	logic	of	financialisation	and	informatics	had	become,	and	continues	to	be,	a	final	and	sovereign	power.	The	departure	of	capital	from	the	commodity	form	and	its	subsequent	journey	into	the	logic	of	the	derivative	had	altered	conceptions	of	space,	time,	the	future,	ideas	of	embodiment	and	power	for	this	community.	Put	another	way,	whilst:	“Commodities	could	be	thought	as	particular	parts	of	an	abstract	whole;	derivatives	are	further	subdivisions	of	those	parts	which	can	be	further	abstracted	into	many	possible	totalities”	(Wark,	2017).	The	polity	that	now	configured	the	town,	and	Britain	as	a	whole,	was	phantasmatic	but	forceful	and	was	veiled	by	the	rituals	of	democracy	in	which	art	partook	and	had	a	vested	interest	in	perpetuating.			In	real	terms,	for	example,	the	component	qualities	of	land	and	buildings	were	divided	and	apportioned	to	different	partners	with	differing	objectives	and	agendas.	The	pavement	was	owned	and	managed	by	the	town	whilst	the	subsoil	was	owned	and	managed	by	the	County.	In	the	‘80s,	key	assets	of	English	new	towns	were	a	given	over	to	central	government	agencies,	making	many	new	towns	economically	unviable,	having	previously	been	net	contributors	to	the	national	exchequer.	Vacant	buildings	and	shop	fronts	were	owned	by	international	banks	and	businesses	that	traded	these	assets	as	securities	on	markets	far	away.	Meanwhile,	sculptures	were	owned	and	managed	by	a	trust,	
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governed,	in	part,	by	members	that	still	held	dear	the	values	of	the	town’s	original	vision.	Fordist	and	neoliberal	visions	of	state	and	community	tussled	for	supremacy,	each	throwing	the	other	into	relief.			Regardless	of	the	appeals	of	the	town’s	citizens,	the	diffuse	but	forceful	polity	of	the	derivative	continued	to	unbundle	the	component	qualities	of	the	town’s	master	plan,	violently	altering	its	spaces	and	futurity	without	presenting	a	centre	to	its	power	that	could	be	addressed	and	paused.	Buildings	and	spaces	had	been	converted	into	information	that	could	be	traded	as	securities	on	global	markets.	Technocratic	and	financialised	imperatives	acted	as	a	phantasmatic	deluge	of	quotidian	power,	whilst	conventional	processes	of	government	acted	as	minor	ornamentation	to	these	unstinting	processes.	These	dynamics	weren’t	unique	to	this	post-war	urban	experiment	but	were	a	polarisation	and	localisation	of	an	international	phenomenon	of	extra-statecraft	that	the	derivative	and	its	logic	perform.	Along	the	way,	this	logic	has	produced	‘spatial	products’	(Easterling)	and	a	triangulation	of	power	through	encampments	of	extra-law	and	extra-space	that	include	free-trade	zones	and	tax-exempt	developments,	for	example.	Both	the	original	post-war	vision	of	the	town	and	its	contemporary	reinterpretation	were	ideological	and	material,	but	the	materiality	and	power	of	the	present	statecraft	was	harder	to	ascertain,	represent	and	address.	Evidence,	however,	existed	of	attempts	to	encapsulate	and	speculate	with	the	town’s	original	phantasmatic	power	and	authority.	These	attempts	would	provide	clues	for	how	to	engage	with	derivative’s	logic	and	apparitional	power.	I	will	come	to	these	examples	shortly.			The	new	town’s	original	master	plan	was	characterised	by	a	centralised	architecture	of	power	that	could	be	likened	to	the	topology	of	polity	sketched	out	in	Franz	Kafka’s	village	in	his	novel	The	Castle	(1926).	James	R.	Martel,	in	his	book	The	One	and	Only	Law:	Walter	Benjamin	and	the	Second	Commandment	(2014),	beautifully	describes	this	topology	in	which	the	village	that	lives	its	life	at	the	foot	of	a	hill	on	which	a	castle	is	built	exists:	“[…]	on	the	circumference	of	a	phantasm	(the	phantasm	is	the	castle	itself	with	all	its	imagined	lords	and	majesty)”	(Martel,	2014,	19).	The	inhabitants	of	the	castle	are	only	rarely	seen	
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and	yet	the	knowledge	of	their	existence:	“[…]	animates	and	manages	the	life	of	the	villagers”	(Martel,	2014,	19).	Whilst	no	castle	was	built	in	the	new	town	of	Harlow,	green	swards	and	neighbourhoods	radiate	out	from	a	ring-roaded	town	centre,	the	design	of	which	draws	on	Italian	medieval	and	renaissance	hill	towns,	with	the	stipulation	by	its	master	planner	that	building	materials	be	pale	in	colour;	mimicking	the	gleaming	stone	of	Italian	city	states	and	the	Athenian	polis.	The	town	centre	occupies	the	highest	geographical	point	and	includes	the	town’s	administrative	buildings,	central	church	and	master	planner’s	offices.	Both	the	town	centre	and	the	outlying	quasi-pastoral	neighbourhoods	were	originally	scattered	with	Italianate	piazzas	populated	by	sculptures	on	plinths.	Sculptures	by	Moore,	Hepworth	and	Chadwick,	for	example,	acted	as	sovereign	actors	of	a	phantasmatic	power	that	was	situated	in	the	raised,	castellated	core	of	the	town’s	design.	In	these	objects	could	be	felt	the	otherwise	metaphysical	and	disembodied	power	of	the	state.			However	spectral	this	model	of	power	seemed	in	its	time,	visible	and	stable	signs	of	its	operations	could	be	identified	and	addressed.	Architectures	of	power,	like	architectures	of	finance	in	this	period,	were	centralised	and	tangible.	The	phantasmatic	power	of	the	derivative	and	informatics	that	has	superseded	these	aforementioned	topologies	of	power	is,	and	continues	to	be,	ever	more	apparitional.	This	mercurial-like	authority,	rather	than	dissolving	power,	has	animated	and	managed	the	lives	of	its	subjects	with	an	even	greater	effect	and	force	than	the	centralised	state.	Knowledge	of	the	existence	of	the	derivative	is	not	explicit	but	the	force	of	its	logic	is	felt	in	myriad	but	phantasmatic	ways	–	animating	and	managing	the	lives	of	its	citizens.	At	another	level,	this	spectral	power	is	detected	and	transmitted	by	media	(film,	television,	art	and	the	internet).	Individuals	find	themselves	no	longer	live	on	the	circumference	of	spectral	power	but	within	its	flows.			The	sculpture	of	the	new	town,	which	acted	as	the	sovereign	actors	of	a	previously	centralised	power,	provided	markers	of	this	power’s	less	visible	dispositions.	Finding	explicit	markers	of	the	dispositions	of	power	of	the	derivative	and	its	extrastatecraft	require	a	methodology	that	can	capture	its	
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spatial	and	temporal	distortions.	This	methodology	would	have	to	embody	the	processes	by	which	government	has	become	opaque	infrastructure,	whilst	money,	art	and	assets	have	become	information	experienced	as	energy.	Contemporary	art’s	practices,	including	institutional	critique	and	post-conceptual	practices,	for	example,	appear	to	readily	lend	their	energies	to	a	conception	of	democracy	that	is	politically	romantic.	Sites,	politics,	minor	and	obscured	histories	become	merely	opportunities	for	the	subjective	occasionalist	to	indulge	their	romantic	productivity.	The	discrete	objects	of	post-war	art	previously	embodied	a	former	spectral	power	and	gave	it	representation	but	now	stand	like	Niobe’s	weeping	rock	as	a	fossilised,	material	testament	to	a	previous	mythic	law.	Contemporary	art	and	its	energies	appeared,	at	the	time	of	the	project,	to	perpetuate	a	political	romanticism	that	enabled	the	forceful	underlying	deterritorializing	actions	of	the	derivative.	The	noise	of	art’s	proliferating	stories	belied	the	proliferation	of	an	underlying	logic	that	privileged	apparatuses	of	investment	and	divestment	over	art’s	objects.	Nonetheless,	in	amongst	the	speculative	projects	I	commissioned	for	Let	Us	Pray…,	there	existed	evidence	of	untheorised	and	productively	clumsy	ways	and	means	of	detecting	this	apparitional	authority.			Martel	suggests	that	the	‘villagers’	of	Kafka’s	book	The	Castle	live	in	the	spectral	presence	of	a	mythical	law	but	are	also	free	to	play	and	speculate	with	the	law.	The	inhabitants	of	the	village	are	able	even	to	deactivate	the	law	through	their	individually	developed	strategies.	This	capacity	for	speculation	and	play	with	a	mythic	and	phantasmatic	law	came	into	view	when	I	devised	an	event	for	the	town	that	focussed	on	the	part	the	town	had	played	in	the	making	of	cinema.	I	discovered	that	the	town	had	been	scouted	by	film	director	Stanley	Kubrick’s	production	team	for	sites	that	could	act	as	locations	for	the	film	A	Clockwork	
Orange	(1972).	Kubrick	lived	in	nearby	Hertfordshire.	Scenes	were	later	filmed	in	the	town	and	the	location	scout’s	photographs	of	the	town	are	lodged	in	the	Kubrick	archives	at	the	London	College	of	Communication.	As	one	small	aspect	of	the	project	Let	Us	Pray…	I	initiated	an	event	and	screening	of	A	Clockwork	Orange	in	the	town’s	theatre	that	brought	together	residents	wanting	to	reminisce	about	the	filming	that	Kubrick	carried	out	in	Harlow.	It	became	apparent	that	cinema,	
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and	cinema’s	affective	thinking	of	ideology,	was	a	medium	that	provided	the	vicarious	means	by	which	to	speculate	with	the	town’s	invoking	of	mythic	law	that	its	liberalism	obscured.	Most	importantly,	the	film’s	temporal	and	spatial	plasticity	acted	for	the	viewers	as	a	refraction	of	the	grafted	together	ideologies	of	the	town’s	statecraft.	The	film	served	as	an	affective	site	where	those	ideologies	could	become	more	concentrated	and	viscous,	and	felt	intensely	and	to	the	point	of	ambiguity.	Through	this	object	could	be	felt	the	concentrated	network	of	forces	that	made	up	the	‘vision’	of	its	master	plan.			The	filmic	violence	of	A	Clockwork	Orange	intimated	ways	and	means	of	thinking	and	playing	with	the	underlying	violence	of	mythic	law	that	the	town’s	design	invoked	in	its	efforts	to	convey	its	own	statecraft	as	an	historical	continuum.	Remember	that	mythic	law	or	man-made	law,	according	to	Benjamin,	attempts	to	possess	the	force	and	authority	of	God’s	law	but	is	always	in	danger	of	literalising	the	violence	of	founding	law,	in	order	constantly	to	reaffirm	its	vulnerable	and	shaky	claims	on	truth	and	authority.	The	film	affectively	explores	liberalism’s	contradictions	and	holds	a	particular	redolence	for	those	that	remember	aspects	of	the	film	being	shot	in	the	town.	The	film	provided	both	a	means	of	giving	the	violence	of	mythic	law	representation	and	of	speculating	with	its	affective	qualities.	I	later	commissioned	the	artist	Wayne	Lloyd	to	perform	in	the	town	centre	church	an	oral	retelling	of	the	films	A	Clockwork	
Orange,	Mon	Oncle	(Jacques	Tati,	1958)	and	The	Fountainhead	(King	Vidor,	1959)	that	explore	the	speculative	way	in	which	these	films	are	received	and	deployed	to	think	architecture,	power	and	mythical	violence	and	law.			Featuring	other	new-town	interiors	and	exteriors,	new	university	and	social	housing	architecture	from	across	southern	England,	A	Clockwork	Orange	shows	cinema	thinking	how	architecture	thinks	power,	community	and	law,	for	example.	It	is	able	to	represent	a	post-war	statecraft	that	collages	together	architectural	and	artistic	signs	and	signifiers	in	order	to	create	a	town	with	all	the	legitimacy	of	previous	more	organically	formed	communities.	The	film	and	its	divinations,	however,	travel	in	two	directions	at	once.	In	the	first	instance,	it	affectively	maps	a	post-war	Britain,	as	Benjamin’s	Angel	of	History.	An	angel	
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with	its	face	turned	towards	the	past	being	propelled	into	the	future,	wings	kept	spread	open	by	a	violent	wind,	watching	a	receding	past,	face	aghast	as	the	debris	of	that	past	grows	skyward.	This	post-war	Britain	was	invested	in	a	futurity	but	guarded	against	the	storm	of	progress	by	making	claims	of	continuity	with	a	previous	Elizabethan	age	and	images	of	a	Shakespearean	Britain.	In	the	second	instance,	the	film	detects	(like	other	examples	of	cinema	from	the	same	period)	and	transmits,	through	its	graphic	violence,	an	emerging	economy	of	affective	media	and	information.	Violence	most	immediately	conveys	that	affect.	The	film	appears	to	show	in	its	ultra-violence	how	the	mythic	law	of	the	state	can	become	mirrored	by	the	individual,	but	also	how	that	mirroring	must	be	apprehended	by	the	state	because	of	the	threat	this	exposure	of	its	own	monopoly	on	violence	poses	to	its	authority.	This	narrative,	however,	because	it	is	done	through	the	technological	platform	of	film,	also	detects	the	ways	in	which	the	mythic	law	of	the	state	is	being	devolved	down	into	informatics.	This	cinema	appears	to	talk	of	the	advent	of	a	reign	of	affect	in	an	age	of	intensified	and	growingly	computational	informatics.			The	town’s	original	master	plan	was	stunted	by	its	inability	to	see	the	oncoming	importance	of	information	networks	and	personal	mobility	that	later	iterations	of	the	British	new	town	would	anticipate.	This	included	the	design	of	the	new	town	Milton	Keynes	(1967),	for	example	that	thinks	of	“community	without	propinquity”	(Melvin	N.	Webber)	or,	put	another	way,	community	without	the	need	for	close	physical	proximity.30	Technology	would	dampen	down	this	prerequisite	for	community	and	partially	convert	bodies	into	a	warranty	for	informatic	prosthesis.	These	iterations	of	urban	planning	and	statecraft	that	came	after	Harlow	(1947)	awarded	information-technology	a	power	that,	combined	with	financialisation,	would	become	both	quotidian	and	absolute.	Whilst	these	ideas	looked	to	the	future,	what	became	lodged	in	them	were	older	technologies	of	power.			The	circumstances	of	the	project	Let	Us	Pray…	provided	a	highly	polarised	microcosm	of	the	changed	nature	of	power,	space,	time	and	materiality	in	the	reign	of	the	derivative	and	informatics.	The	town’s	dilemmas	and	liquified	
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architectures	spoke	of	wider	implications	for	art	and	its	capacity	or	incapacity	to	address	this	new	reality	and	world	born	out	of	financialised	informatics.	Simultaneously,	this	polarised	living	laboratory	of	power	and	statecraft	demonstrated	how	older	forms	of	power	and	theologically	framed	concepts	of	the	political	persist	and	become	embedded	within	informatics.	Put	another	way,	the	objects	of	a	pre-digital	statecraft	thought	of	its	buildings	and	art	as	prostheses	of	a	sovereign	power.	To	paraphrase	medievalist	Ruth	Evans,	and	frame	this	analogy	through	a	theological	conception	of	a	technological	prosthesis,	these	sovereign	actors	functioned	like	the	body	of	Christ,	going	out	in	the	world	to	do	the	work	of	an	otherwise	spectral	God	or	power:	“[…]	using	not	the	products	of	scientific	discovery,	but	Christ”	(Evans,	2010).			The	bumping	together	and	sometimes	melding	of	theological	conceptions	of	the	political	and	of	informatics	suggests	that	the	spaces	of	statecraft	old	and	new	have,	in	some	respect,	always	been	informatic,	without	having	to	be	electrical.	Or,	rather,	information-rich	environments	where,	as	urbanist	Keller	Easterling	points	out,	seemingly	static	objects	become	active	forms	that	possess	an	immanent	disposition.	To	clarify	this	point:	the	presence	of	particular	typologies	of	building,	electrical	grid	or	even	artworks,	for	example,	produces	effects,	spaces	and	things	by	their	presence	alone.	Like	a	ball	at	the	top	of	a	ramp	whose	potential	agency	causes	effects	elsewhere	in	anticipation	of	it	moving,	these	objects	can	produce	both	real	effects	and	a	build	up	of	information	in	expectation	of	its	effects.	Looked	at	conversely,	these	objects	or	active	forms	act	as	nodes	or	markers	of	networks	of	dispositions	and	power	that	remain	hidden	in	plain	sight.	Certain	examples	of	these	objects	(or	even	towns,	in	the	case	of	Harlow),	because	of	their	embeddedness	within	networks	of	disposition,	reveal	more	distributed	forms	of	cognition	that	threaten	notions	of	embodiment,	will	and	consciousness.	It	is	these	objects	that	risk	a	‘split’	(Hayles)	or	edit	that	recomposes	the	relation	between	the	liberal	human	subject	and	these	distributed	cognitive	assemblages,	which	offer	art	practices	a	way	forward.	This	way	forward	potentially	dynamites	the	often-concretised	political	romanticism	of	critical	contemporary	art	practices	that	look	to	locate	and	formulate	idealised	centres	of	power	to	attack.	These	politically	romantic	tendencies,	more	often	than	not,	assume	the	habit	of	
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installing	human	stories	with	the	intention	of	countering	the	alienation	of	contemporary	capital.	However,	they	do	so	without	considering	more	technically	formed	subjectivities	as	phenomena	that	existed	before	capital,	and	which	may	be	less	saturated	by	capital	than	we	might	always	assume.	Having	said	this,	the	methodology	that	I	outline	in	this	thesis	gives	a	role	to	the	artist	that	could	be	considered	romantic,	by	asking	that	they	stand,	like	Caspar	David	Friedrich’s	
Wanderer	(1818),	in	the	flows	of	affective	power	and	informatics,	and	that	they	actively	enjoy	the	ideological	effects	of	those	flows	and	are	dirtied	by	these	currents	of	power.	This	immersion,	however,	differs	from	a	romantic	productivity	in	that	it	potentially	induces	a	‘split’	that,	instead	of	privileging	the	primacy	of	human	functionality	and	of	the	artist’s	subjectivity,	it	sees:	“[…]	human	functionality	expan[d]	because	the	parameters	of	the	cognitive	system	it	inhabits	expand”	(Hayles,	1999,	291).	Only	this	type	of	immersion	will	acquire	the	traction	needed	on	an	otherwise	mercury	like	technological	power	whose	informatics	we	are	implicated	in.			I	remind	the	reader	that	informatics,	according	to	Haraway,	assumes	a	flattening	of	human	and	non-human	distinctions,	and	is	taken	“[…]	to	mean	the	technologies	of	information	as	well	as	the	biological,	social	linguistic	and	cultural	changes	that	initiate,	accompany	and	complicate	their	development”	(Hayles,	1999,	29).	This	‘split’,	therefore,	doesn’t	intend	an	apocalyptic	Nick	Landian	annihilation	of	the	human,	but	a	flattened	ontology	of	cognitive	systems,	of	which	the	human	is	just	one	of	those	systems.	Instead,	and	under	these	circumstances,	art’s	formerly	discrete	objects	become	akin	to	a	slice	of	action	perceived	in	the	flash	of	a	strobe	light	that	allows	us	to	sense	a	network	of	expanded	cognitive	relationships	and	our	place	within	those	networks.	Or,	can	be	likened	to	a	geological	core	sample	that	allows	us	to	see	the	thermodynamics	of	an	immense,	slow	moving	network.	These	objects	are	no	longer	discrete	but	nodal.			Cinema	and	its	clumsy	but	generative	thinking	of	ideology	has,	therefore,	provided	for	this	thesis	a	means	of	standing	in	these	flows	of	affect	and	of	obliquely	reassessing	the	terms	associated	with	my	practice	and	the	practices	of	contemporary	art	to	which	this	PhD	is	most	directed.	These	terms	include	the	
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categories	of	post-conceptual	practices,	institutional	critique	and	the	phenomenon	of	the	artist	as	curator,	who	thinks	of	the	exhibition	as	a	critical	medium.	Cinema	has	also	provided	the	source	material	for	ongoing	and	future	artwork	that	oscillates	between	moving	image,	made	objects	and	text	as	it	attempts	to	locate	and	give	a	grain	and	weight	to	sites	of	power	that	have	proved	elusive	to	those	practices.			Whilst	I	don’t	make	or	aspire	to	make	cinema	of	the	kind	that	I	cite	in	this	thesis,	these	examples	of	cinema	and	moving-image	making	provide	meta-sites	in	which	the	viscous	ideology,	economics	and	technologies	of	a	place	and	time	can	be	felt	and	speculated	with.	These	meta-sites	are	simultaneously	informational,	ideological	and	material,	existing	as	a	thin	but	intense	space	in	which	to	speculate	and	draw	out	chaotic	matter	and	emergent	structures	of	information	that	threaten	to	annul	the	deafening	‘stories’	(Easterling)	of	human	will	and	consciousness,	likely	to	be	valorised	by	the	derivative’s	logic.	It	is	to	these	thin,	interstitial	but	intense	and	viscous	sites	that	these	practices	need	to	turn,	in	order	to	address	the	currents	of	power	that	have	evaded	them	and	in	which	probability	has	played	its	role.			In	the	early	parts	of	the	text,	I	attempt	to	locate	and	give	form	to	the	sovereign	power	of	derivatives,	initially	using	the	film	Performance	(1970)	to	affectively	map	the	emergence	of	that	power	and	its	amplification	by	informatics.	I	sketch	out	how	the	derivative’s	capacity	to	bundle	and	unbundle	the	attributes	of	a	commodity	has	produced	a	crisis	of	embodiment	and	afforded	power	to	information.	The	evolution	of	an	economy	of	affective	media	and	information	is	expanded	on	in	the	following	section,	No	Finance	Without	Romance,	that	frames	derivatives	and	finance	as	what	Schmitt	calls	political	romanticism.	Carl	Schmitt’s	critique	of	liberalism	frames	the	reign	of	affect	as	the	re-emergence	of	a	romantic	spirit	and	paradigm	where	economics,	the	law	and	government	takes	on	the	spirit	of	a	revolution	and	where	every	event	and	object	becomes	the	opportunity	for	individuals	to	indulge	their	‘subjective	occasionalism’.	An	exposition	of	political	romanticism	introduces	the	role	that	probability	serves	in	deepening	a	romantic	productivity,	whilst	installing	an	underlying	control.	I	
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 176	
employ	Schmitt’s	concept	of	sovereignty	in	order	to	better	understand	the	sovereign	power	and	state	of	exception	that	this	data	tsunami	and	probability	has	instated.	I	follow	the	exploration	of	Schmitt’s	political	romanticism	with	his	concept	of	sovereign	or	final	power,	and	the	image	of	Thomas	Hobbes’	Leviathan,	from	which	the	concept	arose.	This	exposition	of	a	theological	framing	of	conceptions	of	power	ballasts	the	claim,	later	in	the	text,	that	the	derivative,	as	an	entity	that	mines	out	information,	conveys	a	sovereign	power	–	due,	in	part,	to	the	immensity	of	it	as	a	trading	activity	that	is	beyond	cognition	and,	like	the	Leviathan,	remains	spectral	but	terrifying	in	its	immensity.	I	then	consider	how	this	new	iteration	of	capital	supersedes	the	commodity	form,	and	the	theory	of	the	commodity	form	that	Walter	Benjamin	generates	out	of	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereignty.	In	the	last	part	of	the	chapter,	I	claim	that	this	caused	a	crisis	of	embodiment	for	art	looking	for	a	critical	purchase	on	capital	that	has	now	left	the	commodity	form	behind.	This	is	followed	by	an	introduction	to	information	theory	and	its	reliance	on	probability.	I	describe	the	sense	of	agency	that	is	afforded	patterned	information,	in	contrast	to	the	chaotic	parts	of	signal,	in	order	to	frame	the	way	in	which	information	is	imagined	as	a	spectral	and	mythic	power.			In	order	to	think	the	ideological	effects	that	this	conception	of	information	has	produced	and	which	have	augmented	the	power	of	the	derivative,	I	then	dedicate	a	chapter	to	how	film	operates	for	the	thesis,	entitled	How	Cinema	Thinks	the	
Derivative.	I	explore	the	ways	in	which	films	of	the	same	economic-cusp	period	as	Performance	(1970)	detect	the	logic	of	the	derivative,	but	also	how	subsequent	films	continue	to	map	its	effects	and	think	the	ideology	and	materialism	of	the	derivative.	In	addition,	the	films	of	Michael	Fassbinder,	for	example,	aid	an	exposition	of	how	cinema	thinks	political	romanticism	and	of	the	liberal	human	subject	as	ideological	excess	and	as	the	ground	of	a	romantic	productivity.	I	suggest,	instead,	that	cinema’s	bodies	are	being	used	to	think	the	sovereign	power	of	the	derivative	and	its	reliance	on	a	patterned	information	that	is	always	in	flux.	I	liken	these	bodies	to	the	baroque	emphasis	on	the	frame,	and	further	explore	Performance’s	bodies	and	method	through	this	metaphor.	The	question	begins	to	arise	in	the	text	of	what	these	bodies	are,	if	they	are	not	
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presence,	but	instead	exist	as	a	force.	This	leads	to	the	question	of,	what	is	the	materialism	that	arises	out	of	the	forceful	ideology	of	the	derivative?	François	Truffaut’s	1973	film	about	film	Day	for	Night	provides	an	exposition	of	ideology’s	materialism	that	is	then	followed	by	the	section	on	the	bodies	of	Stanley	Kubrick’s	films,	in	particular,	that	of	Barry	Lyndon	(1975).	I	describe	these	bodies	as	points	of	convergence	in	a	schema	of	debt,	underscoring	how	they	act	as	a	refraction	of	an	ideological	apparatus	of	debt	and	contracts	in	the	18th	century	that	forecasts	the	age	of	the	derivative.	This	ability	of	cinema	to	think	the	economic	ontology	of	the	times	of	its	production	through	a	pastiche	of	history	is	then	explored	in	the	last	section	of	the	chapter,	Cinema	as	the	Marshalling	of	the	
Sedimented	Forces	of	the	Cosmos.	This	section	begins	to	bring	notions	of	violence	to	bare	on	an	understanding	of	the	derivative.	Through	another	of	Nic	Roeg’s	films	Eureka	(1983),	I	alight	on	an	example	of	cinema	that	affectively	maps	and	allegorises	the	derivative’s	violent	rending	open	of	centralised	architectures	of	value,	in	turn	mobilising	assets,	subjectivities,	space	and	time.	This	conversion	of	the	attributes	of	commodities	and	assets	into	forceful	information	is	expressed	as	violence	in	cinema	and	lays	the	ground	for	thinking	in	the	subsequent	chapter	about	how	the	derivative	collapses	together	ideas	of	law	with	finance	to	produce	a	mythical	power.			In	chapter	three,	entitled	Cinema	Thinks	Violence	as	Form	and	Force,	I	return	to	Schmitt’s	theory	of	sovereign	power.	I	consider	how	a	dematerialised	notion	of	information	performs	Schmitt’s	‘state	of	exception’	by	appearing	to	scythe	through	material	impediments.	Bernardo	Bertolucci’s	1970	film	The	Conformist	is	deployed	as	an	example	of	cinema	that	speculates	with	this	imagining	of	informatics,	but	then	points	to	the	vulnerability	of	its	forceful	cinematic	bodies	and	their	claims	on	authority.	The	last	section	of	this	chapter	uses	the	theological	framework	of	Benjamin’s	concept	of	mythical	violence	and	law	to	consider	why	cinematic	violence	becomes	a	means	of	expressing	the	derivative’s	hubristic	and	law-like	claims	of	legitimacy	and	authority.	I	proffer	that,	because	the	derivative	is	a	contract,	it	perpetually	risks	collapsing	together	qualities	of	the	law	with	finance.	In	turn,	this	gives	the	derivative	a	forceful	quality,	even	whilst	it	remains	a	mutable	contract	that	is	constantly	negotiated	and	renegotiated.	This,	I	suggest,	
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gives	the	derivative	an	authority	that	it	needs	to	keep	reaffirming	in	order	to	constantly	re-establish	its	shaky	claims	on	the	truth.	In	the	following	chapter,	I	argue	that	probability	and	its	function	for	derivatives	and	information	engineering	serves	to	reinforce	this	authority,	but	that	contemporary	examples	of	bodies	in	video	threaten	to	intensify	and	short	circuit	this	authority.			The	fourth	and	final	chapter,	Accelerating	To	A	Standstill	–	Probability’s	Reign,	considers	how	the	logic	of	the	derivative	and,	in	particular,	its	use	of	probability	is	displaced	into	the	fields	of	video	and	contemporary	art.	I	claim,	with	reference	to	Steven	Shaviro’s	work,	that	this	has	led	to	bracketed	and	modulated	forms	of	cultural	production	that	we	feel	as	intense,	accelerated	and	delimited	but,	in	fact,	perform	an	underlying	control.	This	underlying	control	is	challenged	and	given	representation	through	the	intensification	of	its	processes	in	Steven	Shaviro’s	example	of	Grace	Jones	and	Nick	Hooker’s	music	video	for	the	song	Corporate	
Cannibal	(2008).	This	example	of	intensification	is	marked	by	a	desire	to	travel	in	the	same	direction	of	the	dehumanising	aspects	of	the	derivative.	Whilst	Jones’s	body	becomes,	for	video,	a	visible	node	of	the	otherwise	ungraspable	forces	of	financialisation,	I	suggest,	in	the	following	section,	that	contemporary	art’s	objects	have	assumed	the	dynamics	of	the	derivative	and	act	as	what	urbanist	Keller	Easterling	calls	the	markers	of	the	underlying	polity	and	extra	law	of	infrastructure	space.	In	these	objects	or	markers	of	disposition	it	is	possible	to	witness	an	otherwise	phantasmatic	power.	I	argue	that	examples	of	sections	of	the	contemporary	art	landscape	have	assumed	a	romantic	productivity,	akin	to	the	inflation	of	the	derivative’s	market,	in	a	process	that	ensures	that	its	objects	become	secondary	to	an	otherwise	more	forceful	but	underlying	polity	and	infrastructure	of	art.			I	step	back,	in	the	section	entitled	A	Contract	With	All	The	Weight	Of	The	Law,	to	consider	in	more	technical	detail	the	defining	characteristics	of	derivatives	and	the	function	of	probability	in	pricing	and	ensuring	profit,	regardless	of	the	market’s	material	volatility.	Financial	technologist	Elie	Ayache’s	work	on	probability	and	derivatives	serves	as	a	useful	guide,	at	this	juncture,	to	ask	how	probability	has	obscured	the	chaotic	and	contingent	materiality	of	the	markets.	
Roman Vasseur, I am the Sun… 	 179	
This	conception	of	a	chaotic	materiality	leads	into	the	last	section	where	I	revisit	Claude	Shannon’s	theory	of	information	in	order	to	think	of	the	random	parts	of	a	signal	that	the	deployment	of	probability	in	information	management	suppresses.	I	speculate	on	whether	some	examples	of	cinema	detect	and	think	of	these	unpatterned	parts	of	both	its	visual	signal	and	information,	more	broadly.	I	end	by	claiming	that	it	is	in	these	chaotic	materials	that	a	productive	‘split’	can	be	detected,	which	annuls	the	ideology	and	mythic	law	of	the	informatic	derivative.	This	‘split’,	I	suggest,	throws	into	relief	a	flattened	ontology	of	distributed	cognition	of	which	the	human	is	just	one	of	many	systems	of	cognition.			This	thesis	goes	to	some	lengths	to	understand	how	probability	has	afforded	the	derivative	and	conceptions	of	information	the	properties	of	an	absolute	sovereign	power	with	all	the	qualities	of	mythic	law.	I	also	explore	how,	at	the	same	time	as	exacting	this	absolute	power,	probability	has	paradoxically	induced	a	sense	of	intense	freedom	and	romantic	productivity	that	we	feel	as	autonomy.	I	have	appropriated	particular	examples	of	cinema	and	employed	them	as	forms	of	divination	to	locate	instances	where	this	ideological	power	clashes	most	visibly	and	productively	with	the	chaotic	and	actual	properties	of	information.	It	is	in	these	conflicted	and	unstable	bodies	of	information,	these	Horos	(Small,	1995)	or	boundary	markers	between	information	and	hubris,	these	shuddering	and	trembling	figures	of	horror	(or	in	Latin	horrere),	in	which	the	‘split’	that	we	depend	upon	for	our	freedoms	can	be	detected.	It	is	in	the	moment	of	this	‘split’	and	in	the	penumbra	of	its	eclipsing	of	the	hubris	of	probability	that	we	see	emergent	structures	of	information	that	annul	the	mythic	law	of	probability	and	its	quotidian	but	absolute	power.	Here	is	a	power	that	we	cannot	look	upon	directly	but	that	we	can	locate	and	short	circuit	through	its	refracted	bodies.										
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Notes																																																											1	Katherine	Hayles	uses	Haraway’s	term	informatic	and	is	taken	“[…]	to	mean	the	technologies	of	information	as	well	as	the	biological,	social	linguistic	and	cultural		2	François	VI,	Duc	de	La	Rochefoucauld,	Prince	de	Marcillac	(1613	-	1680)	was	a	noted	French	author	of	maxims	and	memoirs.	Much	cited	by	critics	in	the	nineteenth-century	for	sayings	as	well	as	style.	Born	in	Paris	and	a	figure	in	the	French	Royal	Courts	when	Royalty	and	aristocracy	warred	for	influence	against	the	backdrop	of	a	feudal	system.			3	The	term	Fiat	Money	comes	from	the	Latin	term	fiat	meaning	‘let	it	become’,	‘it	will	become’,	used	in	the	sense	of	an	order	or	decree.			4	Hayles	uses	Haraway’s	term	and	is	taken	“[…]	to	mean	the	technologies	of	information	as	well	as	the	biological,	social	linguistic	and	cultural	changes	that	initiate,	accompany	and	complicate	their	development”	(Hayles,	1999,	29).	Donna	Haraway,	A	Manifesto	for	Cyborgs:	Science,	Technology	and	Socialist	Feminism	in	the	1980s,”	Socialist	Review	80	(1985):	65-108.		5	The	original	basis	for	the	film	at	the	time	when	Marlon	Brando	was	to	play	the	criminal	Chas	was	Nabokov’s	book	Despair(1934).	In	the	novel,	the	death	of	a	detective	is	described	as	murder/suicide.	He	meets	his	double	and	solves	the	pattern	of	the	crime	at	the	moment	the	geometry	of	its	plot	is	made	clear	to	him	and	in	the	knowledge	that	his	murder	forms	the	final	part	of	the	equation.	This	later	informed	the	making	of	The	
Conformist	by	Bertolucci.	But	perhaps	the	most	important	story	for	Performance	is	
Death	and	the	Compass	(1942)	by	Borges,	which	is	never	directly	mentioned.	Here,	the	police	inspector	tries	to	decipher	an	oracular	series	of	homicides	whose	locations	describe	a	geometric	puzzle,	the	final	piece	completed	only	when	the	inspector	himself	enters	the	murderer’s	carefully	assembled	lair.	Here,	the	allegorical	image’s	finitude	is	possible	once	the	mechanism	of	its	production	becomes	apparent	to	it.	The	difference	between	the	tragic	hero	and	tragedy	is	made	apparent,	in	that	the	truly	tragic	sacrifices	its	own	ground,	its	own	faith	to	become	heroic	(Fragile	Geometry:	The	Films,	Philosophy,	
and	Misadventures	of	Nicolas	Roeg,	Lanza,	1989,	96).		6	Brian	Massumi	translated	Deleuze	&	Guattari’s	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(Deleuze	et	al.,	2011)	and	provides,	in	the	introduction,	a	definition	of	Deleuze	&	Guattari’s	use	of	the	term	‘affect’.			7	This	subtitle	is	a	play	on	the	title	of	Mark	Fisher’s	essay	No	Romance	Without	Finance,	which,	in	turn,	cited	lyrics	from	the	1986	dance	anthem	by	Gwen	Guthrie	No	Man’s	Fit	
For	Finance.		8	Hans	Kelsen	(1881	–	1973)	was	an	Austrian	jurist,	legal	philosopher	and	political	philosopher.	Due	to	the	rise	of	national-socialism	in	Germany	and	Austria,	Kelsen	left	his	university	post	because	of	his	Jewish	ancestry,	and	departed	to	Geneva	in	1933,	and	then	to	the	United	States	in	1940.	In	1934,	Roscoe	Pound	lauded	Kelsen	as	being	“undoubtedly	the	leading	jurist	of	the	time.”	While	in	Vienna,	Kelsen	was	a	young	colleague	of	Sigmund	Freud	and	wrote	on	the	subject	of	social	psychology	and	sociology.		9	Slavoj	 Žižek’s	 commentary	 on	 Schmitt	 takes	 up	 a	 “position	 (individuals	 assume)	towards	 the	 Event	 of	 Universal	 truth”	 (Žižek	 in	 Mouffe,	 1999,	 36).	 For	 Žižek,	 the	
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																																																																																																																																																														appearance	 of	 politics	 in	 a	 post-political	 age	 is	 the	moment	 “[w]hen	members	 of	 the	Demos,	 those	 with	 no	 firmly	 determined	 place	 in	 the	 hierarchical	 social	 edifice,	demanded	 a	 voice,	 to	 be	 heard	 and	 included	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 –	 they	 represented	themselves	 as	 the	 representatives,	 they	 stand	 in	 for	 the	whole	 of	 society	 for	 the	 true	universality”	 (1999,	 27).	 This	 appeal	 to	 the	 universal	 is	 both	 the	 opportunity	 and	dilemma	of	Schmitt’s	work	that	Žižek	identifies	but,	at	the	same	time,	fails	to	address	its	temporality	and	composition	 in	such	a	way	 that	 the	concept	 falls	back	 into	 the	 trap	of	‘subjective	occasionalism’	or	the	exalted	moment	of	emotions	perceived	as	actions.		Žižek	suggests	that	what	separates	Schmitt	from	Nazism	is	the	desire	to	place	the	institution	before	the	leader	and	the	people.	But,	at	the	same	time,	his	conception	of	sovereignty	is	stuck	within	a	legal	normative	formalism	that	returns	that	institution	to	a	somatic	form,	acting	out	an	idealized	sense	of	action	loaded	with	symbolism.	Instead,	Žižek	argues	that	the	decision	of	the	sovereign	is	better	described	as	an	operation	akin	to	Lacan’s	objet	petit	‘a’.	Žižek	explains	this	objet	petit	‘a’	in	relation	to	Alfred	Hitchcock's	McGuffin,	or	the	object	that	drives	a	film’s	narrative:	the	suitcase	on	a	train;	the	key	to	a	safety	deposit	box;	"[The]	McGuffin	is	objet	petit	‘a’	pure	and	simple:	the	lack,	the	remainder	of	the	Real	that	sets	in	motion	the	symbolic	movement	of	interpretation,	a	hole	at	the	centre	of	the	symbolic	order,	the	mere	appearance	of	some	secret	to	be	explained,	interpreted"	(	Žižek,	1996,	36).		10	Jacob	Taube’s	book	To	Carl	Schmitt:	Letters	and	Reflections	(Taubes,	2013)	is	an	account	of	Taube’s	correspondence	and	meetings	with	Schmitt	in	the	years	up	to	his	death	in	1985	and	the	controversy	following	on	from	Taube’s	contact	with	the	legal	theorist,	called	the	Nazis’	arch	jurist.			11	The	citation	by	Bredekamp	for	this	letter	is:	Benjamin,	letter	to	Schmitt,	9	Dec.	1930,	GesammelteSchriften,	1:3:887,	and	Benjamin,	letter	to	Schmitt,	9	Dec.	1930,	GesammelteBriefe,	ed.	Christoph	Gödde	and	Henri	Lonitz,	4	vols.	(Frankfurt	am	Main,	1997),	3:558;	trans.	Samuel	Weber,	in	Weber,	‘Taking	Exception	to	Decision:	Walter	Benjamin	and	Carl	Schmitt,’	Diacritics	22	(Fall-Winter	1992):	5	(Bredekamp,	1999,	250).		12	The	quote	from	Benjamin’s	Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History,	which	this	sentence	paraphrases,	is:	“A	historian	who	takes	this	as	his	point	of	departure	stops	telling	the	sequence	of	events	like	the	beads	of	a	rosary.	Instead,	he	grasps	the	constellation,	which	his	own	era	has	formed	with	a	definite	earlier	one.	Thus	he	establishes	a	conception	of	the	present	as	the	‘time	of	the	now’,	which	is	shot	through	with	chips	of	Messianic	time.”	For	Benjamin,	messianic	time	represents	a	reconfiguration	of	the	present	that	does	not	conform	to	a	teleological	and	causal	schema	of	history	and	which,	he	argues,	is	the	futurity	of	a	ruling	class	that	flattens	the	present	out	into	a	form	of	homogenous,	empty	time	or	never	ending	present	that	annuls	all	struggles,	past	and	present.	Every	moment	for	Benjamin	is	a	“straight	gate	through	which	the	Messiah	might	enter”	and	only	the	figure	of	the	messiah	can	complete	history	(Benjamin,	1999,	255,).	The	messiah	appears	in	Benjamin’s	schema	as	figure	of	salvation	or	contract	between	the	past	and	present	but	also	as	form	of	time	in	itself.	The	past	is	what	mediates	the	messianic	promise	itself,	offering	an	exit	from	that	form	of	time,	which,	for	Benjamin,	is	employed	by	both	Fascism	and	Social	Democracy,	but	could	be	countered	by	a	temporality	marked	by	festivals	and	memorials	as	opposed	to	machine	time	that	converts	units	of	time	into	equivalent	units	of	value.	Benjamin	is	employing	the	Judaic	notion	of	the	messiah	who	has	not	yet	arrived	with	us,	in	order	to	think	of	both	a	continuity	of	struggle	that	is	intergenerational,	and	is	derived	from	revolutionizing	the	past	not	the	future.	In	this	way,	the	past	offers	redemption	and	change	doesn’t	need	to	be	read	or	experienced	as	teleological	progress	(Benjamin,	1999,,263,	264).		
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																																																																																																																																																																13	Classicism	was	the	then	dominant	academic	school	of	thought	in	German	universities.		14	In	addition,	Benjamin	understood	that	allegory’s	capacity	to	produce	statements	that	act	as	propaganda	would	make	it	available	to	fascists	as	well	utopianists.		15	Named	after	the	place	in	Switzerland	where	a	group	of	economists	met	in	1947,	including	Milton	Friedman,	Karl	Popper	and,	principally,	Theodore	Hayek,	the	group	advocated	free	markets	and	freedom	of	expression	and	were	classed	classical	liberals	but	have	been	credited	by	David	Harvey	as	the	architects	of	neoliberalism.		16	Direct	Cinema	is	a	documentary	genre	that	originated	between	1958	and	1962		in	North	America,	principally	in	the	Canadian	province	of	Quebec	and	the	United	States,	and	developed	by	Jean	Rouch	in	France.	Similar	in	many	respects	to	the	cinéma	vérité	genre,	it	was	characterized	initially	by	filmmakers'	desire	to	directly	capture	reality	and	represent	it	truthfully,	and	to	question	the	relationship	of	reality	with	cinema.		17	The	term	‘supply	side	economics’	first	came	into	common	usage	during	the	Nixon	period	and	was	associated	with	the	journalist	Jude	Wanniski	and	the	economist	Art	Laffer,	who	was	responsible	for	the	eponymously	named	Laffer	Curve:	a	diagram	that	illustrates	an	argument	for	low	taxation,	which,	in	theory,	would	provide	potential	investors	with	capital	to	invest,	which,	along	with	less	government	regulation,	would	stimulate	economic	growth.	According	to	these	and	earlier	developments	in	economic	theory,	including	Say’s	Law	in	economics,	rather	than	demand	creating	supply,	supply	would	create	demand.	This	is	different	from	Classic	Liberalism’s	demand	for	the	banning	of	tax	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	immoral	and	possibly	illegal	and	that	each	man	should	be	the	person	to	decide	what	to	do	with	his	own	money.	Instead,	supply	side	economics	sees	it	as	the	collective	duty	of	citizens	to	pay	less	tax	as	they,	and	not	government,	will	decide	the	social	good	and	express	it	through	their	expenditure.			18	A	French	term	derived	from	heraldry,	and	literally	means	‘placed	into	abyss’.	The	term	has	developed	a	number	of	particular	senses	in	modern	criticism	since	it	was	picked	up	from	heraldry	by	the	French	author	André	Gide.	Mise-en-abîme	occurs	within	a	text	when	there	is	a	reduplication	of	images	or	concepts	referring	to	the	textual	whole.	Mise-
en-abîme	is	a	play	of	signifiers	within	a	text,	of	sub-texts	mirroring	each	other.	This	mirroring	can	get	to	the	point	where	meaning	may	be	rendered	unstable	and,	in	this	respect,	may	be	seen	as	part	of	the	process	of	deconstruction.		19	The	principal	thesis	of	Althusser's	last	philosophical	writings	is	that	there	exists	an	‘underground’	or	little	recognized	tradition	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	Variously	labelled	a	‘materialism	of	the	encounter’	or	‘aleatory	materialism,’	the	method	which	he	uses	to	articulate	this	philosophy	is	to	simply	comment	upon	works	by	philosophers	who	exemplify	this	current	and	to	point	out	where,	how,	and	to	what	extent	they	do	so.	In	addition	to	Marx,	the	philosophers	that	he	cites	as	being	part	of	this	underground	tradition	include	Democritus,	Epicurus,	Lucretius,	Machiavelli,	Spinoza,	Hobbes,	Rousseau,	Montesquieu,	Heidegger,	and	Wittgenstein.	From	these	readings	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	Althusser	aims	to	suggest	that	this	tradition	exists	and	that	it	is	both	philosophically	fecund	and	viable.	He	also	wishes	to	return	to	and	bolster	the	thesis	he	first	ventured	in	the	late	1960s	that	there	are	really	only	two	positions	in	philosophy:	materialism	and	idealism.	This	work	has	been	picked	up	on	by	Speculative	Materialists	and	is	cited	most	notably	in	The	Speculative	Turn:	Continental	Materialism	and	Realism	(ed.	Levi	Bryant,	Nick	Srnicek	and	Graham	Harman).	Quentin	Meillassoux’s	work	Beyond	
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Finitude	also	features	heavily	in	the	same	volume	of	essays	and	there	appear	to	be	parallels	being	drawn	between	the	two	men’s	work.			20	The	war	(1756–63)	of	Britain	and	Prussia,	which	emerged	in	the	ascendant,	against	France	and	Austria,	resulting	from	commercial	and	colonial	rivalry	between	Britain	and	France	and	from	the	conflict	in	Germany	between	Prussia	and	Austria.			21	The	South	Sea	Bubble	was	the	name	given	to	the	events	that	followed	the	formation	of	a	British	joint-stock	company,	the	South	Sea	Company,	founded	in	1711	that	was	created	as	a	public-private	partnership	to	consolidate	and	reduce	the	cost	of	national	debt.	The	company	was	also	granted	a	monopoly	to	trade	with	South	America,	hence	its	name.	Created	to	entice	investors	into	the	potentially	lucrative	markets	of	South	America,	should	those	regions	have	been	released	from	Spanish	rule	after	the	War	of	Spanish	Succession,	the	company	never	made	a	profit	or	traded	a	great	deal	but	attracted	huge	amounts	of	investment,	which	then	caused	the	company	to	collapse	in	1720	producing	enormous	losses	and	affecting	the	national	economy.	Schemes	for	extracting	sunshine	from	vegetables	was	one	of	the	many	ventures	advertised	by	the	company	to	attract	investors.			22	I	am	referring	here	to	the	experiment	of	Chile	and	the	introduction	of	Chicago	School	Economics	to	Chile	by	students	of	the	economist	Milton	Friedman	following	the	ousting	of	President	Salvador	Allende	by	an	American	backed	Military	coup.			23	As	a	partial	aside,	Shaviro	talks	of	Afrofuturism’s	interpretation	of	the	legacy	of	slavery,	experienced	by	Africans	as	a	form	of	‘alien	abduction’	which	results	in	afrofuturists	equating	the	human	per	se	with	white	supremacy	and	with	normative	subjective	positions.	Therefore,	humanity	is	not	something	to	be	attained	but	overcome.	Therefore,	a	claim	is	made	from	the	future	(the	voice	being	that	of	Afrofuturism)	that	expresses	an	extreme	indifference	to	blackness,	understood	in	humanistic	terms.			24	In	Pornotopia,	Beatriz	Preciado	examines	popular	culture	and	pornographic	spaces	as	sites	of	architectural	production.	Her	study	of	Hugh	Heffner’s	development	of	his	own	living	spaces	as	the	template	for	the	Playboy	club	are,	for	Preciado,	biopolitical	techniques	for	governing	sexual	reproduction	and	the	production	of	gender	in	modernity.	The	Playboy	club	is,	for	Preciado,	strategically	situated	in	relation	to	the	American	City	as	an	"interior	exteriority",	behaving	as	an	archipelago	for	white	male	heterosexual	sovereignty,	escaping	the	biopolitical	disciplinary	norm	that	equated	heterosexuality	with	family	and	reproduction.		25	The	Xenofeminist	Manifesto	written	by	the	Laboria	Cuboniks	collective	is	an	attempt	to	articulate	a	feminism	fit	that	embraces	alienation	as	an	emancipatory	force	that	sidesteps	notions	of	biology	in	order	to	see	technology	as	liberatory	once	again.	The	manifesto	was	published	in	June	2015	and	the	members	of	the	collective	are	international.				26	The	Grenfell	Tower	fire	happened	on	the	14	June	2017	at	a	residential,	council	owned	tower	block	in	West	London	causing	72	deaths	and	was	the	result	of	the	mis-managed	regeneration	of	estates	in	Britain	that	stemmed	from	long	running	government	policy	that	had	abandoned	a	vision	of	social	housing	for	the	ideology	of	the	free	market	and	private	provision	of	public	contracts.	The	event	and	burnt	out	building	stood	as	a	material	and	highly	visual	manifestation	of	a	complex	class	politics	that	was	otherwise	obscured	by	narratives	of	the	free	market	and	individualism.			
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																																																																																																																																																															27	Both	Conrad	and	Rhodes’	films	use	a	method	of	‘scoring’	the	edit	like	musical	notation	to	produce	an	effect	on	the	overall	form	of	the	film.					28	Walter	Benjamin	uses	this	term	in	his	‘Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History’	to	describe	a	notion	of	time	that	is	ripe	with	revolutionary	possibility,	time	that	has	been	detached	from	the	continuum	of	history.	It	is	time	at	a	standstill,	poised,	filled	with	energy,	and	ready	to	take	what	Benjamin	called	the	‘tiger's	leap’	into	the	future.	It	isn't	naturally	occurring,	however,	and	takes	the	intervention	of	the	artist	or	revolutionary	to	produce	it	by	‘blasting’	it	free	from	the	ceaseless	flow	in	which	it	would	otherwise	be	trapped.	Benjamin	contrasts	jetztzeit	with	the	‘homogeneous	empty	time’	of	the	ruling	class,	which	is	history	written	from	the	perspective	of	the	victors	(as	Benedict	Anderson	shows	in	his	account	of	nation	as	imagined	community	(A	Dictionary	of	Critical	Theory,	Buchanan,	2010,262)		29	Clement	Atlee,	Leader	of	the	Labour	Party	in	1953	“Let	us	Hope	that	we	are	witnessing	the	beginning	of	a	new	Elizabethan	Age	no	less	renowned	than	the	first.”		Prospero	learns	a	sorcery	that	allows	him	to	remotely	control	spirits,	the	weather	and	even	raise	the	dead.	Ariel,	a	spirit	whom	he	frees,	acts	as	his	remote	eyes	and	ears.	The	play	suggests	an	Elizabethan	concern	with	disembodied	and	embodied	forms	of	technology	and	information	technology	that	is	mirrored	for	example	in	portraits	of	Queen	Elizabeth	I	that	show	her	garments	covered	either	in	jewel	like	eyes	or	a	mixture	of	eyes	and	ears	that	suggest	an	all	seeing	and	hearing	monarch	but	also	indicate	the	development	of	an	intelligence	and	secret	service	network	under	Elizabeth	I.	See	Isaac	Oliver’s	1600-1602	Rainbow	portrait	of	Elizabeth	I	on	display	at	Hatfield	House,	Hertfordshire,	United	Kingdom.			30	Urban	designer	and	theorist	Melvin	M.	Webber	was	considered	by	the	Chief	Architect	of	Milton	Keynes	Derek	Walker	as	the	‘father	of	the	city’.		
